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1. INTRODUCTION 
Safety is the overriding concern in any industry. With regard to the transportation 
industry, commercial aviation has a particularly good record of safety. Nagel (1988) notes 
that worldwide there are about two accidents for every one million departures. Inextricably 
linked with the concern for safety is the notion of human performance, in this case crew 
performance. Crew performance is usually gauged by studying and classifying errors in 
operation. Various sources indicate that over 60% of all aircraft accidents are caused due to 
'pilot error'. In a recent airline safety review conducted by Flight International, Learmount 
(1994) reports that 27 out of a total of 46 worldwide accidents in the year 1993 were 
attributed to 'aircrew error'. An analysis of these so called 'pilot error' or 'aircrew error' 
accidents suggests the central theme in each of these cases seems to be an error resulting 
from a failure in interpersonal communications and crew coordination (Helznreich & 
Foushee, 1993). 
1.1 Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
Failures of interpersonal communication and coordination are viewed to occur as a 
result of poor management of flightdeck 'resources'. These resources include not just the 
aircraft hardware and software but also the human elements or liveware. Crew Resource 
Management (CRM), earlier known as Cockpit Resource Management, is a concept that 
evolved within the aviation community to specifically address this issue of resource 
management. 
In the past when addressing 'pilot error' issues, research in the aviation community 
tended to focus on the individual pilot. Soon there was a realization that these problems 
could not be addressed at the individual level; CRM necessitated a paradigm shift, a change 
in focus from individual issues to crew level issues. Only by understanding crew behavior 
can one hope to be able to reduce the occurrence of breakdowns in performance. Thus, 2 
fundamental to the concept of CRM is the concept of understanding crew performance, 
which is the primary focus of this thesis. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Ongoing research in the field of CRM has led to the development of a few models 
of CRM and group performance. Although these theories and models provide valuable 
insight into the issues involved, they fail to present a much needed, coherent theory of crew 
performance. 
Presently, a primary goal of the aviation industry is the development of objective 
measures of crew coordination so as to enable the establishment of CRM standards for 
evaluation purposes. Since crew coordination is an aspect of crew performance, I believe 
that objective performance measures of crew coordination can be arrived at through the 
development of a coherent theory of crew performance. 
Further, I believe that it is possible to arrive at such a theory through the application 
of the principles of systems engineering. Systems engineering allows for a rigorous, 
analytical treatment of systems. By treating the crew as a system, a systems analysis 
would result in a better understanding of the concepts underlying crew performance. 
Conducting the analysis with an emphasis on crew coordination may lead to a better 
understanding of CRM, thereby enabling the development of objective measures of 
performance. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The focus of this research is CRM or crew coordination. The goal of this research 
is to provide a better understanding of crew coordination, through a better understanding of 
crew performance. 
In order to provide a better understanding of crew coordination, issues and 
concepts underlying crew performance need to be understood. A goal of this research is 
thus to acquire and present an in-depth knowledge of the domain of crew performance. 
I believe that a systematic analysis of the concepts of crew performance, through 
the application of systems theory, can lead to a better understanding of crew performance. 
A goal of this research thus is to acquire an adequate understanding of the concepts of 
systems engineering. 3 
There are different methods of application of systems concepts to any particular 
domain. This means that for the application of systems theory to crew performance, a 
suitable methodology needs to be studied before it can be applied. A goal of this research 
thus is to gain a firm grasp of a suitable methodology which will then provide the 
framework for the analysis of the crew system. 
A systems analysis involves the development of a model. A model of crew 
performance should establish a framework leading to a better understanding of crew 
performance. Since the overall objective is to gain a better understanding of crew 
coordination, the model should be developed with an emphasis on crew coordination. A 
goal of this research is thus to provide a framework which would be useful in the 
development of a coherent theory of crew performance. Such a framework could then 
allow for the determination of objective measures of performance. 
1.4 Overview of Thesis 
An understanding of crew performance or CRM necessitates an understanding of 
crew behavior. To merely say that this is not an easy task would be understating the issue. 
Coupled with the complexity of understanding the behavior of individuals, crew 
performance deals with complex interactions among individuals, making the understanding 
of crew performance even more difficult. 
Despite a decade of research, CRM remains a complex and fuzzy concept. An 
objective of this research is to 'de-fuzz' the issue of CRM. This is done by providing a 
better understanding of crew performance through the application of the concepts of 
systems engineering. A model of crew performance is the result of this application.  An 
overview of the thesis and organization of the material is presented below. 
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the airline industry and its concern for safety. 
As was noted above, the notion of safety is linked with human performance and the study 
of error. An introduction to error and an overview of the methods of studying error in 
aviation is also presented. The chapter concludes with an introduction to the concept of 
CRM. 
Chapter 3 deals with the specific issues of CRM; its history and development. An 
overview of current research and training in CRM is presented. 
Chapter 4 deals with the theory of crew performance. It presents a detailed 
presentation of key concepts underlying crew performance. Different perspectives on these 4 
concepts are reviewed and synthesized so as to provide a framework for developing a 
model of crew performance. 
Chapter 5 deals with the concepts of systems engineering and their application to 
the domain of crew performance. The specific systems methodology adopted to analyze 
crew performance is explained. Finally, the application of this methodology to crew 
performance along with a detailed explanation of the resulting model is also presented. 
The utility of the model is derived from the fact that it provides a better 
understanding of crew performance. The model being a way to understand crew 
performance is applied to aircraft accidents so as to demonstrate its utility in providing a 
framework for understanding actual crew performance. All this is dealt with in Chapter 6. 
Various aspects of the research are discussed in Chapter 7. Specifically, these 
include a discussion of: (a) the general approach adopted, (b) modeling methodology, (c) 
the crew performance model, (d) model application, and (e) model utility and validity. 
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions of this research along with recommendations for 
further research. 5 
2. BACKGROUND
 
2.1 Aviation Safety 
The focus of this thesis is on the performance of airline pilots. Linked with the 
concept of performance is the notion of safety, central to which is the concept of error. 
This chapter provides an overview of airline safety, followed by a discussion of the 
concept of human error and its ties with safety and pilot performance. 
The airline industry has a remarkable safety record. Each year some 900 million 
passengers fly all over the world. Of these, approximately 800 persons are killed each year 
(Young, 1987). Despite the billions of passenger miles flown each year, commercial travel 
continues to be among the safest forms of transportation. Sears (1986) as cited by Nagel 
(1988) reports that on an average there are "...about 20 major accidents worldwide per 
year, of which about five occur to U.S. air carriers" (p. 263). Compare this with some 
figures on road travel. The Oregon Department of Transportation recorded 471 fatalities 
due to road accidents in the year 1992 alone (Transportation Safety Section, 1993). In the 
United States, the figure was an astonishing 39,235 as against 10,536 total aviation 
fatalities over the entire past decade (Learmount, 1994). If fatalities are an indication of 
transportation safety, there is no question that the airline industry is, relatively speaking, 
safe. Today the focus has shifted from absolute measures to continuous improvement 
measures. How safe is safe? Or rather, is it as safe as it can be? 
In the words of William Reynard, then Director of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration's (NASA) Aviation Safety Reporting System, "when we start talking 
about safety in terms of accidents or number of people killed, what we are really saying is, 
how many people can we afford to kill and still call the system safe?" (Young, 1987). 
System safety, in particular, airline safety thus continues to be a cause for concern. 
Although it is true that the fatality rate has been dropping over the years, since 1975 the 
overall rate of decline has leveled off and there is concern about this rate actually 
increasing, given the intermittent slumps in passenger traffic due to changing economic 
forces. 6 
2.2 Economy and Future Implications 
The 1970s was a period of stagnation for the domestic industry, with a small 
increase in passenger revenue relative to the economy. At the time, government 
deregulation, as Greens let (1993) writes, "...offered the best prospect for ending this 
stagnation and reviving the airline business as a growth industry" (p. 72). Today the 
domestic airline industry is once again in the throes of a major recession and chances ofa 
recovery, according to Greens let, seem slim. Fortunately, prospects for the airline industry 
on a worldwide basis are not as bleak. Changes in political situations and opening of 
markets around the world as in the former USSR, China, and India, prove to be promising 
for the world economy. Shifrin (1994) reports that "...for the first time since 1988, traffic 
in 1993 grew faster than capacity, with international scheduled traffic up 7.7% in 1993 and 
capacity up 5.2%" (p. 28). Further, Shifrin projects an 8% rise in traffic and 5% increase 
in capacity for the year 1994, based on which it is predicted that "world airlines are 
expected to return to profitability in their international scheduled service in 1994..." (p. 
28). Proctor (1994) cites a recent study that predicts airline capacity to "...grow at a 
healthy average of 5.2% through the year 2013" (p. 32). Proctor further cites the study to 
predict that "...world passenger traffic will almost triple over the next 20 years." More and 
more people are going to be choosing air travel over other means as a safe, economic and 
efficient means of commuting. Even if the current rate of decline in fatalities were to level 
off, it would mean that there would be more fatalities (in terms of absolute numbers) than 
in previous years; an undesirable situation. So what can be done to make the system more 
safe and reliable? Perhaps a brief look at the history of the evolution of this complex 
human-machine system may provide some insight. 
Flying used to be about heroes in 'white scarves and goggles' operating fabric-
covered machines held together with baling wire by the 'seat of their pants' (Foushee & 
Helmreich, 1988). One look at a modern jetliner makes it obvious that a lot has changed 
since then. The past couple of decades has seen a tremendous advancement in technology. 
The introduction of microprocessor chips and the advent of computers have resulted in a 
significant increase in automation on the flight deck. Consequently, the role of the pilot has 
changed drastically. The machine is now capable of doing a lot of routine tasks that 
constantly engaged the pilot, such as making corrective control inputs to maintain stable 
flight. If it has reduced some of the pilot's apparent workload, it has added a lot to his/her 
'invisible workload'. The pilot now has to perform newer tasks and assume newer 
responsibilities. Thanks to superb engineering and technology, the machine has become a 
lot more than a piece of 'fabric-covered machinery% indeed it now exemplifies the cutting 7 
edge of sophisticated technology. But what about the pilot? How much has he/she 
changed? Is the human pilot just as reliable as the machine? Studies of aircraft accidents 
indicate that although the machine has become more reliable, the human has not. 
According to Foushee and Helmreich, if the decreased percentage of accidents due to 
hardware problems is "...a testament to this increased reliability, the percentage of 
accidents due to human error has not exhibited the same downward trend" (p. 192). They 
further write, "Although estimates vary, even conservative figures attribute about 65% of 
all accidents worldwide to the human error [italics added] category" (p. 192). In fact, in a 
report on an analysis of worldwide commercial jet accidents from 1959 to 1993, the Boeing 
Commercial Airplane Group (1994) determined the flightcrew to be the primary factor in 
64.6% of all accidents. The same report found the airplane to be the primary factor 
responsible in only 15.7% of the accidents. Pilot error or flightcrew error being a primary 
factor in more than half of all accidents has significant implications for anyone interested in 
airline safety. Before moving on to understanding these implications, it becomes necessary 
to take a closer look at what is meant by pilot error or human error. These questions are 
addressed as follows. 
2.3 Human Error 
According to Senders and Moray (1991), "... for most people error means that 
something has been done which was: not intended by the actor; not desired by a set of rules 
or an external observer; or that led the task or system outside its acceptable limits" (p. 25). 
While this may serve the purpose of providing a general meaning of the term, it is rather 
inadequate, particularly when error leads to accidents resulting in loss of human life. If all 
human-machine systems are designed by people, isn't it ultimately the human who is 
responsible for any system failure? Can the pilot alone be held responsible for a mishap 
caused by a failure of some mechanical component or automation? Are such mishaps truly 
'human error' or merely acts of God? Can anything be done about them or are they 
random events? These are the types of questions stemming from the concept of error 
which forms the backbone of the issue of system safety. Although the emphasis of this 
research is not the study of error, some of the issues surrounding the concept of error and 
the difficulties involved in dealing with errors is critical to this discussion. Without going 
into the details of error theory, some of the approaches adopted by researchers to study this 
concept will be presented. 8 
Error is a complex issue. Yet, surprisingly, there have been few efforts to 
systematically study the concept of error (Senders & Moray, 1991). According to Senders 
and Moray, those who have studied the impact of error on complex human-machine 
systems generally believe that between 30% and 80% of serious accidents are due, in some 
way, to human error. The problem of human error in aviation is difficult, both to 
understand and to resolve. Understanding human error boils down to understanding 
human behavior, which is no simple matter. According to Nagel (1988), part of the 
reason why the problem of human error in aviation is so difficult, "... is that the human is 
so complex that the understanding of behavior is not nearly as advanced as that of physical 
phenomena" (p. 266). If human error is such an important issue, why is there so little 
research done on it? One reason for this, according to Senders and Moray is that error is 
frequently considered only as a result or a measure of some other variable, and not as a 
phenomenon itself.  Concentrated efforts to systematically study error as a phenomenon in 
its own right have only recently begun as is evident from the first error conference, 
"...called The Clambake Conference on the Nature and Source of Human Error..." 
(Senders & Moray, 1991, p. xi), which was held in 1980 in Columbia Falls, Maine. 
2.4 Human Error and Accidents 
Human error, according to Sanders and McCormick (1993) can be essentially 
described as "...an inappropriate or undesirable human decision or behavior that reduces, 
or has the potential for reducing effectiveness, safety, or system performance" (p. 656). 
Further, the authors note that what is appropriate behavior and what is not, is usually 
determined by someone conducting a careful evaluation of the behavior after the error has 
occurred. They write, "In essence, what is considered to be a human error is somewhat 
arbitrary because the determination of what is appropriate may not have been established 
until the error was identified" (p. 656). 
An accident is defined by Meister (1987) as an unanticipated event which damages 
either the system or the individual so as to affect the accomplishment of the system mission 
or the individual's task. In discussing accidents and human error, Sanders and McCormick 
note that human error is often used to describe operator error or error on the part of the 
affected or injured individual. This, as they believe, is a very narrow view of human error, 
and its determination to be the cause of the accident results from "stopping" at the operator 
and not further backtracking to determine the underlying causes. "How far back to go" 
then becomes the question and it is an open one. As Sanders and McCormick write, "One 9 
could stop at the operator's actions and call the event a human error, or one could 
investigate what caused the human to act as he or she did" (p. 656). This, they believe 
would lead to the cause being traced to "...other factors such as faulty equipment, poor 
management practices, inaccurate or incomplete procedures" (p. 656). Even these can be 
traced to factors such as poor design, inadequate maintenance, and inspection procedures, 
all of which are traceable to designers, maintenance personnel, and inspectors, who are 
also humans. Thus, philosophically speaking, one could conclude, as Petersen (1984) did, 
that human error is the basic cause behind all accidents. If human error is the basic cause 
behind all accidents, it is probably meaningless to ask what proportion of accidents were 
caused due to it. As Sanders and McCormick suggest, "a more meaningful question would 
be how much does human error contribute to accidents relative to other contributing 
factors?" (p. 663). 
No accident can be attributed solely to a single cause. In any accident investigation, 
a little backtracking makes it evident that there were other factors involved that led to the 
accident; a 'causal link'. When a certain percentage of accidents are stated to have been 
caused due to 'human error', what is really being said, as suggested by Sanders and 
McCormick above, is the fact that human error contributed significantly to the accident 
relative to the other contributing factors. Human error is never the only factor involved in 
an accident. A causal link of factors implies that, had this chain of factors or causal events 
been broken at any point, the accident or mishap may not have occurred. In a modem 
aircraft, ultimate responsibility for the safety of the aircraft and its passengers rests with the 
pilot. To the extent that the pilot is seen as having been incapable of 'breaking' the causal 
link of events that leads to an accident, one can easily cite 'pilot error' as the cause of the 
accident. Traditionally this has been the approach taken by those responsible for 
investigating the cause of aircraft accidents. Part of the reason for such an approach can be 
attributed to society, which is punitive and blame oriented. Shealy (1979) as cited in 
Sanders and McCormick suggests that it is just human nature to blame the active operator 
when something goes wrong since our legal system is geared toward the determination of 
responsibility, fault, and blame. 
2.5 Directions in Error Research 
Humans are imperfect; 'to err is human'. As long as humans are involved in a 
system, they will make mistakes and errors will occur. Despite this, it would be foolish to 
adopt a fatalistic attitude and do absolutely nothing about errors. The question is, what can 10 
be done about them? The earlier discussion on the difficulties of determining 'human error' 
as the cause of accidents was not meant to obviate responsibility on the part of the human 
designer or operator, but simply meant to illustrate some of the problems encountered in 
dealing with the concept of error. As stated earlier, error is indeed a complex issue because 
its study is essentially a study of human behavior. Nonetheless, systematic studies of the 
phenomenon of error are being undertaken by a variety of professionals from many 
disciplines, including system designers, human factors engineers, and psychologists. 
Engineers and psychologists alike are drawing more upon the methods and principles of the 
behavioral and social sciences. These are increasingly being used in conjunction with those 
of science, and engineering, in an attempt to optimize human performance and reduce 
human error. Some of the results are not entirely disappointing. For example, it is now 
known that not all types of errors occur completely at random. Instead, they are associated 
with certain patterns of behavior, and a certain probability of occurrence can be associated 
with the exhibition of such patterns. 
The formal study of error in aviation has a long tradition, but these efforts tended to 
focus primarily on traditional human factors issues such as the design of human-machine 
interfaces. (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993) As mentioned earlier, flying is no longer what it 
once was. Advances in engineering and technology such as turbojet engines, and 
composite materials have altered the structural design of the aircraft to make it a much more 
sturdy and reliable machine. Accidents resulting from problems in engines and airframes 
have diminished greatly. Microprocessor chips and computers have increasingly led to the 
automation of many of the tasks that the pilot once performed. These changes have 
resulted in a change in the role of the pilot from 'controller' to 'manager' (Billings, 1991). 
In many cases automation has taken over some of the pilot's routine tasks but has added 
different kinds of tasks to his workload such as the monitoring of the automation itself. 
Newer tasks lead to newer errors. Newer errors imply that newer ways to either prevent 
these errors or deter their leading to disasters need to be discovered. The aviation industry, 
particularly in the United States, is a classic example where government, industry and 
academia have all risen to this challenge. How this has been undertaken is discussed in the 
following sections. 
2.6 Approaches to Studying Error in Aviation 
Nagel (1988) writes that there are generally four approaches available to studying 
errors, learning about their causes, and exploring methods "of reducing or eliminating the 11 
incidence or severity of human error in a complex, operational system like the air 
transportation system" (p. 267). These are (a) direct observation, (b) accident and post-
accident analysis, (c) self-report, and (d) laboratory and simulator studies. Each of these 
methods have been adopted to varying levels of usefulness. 
2.6.1 Direct Observation 
In direct observation, the observer watches the crew perform their duties on the 
flight deck, making a note of his/her observations. An obvious drawback of this method is 
that the presence of the observer might alter the behavior being observed. Further, the 
observer is not in a position to manipulate the environment and is thus not in control of all 
the variables that might be of interest. Despite its drawbacks, this method has been applied 
successfully by many researchers. 
2.6.2 Accident and Post-Accident Analysis 
The second approach to studying error, namely, accident and post-accident analysis 
can, as Nagel (1988) notes, provide useful data, although the information record is often 
incomplete. As he states, "...accidents are often catastrophic; typically, little information is 
available from which to piece together a complete or comprehensive picture of causality" 
(p.266) Another drawback of this method, as Sanders & McCormick (1993) note is that 
"In some cases, after-the-fact explanations are created by the involved people to rationalize 
their behavior, or they will create information because it seems as though it must have been 
that way to make sense out of the situation" (p. 669). Of course, there must also be a 
systematic way of conducting the investigation after the accident, as well as a method to 
maintain the voluminous amounts of data that can be generated over the years. This 
formidable task has been entrusted to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), 
which according to Kayten (1993) is "the watchdog agency of transportation safety in the 
United States, responsible for determining the cause of all U.S. civil aviation accidents, as 
well as carefully selected accidents in other modes" (p. 283). 
The NTSB was created by the Department of Transportation (DOT) Act of 1966, 
and was later made completely independent of the DOT or any other federal agency by the 
Independent Safety Board Act of 1974. Immediately following an accident, the NTSB 
sends a team of investigators to collect data from the site of the accident. Typically, such 12 
data is recovered from instruments such as the digital flight data recorder (DFDR), the 
cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and other flight data recording devices such as Airborne 
Integrated Data Systems (AIDS) installed in some modern aircraft (Kayten, 1993).  The 
NTSB completes its investigation, and after following a documented procedure of hearings 
and reports, publishes an accident report and makes recommendations to the appropriate 
agencies of the DOT. In the case of aviation-related accidents, this agency of the DOT is 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The FAA first came into being as the 
Aeronautics branch of the Department of Commerce, created by the Air Commerce Act of 
1926, and has since assumed different names. The FAA, as it is now known, was created 
in 1966 by the same DOT act which was responsible for the creation of the NTSB 
(Birnbach & Longridge, 1993; Kayten, 1993). The FAA, upon receiving the 
recommendations from the NTSB is then required to respond to them, although as Kayten 
writes, "The NTSB has no authority to force any other agency, institution, or entity to 
implement a recommendation" (p. 285). 
2.6.3 Self-Report 
The self-report method is also aimed at obtaining useful data from the operational 
setting. However, it relies on obtaining such data, not from errors that have already led to 
catastrophic accidents, but from incident reports or self-reports of errors that could have led 
to an accident. In this method, operators of the system are encouraged to submit a self-
report on any incident that might have occurred during the execution of their duties, which 
could have led to serious consequences. However, such feedback from operators in a real-
world setting fraught with insecurities such as litigation and 'action' from management can 
only be expected in a relatively fear-free environment; an environment which does not seek 
to take punitive action against the reporter. Once again, the aviation industry in the US has 
risen to this challenge and there now exists such a system of reporting called the Aviation 
Safety Reporting System (ASRS). 
ASRS was formed and developed by NASA for the FAA in 1976. It serves as the 
nerve center for the self-reporting approach to studying error in aviation operations. The 
system is designed to maintain confidentiality and provide relative immunity from 
prosecution to the reporter in cases other than those involving criminal actions (Nagel, 
1988). Confidentiality is maintained by de-identification of reports. De-identification 
means the removal of all personal and organizational names, dates, times, and all other 
related information that could be used to trace the identity of the reporter. Operators of the 13 
system, including pilots, and air traffic controllers, voluntarily report incidents that, in their 
opinion, were potentially dangerous and could have led to a disaster. ASRS then keeps a 
confidential record of these incidents by de-identifying the report and maintains a database 
of all such reports. These reports are classified and made accessible for further research. 
An important feature of this system is that it allows for 'callback'. This means that 
although reporters are guaranteed confidentiality, it is possible for investigators to contact 
them, prior to de-identification. As Nagel writes, this is important because it allows 
learning about why errors are made, as well as learning about the circumstances that led to 
their occurrence. However, there are a few drawbacks with such a voluntary system of 
reporting. Firstly, as Nagel notes, by the very nature of their being voluntary reports, they 
are not made on a purely random basis and "...these sampling characteristics make 
quantitative analysis of the incident record difficult" (p. 270). What Nagel refers to here, is 
the fact that certain individuals under certain operational conditions may be more likely to 
submit reports and may thus be doing so on a more regular or frequent basis versus others 
who may not be choosing to do so. Thus, as Nagel points out, "we may learn a great deal 
about what errors are occurring but not necessarily be able to determine much about how 
often errors occur" (p. 270). More importantly, the incident report is in the form of a 
narrative submitted by the operator and is likely to be biased. The reporter will report what 
he or she perceived the situation to be like, and this may or may not be an objective 
representation of reality. Despite these drawbacks, the ASRS system has proven to be 
useful in understanding the problems encountered by the operators of the aviation industry. 
Several investigative studies have been conducted on the basis of ASRS reports and they 
continue to be one of the major resources for researchers in their understanding of the 
'hows' and 'whys' of error. 
2.6.4 Laboratory and Simulator Studies 
The fourth approach to studying error involves laboratory experiments and 
simulators. In a laboratory study, the researcher can be in control of a lot of the variables 
he/she is interested in studying. As Nagel (1988) writes, the primary advantage of this 
method is that "Behavior can be stripped to its most elemental aspects and the root causes 
of errors dissected to yield predictive models of causality" (p. 270). The catch, however, 
is that for the results to be ecologically valid, the situation presented in the laboratory must 
simulate real-life as closely as possible. The problem here is that real-life situations are 
very complex, often leading to complicated chains of behavior and thus are difficult to 14 
duplicate in a laboratory setting. Thanks to modern technology though, there is a solution 
to this problem. Today's flight simulators make it possible to simulate almost all the 
operational complexity of actual flight, thus providing a controlled environment to better 
understand and study the cause of error. As would be expected, this technique has proven 
dramatically useful in error analysis and has been exploited by both researchers and the 
airline industry. 
2.7 Fruits of Error Research 
In the past, whenever 'pilot-error' was cited as a cause or contributing factor in an 
accident, research efforts focused on traditional human-machine interface issues. In 
essence though, the focus of the study was the individual pilot. Lately, due to the use of 
approaches discussed in the previous sections, the focus has changed. The usefulness of 
this shift in guiding future research is detailed below. 
In the mid-seventies, there was a lot of research underway at NASA devoted to 
studying the phenomenon of 'pilot-error'. Researchers like Charles Billings and George 
Cooper at NASA-Ames Research Center's Man-Vehicle Systems Research Division, along 
with NTSB's John Lauber, developed a structured interview program "...to address some 
of the more perplexing problems which were the underlying factors causing so-called pilot-
error [italics added] accidents" (p. 6). In 1976, the NTSB conducted a special study on 
flightcrew coordination procedures in air carrier instrument landing system (ILS) approach 
accidents. According to Kayten (1993), "...the special study found that flightcrew 
coordination procedures were either lacking or not followed in most of the accidents..." (p. 
294). Thereafter, the NTSB made several recommendations regarding flightcrew 
coordination procedures (NTSB, 1976). Meanwhile, researchers analyzed NTSB accident 
data for jet transports (Cooper, White, & Lauber, 1980) while Murphy (1980) analyzed 
ASRS incident data at the same time. Both these studies provided invaluable insights into 
human error related accidents and incidents. Helmreich & Foushee (1993) summarize the 
results of these studies by noting that these investigations concluded that pilot-error in 
"...documented accidents and incidents was more likely to reflect failures in team 
communication and coordination than deficiencies in 'stick-and-rudder' proficiency" (p. 7). 
While researchers at NASA and NTSB were analyzing accident and incident data, the 
operational community was also playing an active role. Around 1974, one of the first 
airlines to recognize the importance of the crew concept was Pan Am which began to 
conduct both simulator training and checking in the context of a full crew conducting 15 
coordinated activities. All this signified a change in focus from the individual to the crew 
as being central to the process of understanding the determinants of safety in flight 
operations. 
2.8 Cockpit Resource Management 
In 1976, Patrick Ruffell Smith, a physician and pilot with a background of human 
factors in aviation conducted a full-mission simulation experiment, one of the first of its 
kind, at NASA Ames Research Center (Ruffell Smith, 1979). The goal of the experiment 
was to study the interaction of pilot workload with errors, vigilance and decisions, under 
highly realistic conditions. Although the study itself was one of errors, and their relation to 
workload, it proved to be a landmark in the history of aviation research, in the sense that it 
helped focus on crew level issues and developing notions about the role of management 
skills in cockpit operations (Lauber, 1993). For example, one of the errors studied is 
referred to by Ruffell Smith as 'errors of crew integration', which "...included episodes 
where P1 [Captain], failing to realize that P2 [First officer] or P3 [Second officer] was 
overloaded, asked them to retrieve information, further disrupting their performance" (p. 
15). The study also noted "...large variations in respect to leadership, resource 
management and decision making..." (p. 28) with regard to the behavior of the captains. 
Among other resource management variations, the author noted problems in task 
assignments and task prioritization. 
In summary, there was a lot of variability noted in the performance of the crews, 
and as Lauber (1986) writes, "it seemed to us that much of this performance variation could 
be attributed to the variable effectiveness of the pilots and flight engineers in utilizing 
available resources" (p. 7). Thus was born the concept of Cockpit Resource Management. 
At the time of the Ruffell Smith study, airlines like Pan Am and Northwest were 
already beginning to focus on crew-level issues. Northwest, for example, already had a 
program called Coordinated Crew Training (CCT), which also made use of simulator 
studies. However, a lot of such efforts which were then in the early stages, really took 
shape and form after NASA sponsored the first workshop on "Resource Management on 
the Flight Deck" in June 1979. The workshop invited participation from all those interested 
in aviation, the regulatory agencies, the operational and research communities. 
Representatives included those from the FAA, the NTSB, and many major airlines. The 
workshop was successful in bringing together an industry wide focus on crew level issues 
and the Cockpit Resource Management movement was officially in place. 16 
The focus of this thesis is on Cockpit Resource Management, and specifically on 
crew level performance issues. In the next chapter, a closer look is taken at Cockpit 
Resource Management; what it means, what it was, what it is, and what it promises to be. 17 
3. CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
3.1 History of CRM 
In the preceding chapter, the outcomes of several approaches to studying error were 
considered. Analyses of accident and incident data coupled with data from NASA's 
structured-interview program provided evidence for the need to focus more on crew-level 
issues rather than on training of individual skills Research in simulators like the classic 
Ruffell Smith (1979) study were responsible for the introduction of the concept of 
management of resources on the flight deck. NASA's sponsoring of the first workshop on 
flight deck resource management in 1979 formalized this notion of Cockpit Resource 
Management. Helmreich and Foushee (1993) write, "...with recognition of the 
applicability of the approach to other members of the aviation community including cabin 
crews, flight dispatchers, and maintenance personnel..." (p. 3), the term Cockpit Resource 
Management is being replaced by Crew Resource Management. The following sections 
provide a synopsis of the evolution of the CRM concept. 
3.1.1 NTSB and CRM 
Most major airlines today incorporate some kind of CRM training program. Such 
"buy-in" from the operational community would not have been possible were it not for the 
persistent efforts of the NTSB and the cooperation of the FAA. As Kayten (1993) writes, 
"...the NTSB has played a major part in fostering the wide acceptance CRM concepts now 
enjoy in the regulatory, airline, and military environments" (p. 283). Several accidents 
prior to 1979 also had what are today referred to as 'CRM problems'. The NTSB in their 
reports used to refer to these as problems centering around 'teamwork', 'inadequate flight 
management', 'task-sharing', and 'delegation of authority'. According to Kayten, earlier 
treatment of these issues was in the framework of operational procedures and airmanship. 
It was only after the NASA sponsored workshop in 1979 (see Cockpit Resource 
Management Chapter 2) that "...these problems were thought to have a unique training 
solution" (p. 289). 
Incidentally, the NTSB's first explicit mention of 'poor CRM' was in its report 
after the crash of a United Airlines flight, in 1978, in Portland, Oregon (Kayten, 1993). 
According to NTSB (1979), this accident "...exemplifies a recurring problem  a 
breakdown in cockpit management and teamwork during a situation involving malfunctions 18 
of aircraft systems in flight" (p. 26). Because of its significance, it is elaborated upon 
below. 
On December 12, 1978, the three person flight crew of United Airlines' Flight 173 
prepared to land the four-engine DC-8-61 at Portland International Airport. Upon lowering 
the landing gear on final approach, they heard a dull thump which seemed to be in the main 
gear area. Uncertain about what might have caused the thump or its implications, the crew 
decided to abort the landing and put the aircraft in a holding pattern. The aircraft stayed in 
this holding pattern for almost an hour during which the captain directed the crew to 
ascertain the cause of the noise. During this time, both the First-officer and Second-officer 
warned the Captain, on four separate occasions that they were running low on fuel. The 
Captain apparently ignored these warnings and insisted they stay in the holding pattern. 
Low on fuel, one of the engines filially flamed out. The Captain, bringing the plane near 
the field, demanded an explanation from the Second-officer for the cause of the engine 
failure. Meanwhile, the other three engines, with fuel tanks now dry, began to fail in 
sequence and the DC-8 nosed downward. The aircraft crashed into a wooded area near the 
airfield killing 8 passengers, the Second-officer, and a flight attendant. Among those 
seriously injured were 21 passengers, the Captain and the First-officer. 
The NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident to be the Captain's failure 
"...to monitor properly the aircraft's fuel state and to properly respond to the low fuel state 
and the crew members' advisories regarding fuel state" (p. 26). The NTSB later made 
recommendations to the FAA to ensure that flightcrews were indoctrinated in principles of 
flightdeck resource management. By now, CRM was a familiar concept in the aviation 
community and the NTSB frequently referred to it in making subsequent recommendations 
to the FAA following similar accidents. 
3.1.2 FAA and CRM 
NASA and the NTSB have played important roles in the recognition of the concept 
of CRM, but it is the FAA in its dual role of enforcer and enabler (Birnbach & Longridge, 
1993) which has been largely responsible for ensuring the indoctrination of the concept in 
airline operations. Following the 1978 Portland crash and the recommendations by the 
NTSB, the FAA played an active role in ensuring the implementation of CRM principles by 
air carriers. One of its first actions, as Kayten (1993) reports, was to issue "...Air Carrier 
Operations Bulletin 8430.17 Change 11, which included instructions regarding resource 
management and interpersonal communications training for air carrier flightcrew." (pp. 19 
294-295). Subsequent responses to NTSB recommendations included the initiation of 
specific projects like the one to optimize Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) to enhance 
CRM within the FAA's Aviation Behavioral Technology Program (Kayten, 1993), and the 
publication of its Advanced Simulator Plan as Appendix H to Part 121 in 1981 "...to 
encourage the use of advanced flight simulators and to specify their permissible use for 
training and checking..." (Birnbach & Longridge, 1993, p. 267). 
In 1987, the FAA formed the Joint Government-Industry Task Force to review the 
FAA's airline crew standards. Perhaps the most significant of FAA responses to NTSB 
recommendations to urge the fostering of CRM concepts among airlines was by the Joint 
Task Force in the form of the Advisory Circular (AC) 120-51 on CRM training dated 
December 1989, and the issuance of the final rule for an Advanced Qualification Program 
(AQP) Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR-58) dated October 1990. Of these, the 
AQP promises to be the most prominent catalyst for the acceptance of CRM by many major 
airlines. The AQP is a voluntary, alternative training program aimed at integrating a 
number of training features and factors aimed at providing airman performance when 
compared to traditional programs. As defined in SFAR-58 (FAA, 1990), the AQP 
"...provides for a voluntary, alternative method for meeting the training, evaluation, 
certification, and qualification requirements...the principle factor of the AQP is true 
proficiency-based qualification and training" (p. 40263). More detail on the role of AQP in 
CRM will be provided in a later section. 
3.2 What is CRM? 
Helmreich and Foushee (1993) define CRM as the "...application of human factors 
in the aviation system." (p. 4). In 1978, John K. Lauber, a psychologist with the NTSB, 
coined the term CRM. This CRM pioneer's definition is more formal and more widely 
accepted than other definitions of the concept. Lauber (1986) defines CRM as "...the 
effective utilintion of all available resources hardware, software, and liveware  to 
achieve safe, efficient flight operations" (p. 9). 
The FAA (1991) Advisory Circular (AC 120-51) clarifies that CRM is not a training 
program, "...nor is it correctly used as a title for a training program" (p. 3). Further, it 
states, "CRM is a concept [italics added] that encompasses the aircrew expressed in 
behavioral terms in the context of the environment in which the behaviors occur" (p. 3). 20 
CRM is evidently a broad concept. It encompasses the effective utilization of all 
possible resources available to the crew in order to safely and efficiently execute a mission. 
In the context of commercial aviation, this basically involves the transportation of a payload 
(of passengers and/or cargo) from one destination to another. This may seem like an 
accurate enough definition, but it is not adequate for a clear understanding of the concept. 
In an attempt to provide further insight into CRM, Lauber (1986) describes the 
'dimensions' or 'elements' of CRM as including: 
1. Delegation of tasks and assignments of responsibilities 
2. Establishment of priorities. 
3. Monitoring and cross-checking 
4. Use of information 
5. Problem assessment and the avoidance of preoccupation 
6. Communications 
7. Leadership 
Each of the above seven dimensions of CRM are essential for the effective 
management of resources on the flightdeck. Yet these dimensions are not sufficient to 
systematically study or analyze CRM. What is needed is a framework to identify and 
further analyze the components of CRM so as to yield a better understanding of crew 
performance. A framework to understand CRM is provided in the FAA's Advisory 
Circular (AC 120-51) on CRM and is discussed in the following sections. 
3.3 CRM: Guidelines. Research. and Training 
Since its conception, there has been a lot of research in CRM being conducted by 
NASA's Aerospace Human Factors Division in conjunction with airlines. In 1990, the 
FAA outlined the National Plan for Aviation Human Factors. This provided the blueprint 
for addressing the needs of the aviation community. But perhaps the best guideline for the 
development of CRM was provided by the FAA's (1991) Advisory Circular (AC) on CRM 
mentioned earlier. Many of the findings in this circular are based upon research conducted 
by researchers at NASA in collaboration with Robert Helmreich and his colleagues at the 
University of Texas, Austin. This advisory circular made the initial stab at providing a 
"...contemporary explanation of aircrew behaviors..." as well as provided "...guidelines 
for developing training and evaluation programs..." (p. 1). 21 
In attempting to provide an explanation of aircrew behaviors, the AC identified 
some "new" cognitive and interpersonal skills and attitudes in addition to the traditional 
individual technical skills and knowledge. This new "family" of skills was further 
classified under three "clusters" (a) communications process and decision behavior, (b) 
team building and maintenance, and (c) workload management and situational awareness. 
These three clusters are further subdivided into behavioral categories. These categories 
illustrate the kinds of behavior and associated skills that the concept of CRM encompasses. 
For instance, the 'communications process and decision behavior' cluster is subdivided 
into categories that include briefmgs/debriefings, inquiry/assertion, and conflict resolution, 
while the 'team building and maintenance' cluster includes categories of behavior such as 
leadership, concern for operation, and interpersonal climate. Once these behavioral 
categories included under CRM had been identified, the issue was one of being able to 
observe and identify behavior as classified under the clusters. For this purpose, the AC 
further identifies several 'behavioral markers' associated with the behavioral categories of 
each cluster. As Helmreich, Wilhelm, Kello, Taggart, and Butler (1991) write, 
"Behavioral markers are specific behaviors that serve as indicators of how effectively 
resource management is being practiced" (p. 7). Further, they point out that these markers 
are not intended to be "...exhaustive lists of behaviors that should be seen, but rather as 
exemplars of behaviors associated with more and less effective CRM" (p. 7). 
While CRM emphasizes the importance of these Cognitive and Interpersonal (C&I) 
skills, it does not cease to recognize the importance of so-called, traditional, 'technical 
skills' However, as the AC emphasizes, "it is now accepted that these two behavioral sets 
are in fact mutually supportive, provide an effect greater than the sum of their parts and 
must be taught and evaluated together." By describing crew performance in terms of 
integrated sets of technical, and C&I behavior, the AC essentially outlined a model of 
CRM. Research into CRM thus focused on several interrelations between these issues. In 
most cases, such research had to be conducted in conjunction with developing training 
programs. 
In a study originally aimed at assessing the effects of fatigue on crew performance, 
Foushee, Lauber, Baetge, and Acomb (1986) found that fatigued crews, surprisingly, 
made fewer errors than did crews composed of rested pilots who had not yet flown 
together. In another study, Foushee and Manos (1981) analyzed the cockpit voice data 
obtained from the Ruffell Smith (1979) study. The approach involved classifying speech 
acts as to type and the primary conclusion was that crews who communicated more overall, 
performed better. Kanki, Lozito, and Foushee (1989) further refined the methodology and 
analyzed earlier gathered data. They concluded, as Helmreich and Foushee (1993) note, 22 
that "...greater information transfer in the form of 'commands' structuring activities and 
acknowledgments validating actions was associated with more effective crew performance" 
(p. 18). Hackman and Walton's (1986) theory of leadership provides insight into group 
performance, while Ginnett's (1987) study of Boeing 727-200 crews refinedgroup theory 
by introducing the concept of 'shells' and discussed the importance of the initial meeting 
between crewmembers. While studies of this kind focused on team building and 
interpersonal skills, researchers like Orasanu (1990) focused on the cognitive aspect of 
CRM or decision-making skills. Orasanu (1993), in discussing various aspects of crew 
decision making, suggests situation awareness, planfulness and shared mental models to be 
three ingredients that contribute to effective crew decision making (these and other related 
concepts are discussed in Chapter 4). Other researchers also stress the importance of 
shared mental models and group situation awareness in team building and maintenance 
(Cannon-Bowers, Salas, Converse, 1993; Wellens, A. R., 1993). Even as research and 
training continue to evolve, several consistent findings are being made. For instance, 
survey data obtained from more than 20,000 flight crewmembers in civilian and military 
organizations in the US and abroad, by Helmreich and his colleagues, found an 
overwhelming acceptance of CRM concepts (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993). Data on 
attitudes indicate that these are amenable to change, and that these changes are measurable. 
However, one must remember that these conclusions are based upon survey data. As 
Helmreich and Foushee caution, 
the number of accidents involving crews with formal training in CRM and 
LOFT is too small to draw any statistical inferences regarding the role of 
these experiences in helping crews cope with serious emergency situations. 
(p. 36) 
The AC also sets the stage for conducting training in CRM and provides broad 
guidelines for airlines. The AC stresses certain concepts seen as basic or essential to any 
form of CRM training. For example, it emphasizes the focus of the program to be the 
"...functioning of crews as intact teams, not simply as a collection of technically competent 
individuals..." (p. 10). It also stresses the need for training to be continuously reinforced 
(i.e., recurrent training should be a feature of any CRM training program). The AC further 
outlines three phases of CRM training. The first phase is the indoctrination or awareness 
phase which typically constitutes an introduction to CRM concepts in a classroomor 
seminar, involving role-playing, and group discussions. The second phase is the practice 
or feedback phase. This phase typically includes Line-Oriented Flight Training or LOFT 
which makes use of simulators accompanied with video feedback during debriefing. The 23 
full-mission scenarios in LOFT are oriented towards emphasizing critical CRM concepts 
such as decision making, team participation and leadership sharing. The third phase 
recommended in the AC is the operational reinforcement phase. A short, one-time CRM 
training course, cannot be effective in influencing behavior that has been developed over a 
crewmember's life span. The AC recognizes the fact that attitudes revert to their pre-
training status in the absence of continual reinforcement, and therefore stresses the 
importance of this phase. It stresses the need for CRM training to include refresher 
curriculum, integrating feedback exercises such as LOFT with video feedback. The AC 
also stresses the important role of check airmen or CRM instructors, since these are the 
people who serve as role models for all crews in any airline. 
3.4 A Model of Group Performance 
Helmreich (1986) in making a distinction between 'resource management' and 
'crew performance' considers performance, at both the individual as well as crew levels, to 
include "...two distinct components: technical proficiency and competence, and second, 
resource management or crew coordination" (p. 15). Thus, he uses the term resource 
management and crew coordination in an interchangeable sense, while further expressing 
that "...crew coordination is the cornerstone of resource management..." (p. 15). 
To recapitulate, CRM, resource management or crew coordination is one aspect of 
crew performance, an aspect which has long been ignored. The other, interrelated aspect is 
technical proficiency. Both of these are necessary to produce superior crew performance. 
Initially, what was lacking was this insight - that crew coordination or resource 
management is an essential and integral part of crew performance. With the birth of the 
CRM movement, this aspect is now clear and widely accepted. The aviation community 
needs to go beyond simply accepting that this is necessary. As Chidester (1993) writes: 
human factors research should continue to shift from justifying CRM as a 
useful concept to focusing on how to select crewmembers, what to train, 
and how to design cockpit procedures to optimize crew coordination. (p. 
330) 
In essence then, what is needed is a sound theory of crew behavior and a more 
rigorous framework to discuss performance issues. One such framework to discuss crew 
performance in the context of CRM is the model proposed by Helmreich and Foushee 
(1993). Because of its significance and usefulness in serving as a basis for understanding 24 
the remaining sections of this thesis, the model is discussed below. The model is a three-
factor model of the determinants of group performance and is based on McGrath's (1964) 
work in the field of social psychology. Basically, the model defines three major 
components of group behavior (a) input factors, (b) group process factors, and (c) outcome 
factors. 
Input factors, according to Helmreich and Foushee (1993), "...include 
characteristics of individuals, groups, organizations, and the operational environment." 
These characteristics include the individual's knowledge, skills, attitudes, personalities, 
motivation, physical and emotional states, including fatigue and a variety of life stresses. 
Characteristics of the organization include the 'culture' of the organization and any factors 
in the organizational context that are likely to influence the individual performance of a crew 
member, such as management's attitude towards staff, level of training, specific operational 
procedures, rules and regulations. Characteristics of the crew or group factors, include the 
structure, climate, roles, norms and style of leadership present. The authors write: 
The climate that develops in a group is multiply determined by the 
characteristics of individual members, by the structure imposed by the 
formal and informal norms of the organization, and by the quality and style 
of leadership present. (p. 11) 
The operating environment primarily involves the environment (i.e., weather 
conditions and the aircraft along with its capabilities and limitations). The operating 
environment is further influenced by organizational and regulatory factors, such as the 
ability of the organization to provide timely and accurate information to the crew. In 
general, input factors "...provide the framework and determine the nature of group 
processes that lead, in turn, to the various outcomes" (p. 8). 
According to Helmreich and Foushee (1993), group process factors include "...the 
nature and quality of interactions among group members..." (p. 8). The authors further 
classify group processes during flight operations under two broad categories, one 
consisting of interpersonal and cognitive functions, and the other including machine 
interface tasks. In elaborating upon the former category, the authors cite several studies 
which determined the central role of verbal communications processes in the cockpit. They 
further decompose the interpersonal and cognitive functions into three broad 'clusters' of 
observable behavior. These clusters are (a) team formation and management tasks, (b) 
communications processes and decision tasks, and (c) workload management and situation 25 
awareness tasks. The machine interface category is considered to reflect the technical 
proficiency of the crew and is further subdivided into two clusters, "...the actual control of 
the aircraft (either manually or through computer-based flight management systems) and 
adherence to established procedures for the conduct of flight" (p. 20). 
Outcome factors are considered to include "...primary outcomes such as safety and 
efficiency of operations and secondary outcomes such as member satisfaction, motivation, 
attitudes, and so on" (p. 8). According to Helmreich and Foushee (1993), primary 
outcomes are readily recognizable and quantifiable, while secondary outcomes are 
influenced by group processes, which in turn influence input factors. 
The model itself is iterative in nature (i.e., input factors affect group process factors 
which affect the outcome factors). The outcome factors may change input factors and may 
even directly affect group process factors. As the authors state, "it is the iterative nature of 
the factors determining group performance that makes its study both complex and 
challenging" (p. 9). 
3.5 Need for a Better Definition 
Fundamentally related to the issue of performance is that of measurement or 
evaluation. In the earlier section on CRM research and training, it was noted that survey 
data obtained by Helmreich and his colleagues clearly indicate the acceptance of CRM 
concepts. If this is true, why then does it become necessary to assess performance in CRM 
related skills? Indeed, as the AC on CRM notes, there are concerns expressed by industry 
as to the necessity of evaluating CRM, particularly since CRM training has been indicative 
of being effective in changing behavior when it is not evaluated. While there are some 
philosophical and psychological issues in this debate, from the regulatory standpoint, there 
is no question that performance in CRM needs to be evaluated. 
Thus, from a regulatory perspective such as the FAA's, ultimately the issue of crew 
performance and training boils down to one of qualification and certification. Typically 
reflective of an industry whose regulatory structure as well as physical characteristics of 
operations focus on the individual, pilot training and evaluation, to this day, is done on an 
individual basis. With the advent of CRM and particularly under the auspices of AQP, this 
is being re-examined and is slowly changing. As Birnbach and Longridge (1993) note, 
"the changing role of the pilot warrants a complete reexamination of the standards which 
should be applied to a determination of competency...AQP provides a systematic 
methodology for such a reexamination" (p. 275). 26 
Central to the issue of qualification and certification is that of the establishment of 
objective measures of performance or standards. FAA(1990) SFAR 58 notes that "once 
data have been collected to validate the effectiveness of CRM training sessions, the FAA 
believes that objective criteria for evaluation can be developed" (p. 40267).  It further 
notes: 
Once the FAA has developed objective criteria for evaluating CRM 
performance of an individual, the criteria will be used in determining 
whether an individual is qualified...Thus, when CRM objective criteria are 
fully implemented, it will be possible for an individual to fail a CRM
session. (p. 40267) 
To this date, neither the airlines nor the FAA have been successful in coming up 
with objective measures of performance for crew coordination activities, and herein lies the 
challenge for further research. 
Chapter 1 outlined the problem statement as well as the objectives of this research. 
Chapters 2 and 3 provided the background necessary to understand the concept of CRM. 
In the next chapter, the theory behind key concepts of CRM is studied. This provides the 
foundation necessary to understand the model of crew performance developed, which is 
described in Chapter 5. 27 
4. THEORY UNDERLYING CREW PERFORMANCE
 
4.1 Knowledge Representation and Mental Models 
Any attempt to understand human performance requires an appreciation of the core 
concept of human cognition. Central to the concept of human cognition is the issue of 
representation, specifically, the representation of knowledge in memory. As Rumelhart 
and Norman (1988) write, "In spite of its centrality (perhaps because of it) issues 
surrounding the nature of representation have become some of the most controversial 
aspects of the study of cognition" (p. 511). The concept of mental models is a particular 
case of representation of knowledge, a concept which is now recognized as being 
fundamental to the understanding of many aspects of human performance. The concept has 
also been logically extended to serve as a basis for explaining team performance, which is a 
primary objective of this research. Therefore to understand team performance, one needs 
to thoroughly understand the concept of representation and of mental models. This section 
deals with both these concepts. It begins with a detailed review of representational systems 
and leads into the concept of mental models. 
4.1.1 Representations 
Rumelhart and Norman (1988) define a representation as "something that stands for 
something else. In other words, it is a kind of a model of the thing it represents" (p. 513). 
A representational system consists of a world that needs to be represented and a 
representation or a model of that world (also known as the representing world). Not all 
aspects of the represented world are necessarily represented in the representing world; 
likewise, there can be several pairs of the representing and represented worlds. According 
to Rumelhart and Norman (1988), there are essentially three worlds to be represented: our 
environment, our brain and its states, and our phenomenal experience" (p. 514). Further, 
they write: 
most issues of representation are not about how the environment is 
represented in our phenomenal experience, but they concern the 
representational system in which our theories are the representing world, 
and the environment, brain states, and our phenomenal experience are the 
world to be represented. (p.514) 28 
The concept of mental models has to do with just such a kind of representational 
system. Mental models are the representing world; they seek to represent our theories 
about the represented world, namely, our environment, our brain and its states, and our 
phenomenal experience. Mental models are discussed in greater detail in subsequent 
sections. 
There have been many kinds of knowledge representational systems proposed over 
the years by philosophers, psychologists and scientists. Rumelhart and Norman (1988) 
classify these into four basic categories: propositional, analogical, procedural and 
distributed knowledge representational systems. Each of these systems have their own 
powers and efficiacies, along with their own limitations. The primary objective of these 
various representational systems however, remains the same, (i.e. to allow us to adequately 
formulate theories of human cognition). 
4.1.2 Propositionally Based Representational Systems 
Propositionally based representational systems rely heavily on the use of predicate 
calculus as a means for representation. Examples of these kinds of systems include the 
'feature comparison model' by Smith, Shoben, and Rips (1974) and Tversky's '(1977) 
'feature matching model'. In these models, which form perhaps the simplest of all 
representational systems, concepts are represented as a set of semantic features or 
attributes. Some of these features are considered necessary and sufficient and are termed as 
defining features, while others are considered to be characteristic. These models seem 
adequate to handle only particular tasks such as those of similarity and definition. They 
cannot and do not claim to account for the representation of knowledge in general. 
Hence, as Rumelhart and Norman (1988) write, the idea of choosing 
representational systems in which "...knowledge pieces are connected to each other to form 
an associative network of interrelated pieces of knowledge" (p. 523), appealed to some and 
led to the development of the notion of semantic networks. In a semantic network, the 
smallest unit is a 'node', which represents a 'concept' in memory. A set of nodes 
interconnected together by 'relations', which are associations among nodes, form the basic 
structural element of a semantic network. The basic notion is that "knowledge can be 
represented by a kind of directed, labeled graph structure ... the meaning of a concept being 
given by the pattern of relationships among which it participates" (p.523). Even these fail 
to capture intuitions of the phenomenology of mental structures. 29 
These and all such other systems of representation are broadly classified as 
'propositionally based representational systems' because in each of these, "...knowledge is 
assumed to be represented as a set of discrete symbols or propositions, so that concepts in 
the world are represented by formal statements" (p. 515). Propositionally based 
representational systems, as mentioned earlier, are indeed useful in explaining certain 
selective aspects of human cognition, but they somehow fail to capture the richness of 
human cognition. What was needed was a framework of representing more than mere 
lexical or sentential knowledge. This need for the representation of knowledge in higher 
order structures (i.e. the need for representations of supra sentential knowledge) led to the 
development of the concepts of schemata, frames, scripts and plans, which finally led to 
the development of analogically based propositional systems. 
4.1.3 Schema Theory 
Of the notions of schemata, frames, scripts, and plans, the notion of schemata is 
perhaps most relevant to the understanding of the concept of mental models. Although the 
notion of schemata has been invoked by many psychologists in various contexts, it remains 
somewhat fuzzy. The roots of schema theory can actually be traced to Gestalt 
psychologists who were the first to propose that the key to problem solving lies in 
'understanding' the problem. Further, they also believed that prior experience can have 
both positive and negative effects on problem solving. 
According to Mayer (1983), a schema is "a general knowledge structure used in 
comprehension. A schema serves to select and organize incoming information into an 
integrated, meaningful framework" (p. 228). Thus, essentially, the process of 
understanding "involves the construction of a schema and the assimilation of incoming 
information to the schema" (p.228). It was Bartlett, the early 20th century psychologist, 
who is credited with a lot of work done on schema theory. His experiments on learning 
and problem solving served to show that memory is "schematic [italics added]- that both 
learning and remembering are based on general schemas rather than specifics" (p. 232). 
Learning refers to the assimilation of new information for subsequent storage in memory, 
while remembering refers to recalling information from memory. 
Rumelhart and Norman (1988) define schemata (plural for schema) as "data 
structures for representing the generic concepts stored in memory" (p. 537). Further, 
schemata are believed to exist for various generalized concepts like objects, situations, and 
events. They are basically models of the world by which human beings are able to perceive 30 
and understand their surroundings. Schemata are considered to be like packets of 
information residing in long-term memory, each containing a fixed and a variable part. The 
fixed part is analogous to the "defining features" concept of earlier described propositional 
systems while the variable part roughly corresponds to the characteristic parts having 
'default' values which are subject to change based on continuously received, current 
information from the environment. Further, schemata can embed themselves within one 
another. Thus, essentially, a schema comprises not just one knowledge structure, but 
consists of several configurations of subschemata within it. The authors also believe that 
schemata behave as active recognition devices - they process information by actively trying 
to match themselves with incoming data, trying to determine which one of themselves most 
appropriately matches the incoming data. Since schemata are believed to exist for various 
generalized concepts, they are considered to represent knowledge at all levels of 
abstraction, "from ideologies and cultural truths to knowledge about what constitutes an 
appropriate sentence in our language, to knowledge about the meaning of a particular word, 
to knowledge about what patterns of excitations are associated with what letters of the 
alphabet" (p. 538). Further, as the authors believe, "...schemata are our knowledge. All 
of our generic knowledge is embedded in schemata" (p. 538). According to them the entire 
memory system is thus composed of countless schemata, or countless packets of 
knowledge. Thus, with reference to meanings of words, schemata are thought to possess 
not just the dictionary -like meanings of words but along with it, they are supposed to 
possess information pertaining to 'encyclopedic knowledge' (i.e. knowledge of many facts 
and relationships about the particular concept represented by the word), in addition to an 
episodic meaning of the concept (i.e. they are also supposed to contain information about 
our experiences with that particular concept). Thus, schemata are considerably 'richer' 
knowledge representation structures, which seem to explain some of the richness of human 
cognition. Scripts and plans are particular examples of schemata developed by 
psychologists like Schank and Abelson (1977) to demonstrate whether such a kind of 
memory system can indeed serve as a practical basis for understanding specific situations 
around us. 
4.1.4 Analogically Based Representational Systems 
Propositional representational systems such as semantic networks and schemata 
serve to represent information stored in long-term memory. While these are 'rich' 
representational systems, they fail to adequately explain, for instance, the representation of 31 
images. Such considerations led to the development of analogically based representational 
systems in which it was proposed by some like Kosslyn (1980) that the knowledge 
underlying images is analogical versus propositional. Kosslyn has proposed a rather 
elaborate theory of imaginal representation. According to Rumelhart and Norman (1988), 
Kosslyn claims that there are two fundamental kinds of representations of imaginal 
information a 'surface representation' , which was thought to consist of some kind of a 
'matrix format' occurring in some spatial medium, (for which he used the metaphor of a 
CRT [Cathode Ray Tube] to elaborate upon) and a 'deeper representation', which was 
actually of some propositional form, from which the surface representation is generated. 
Thus, Kosslyn's view can be summarized by saying that he believed that knowledge was 
stored in long-term memory, essentially in propositional form, which was converted into 
an image whenever needed. Such a kind of 'matrix format' for a surface representation 
seems adequate to describe simple cases of imagining objects and performing simple 
transformations on them. But human beings are able to imagine a much wider range of 
activities which incorporate more than just visual stimuli. Indeed, humans can imagine the 
occurrence of entire events, complete with sounds and smells! They are able to imagine a 
dinner setting, complete with the clinking of glasses of champagne and the smell of pot 
roast. It is possible for human beings to imagine being pushed and falling off a bicycle. In 
playing a game of chess, players are able to 'make' their moves in anticipation of the 
other's moves, and thereby predict the outcome of a certain move. In other words, they 
actually 'simulate' moves based on different strategies, and then select the one with the 
most favorable outcome. It is primarily to account for the human's ability to imagine such 
a wide range of activities that Rumelhart and Norman (1988) suggest that we should think 
of a 'mental model' rather than just a 'mental image'. 
4.1.5 Mental Models 
4.1.5.1 An introduction 
The concept of mental models has been invoked by many researchers in different 
professions, with varying backgrounds and for various purposes. Of all the different 
perspectives, two are predominantly apparent, that of ergonomists or human factors 
specialists and that of psychologists and cognitive scientists. The primary interest of 
psychologists and cognitive scientists stems from their wanting to understand or explain the 32 
complex function of human cognition whereas ergonomists or human factors specialists, 
by virtue of the 'applied' nature of their profession tend to see mental models as a basis for 
explaining complex human behavior like naturalistic decision making. Expectedly, these 
different perspectives are reflected in the varying definitions or conceptions of 'mental 
models' invoked and further refined. A fact that becomes apparent by even a cursory 
glance at the literature, and one which has been quoted in several instances, is how 
extensively the phrase 'mental models' has been used and yet how few formal or explicit 
definitions exist (Wilson & Rutherford, 1989; Rouse & Moths, 1986). There are several 
reasons for this. As Rouse and Morris point out, "...this most likely reflects the extent to 
which the concept has come to be acceptable on an almost intuitive basis" (p.349). As 
Wilson and Rutherford write, "...this might reflect the many different domains of 
application of the concept and the narrow or operational nature of the definition 
consequently used" (p.618). Further, they write, "any differences [in conception] are 
accentuated by an apparently mutual lack of communication between the human factors 
community and psychologists" (p.619). 
Nevertheless, the importance of a better and more concrete understanding of this 
concept has been recognized by the aviation community, particularly those involved in the 
training of crews and the development of CRM training programs. Indeed, the concept of 
mental models has been extended to that of 'shared mental models' which have been 
invoked by many researchers to explain the performance of teams and team decision-
making (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Orasanu, 1990). Some are wise to 
plead caution in their usage  as Wilson & Rutherford (1989) point out, "there is a danger 
that workers in human factors and systems design may see the mental models notion as a 
key - even a panacea for successful design and development." 
With this introduction to the concept, current research on mental models is 
examined in greater depth. What exactly is meant by the term 'mental models'? What 
purpose do they serve? What are their defining characteristics? Each of these questions is 
addressed below. 
4.1.5.2 What are mental models? 
The term model brings to mind some sort of representation, which is in essence 
what mental models really are. Norman (1983) outlines in very simple and general terms 
the concept of a mental model. According to him, "in interacting with the environment, 33 
people form internal, mental models of themselves and of things with which they are 
interacting." 
Wickens (1984) also invokes the concept of "internal models" in his attempt to 
explain the decision making process of operators. According to him, "as patterns of 
correlation are learned by experience and training, an internal 'model' of the environment is 
formed" (p. 110). Rouse and Morris (1986) cite Wickens (1984) who reminds us that 
"...mental models are constructs used by researchers to explain display sampling, 
scanning, formulating of plans, and translating of goals into actions" (p. 350). 
Rasmussen (1990) also invokes the concept of mental models in talking about goal-
controlled knowledge-based performance. He writes, "at this [knowledge-based] level of 
functional reasoning, the internal structure of the system is explicitly represented by a 
'mental model' which may take several different forms" (p. 63). 
Wilson and Rutherford (1989) summarize the different perspectives of mental 
models amidst the human factors community, as: 
a representation formed by a user of a system and/or task, based on 
previous experiences as well as current observation, which provides most 
(if not all) of their subsequent system understanding and consequently 
dictates the level of task performance. (p. 619) 
4.1.5.3 What purpose do they serve? 
Broadly speaking, from a knowledge representation viewpoint, mental models, as 
described above, provide a "richer" framework to account for the richness of human 
cognition. All the earlier described systems of knowledge representation, such as 
propositional and analogical are capable of explaining only certain aspects of how human 
beings process information. Mental models, thus, essentially are a way of representing and 
thereby explaining our view of thinking. Ultimately, they seek to represent theories about 
the represented world, namely, the environment, the human brain and its states, and the 
phenomenal experience of humans. 
Perhaps the essence of this is captured in Wilson and Rutherford's (1989) words, 
"A mental model is a theoretical entity. In less grand terms, it is an idea that is employed to 
account for empirical data" (p. 630). 
Nevertheless, like all representational systems, they serve useful purposes. 
Norman (1983) points out that mental models provide predictive and explanatory power for 34 
the operator's understanding of the interaction between the individual and the system 
environment with which he/she is interacting. 
Wickens (1984), in talking about the "internal models" of the environment formed 
by operators of the system, suggests that, "This internal model then provides a framework 
for easier integration of information that is consistent with it and removes much of the 
burden of working memory associated with processing large amounts of uncorrelated 
information" (p. 110). Elsewhere, in discussing display compatibility and implications for 
display design, he writes that "there is good evidence that continuously changing systems 
have continuous analog mental representations. These internal representations form the 
basis for understanding the system, predicting its future behavior, and controlling its 
actions" (p.178-179). 
Veldhuyzen and Stassen (1977) in reviewing the use of the term "mental model" in 
manual control theory conclude that mental models are the basis for estimating the state of 
the system. They further see them as the basis for all further actions such as the 
development of plans and strategies and selection of control actions. 
Rasmussen (1990) while discussing functional reasoning in the knowledge-based 
realm, sees the mental model of the causal structure as the basis of mental data processing. 
Further, he views the modification of mental model as an effective way to counteract the 
limitations of attention and optimize the transfer of previous results thereby minimizing the 
need for new information. According to him, the efficiency of human cognitive processes 
depends on such modifications or model transformations. 
Rouse and Morris (1986) provide a good 'functional definition' of mental models 
based on a modification of Rasmussen's (1979) taxonomy of mental models. Mental 
models, are thus defined by Rouse and Morris as "the mechanisms whereby humans are 
able to generate descriptions of system purpose and form, explanations of system 
functioning and observed system states, and predictions of future system states" (p. 351). 
It would appear from the above descriptions that the concept of mental models is a 
'fuzzy' one. Although there are several unresolved issues surrounding this concept, some 
of these, as Rouse and Morris (1986) point out may never be resolved. They offer a 
detailed discussion of these issues and the limits constraining their resolution. Some of 
these limits, they point out may be fundamental. They write: 
the problem of subjectivity and arbitrariness is aggravated in the study of 
mental models because, in effect, such studies amount to one or more 
persons developing models of others' models of the external world. This 
dilemma is fundamental and cannot be resolved. (p. 359) 35 
However, there are certain aspects of mental models which can and need to be clarified. 
Some of these are examined in the following sections. 
4.1.6 Characteristics of Mental Models 
4.1.6.1 Mental models and knowledge 
If the concept of mental models appears fuzzy from the above descriptions, one 
need only think about the concept of knowledge and the difficulties encountered in its 
definition. It is precisely because of the ambiguity of the concept of knowledge and our 
attempt to "capture" it or "represent" it, that has led to the development of the theories of 
knowledge representation described earlier. 
Although mental models are a type of knowledge representation, they do not 
represent all knowledge, or knowledge in general. Indeed, as Rouse and Morris (1986) 
point out, the differentiation of the concept of mental models from that of knowledge in 
general poses a significant difficulty. Yet, they assert that "it appears to be reasonable to 
use the concept of mental models to denote special types of knowledge [italics added] " (p. 
350). The topic of attempting to determine precisely the 'knowledge contents' of mental 
models is addressed in subsequent sections. 
4.1.6.2 Mental models and schemata 
A related issue of interest is that of the difference between mental models and 
schemata as systems of knowledge representation. After all, schemata have been viewed as 
organized knowledge structures used to interpret incoming information and predict future 
events, just as the functional definition of mental models proposed by Rasmussen (1979) 
(see above) suggests that they are mechanisms for generating explanations of system 
functioning and observed system states, and predictions of future system states. To what 
extent are these two concepts related or are they distinctly separable? 
Rumelhart (1984) describes a mental model as the total set of schemata instantiated 
at the time. Wilson and Rutherford (1989) cite Johnson-Laird (1983) as suggesting that 
"...schemata provide the procedures from which mental models are constructed" (p. 624). 
Brewer (1987) identifies the time when particular representations are created as a point of 
distinction between mental models and schemata. According to Brewer, as cited by Wilson 
and Rutherford (1989), "...mental models are creations of the moment, and although the 36 
same mental model may be reconstructed several times, it is schemata that are considered to 
be stored and activated" (p. 624). Finally, in accepting that there may not be a distinct cut­
off point between the two concepts, Wilson and Rutherford conclude that "...the major 
difference between mental models and schemata is that the latter are taken to be data 
structures in memory, which can be activated, whereas the former are regarded as 
utilization of such information in a computationally dynamic manner" (p. 624). They 
further emphasize that it is the dynamic computational ability of a mental model beyond that 
presumed of background knowledge that provides the notion of mental models with its 
theoretical utility. 
4.1.6.3 Mental models and conceptual models 
Another issue concerns the distinction between 'mental models' and 'conceptual 
models'. Norman (1983) proposes a scheme of classification. He maintains that the 
designer's conceptual model of the system is not to be confused with the operator's/user's 
mental model. According to him, "Conceptual models are devised as tools for the 
understanding or teaching of physical systems. Mental models are what people really have 
in their heads and what guides their use of things" (p. 12). Thus, a user may have a 
'conceptual model' of the system based on what he/she has been taught, whereas his/her 
actual interaction with the system will lead to an evolution of his/her 'mental model'. As 
Wilson and Rutherford (1989) write, "the latter [mental model] is based on users' 
expectations and experiences and on their current perception of the system and provides a 
basis of their understanding" (p. 619). Thus, if the system being studied is 'mental models 
of users', any representation of a user's mental model would necessarily be, as Norman 
(1983) writes, "...the scientist's conceptualization of a mental model...a model of a model" 
(p. 8). 
4.1.7 Knowledge Content of Mental Models 
In the earlier section, it was noted that mental models are distinguished from general 
knowledge by considering them to be special types of knowledge. This raises the question 
of what precise knowledge is contained in mental models. This section addresses this issue 
by first considering the differences between types of knowledge. The section concludes 
with a summary of what is meant by mental models, thereby making explicit the types of 
knowledge supposedly contained within them. 37 
In the literature on representational systems, there is generally a distinction made 
between procedural and declarative knowledge. Knowledge of or about something is 
referred to as declarative knowledge, whereas knowledge about how to do something is 
called procedural knowledge (Rumelhart & Norman, 1988). Rumelhart and Norman 
(1988) further distinguish between declarative and procedural knowledge by claiming that 
declarative knowledge is often accessible, whereas procedural knowledge tends to be 
relatively inaccessible, in the sense that it is not available for examination. In other words, 
"we seem to have conscious access to declarative knowledge; but we do not have this 
access to procedural knowledge" (p. 561). However, the most relevant feature of the 
distinction between procedural and declarative knowledge is the fact that data and process 
are closely bound together i.e., "in some sense all knowledge is declarative upto the point 
where the final machinery that actually performs the physical actions is reached" (p. 565). 
To elaborate further, any procedure has to be in some kind of declarative form for a 
'mechanism' such as an interpreter to interpret, follow and execute. This knowledge in 
declarative format may not be accessible at any other level but the one where it is used. 
Finally, "the difference between knowledge that is declarative and knowledge that is 
procedural simply depends upon one's viewpoint" (p. 565). 
4.1.8 Summary of Mental Models 
Evidently, there are a number of viewpoints about mental models and its knowledge 
contents. For the purpose of this research, a summary of mental models is presented. 
Firstly, like many psychological phenomena, I accept that mental models are basically 
hypothetical constructs. They are essentially a way of representing and thereby explaining 
our view of thinking. 
For purposes of defining what is meant by mental models, both Wilson and 
Rutherford's (1989) as well as Rouse and Morris' (1986) functional definitions previously 
mentioned, are acceptable. I also concur with the views expressed above that mental 
models are distinct from schemata and that their primary utilitarian value is derived from the 
fact that they possess a dynamic computational ability, by means of which it becomes 
possible to project future situations. Bainbridge (1988) notes that Johnson-Laird used the 
term mental model "..to designate the temporary data structure built up during 
understanding..." (p. 82). I therefore presume that a mental model resides in working 
memory and relies or draws upon the contents of more permanent or long-term data 
structures such as schemata. 38 
4.1.8.1 Specific knowledge contents of mental models 
For the sake of completeness, I summarize that the mental model shall be assumed 
to contain the following declarative knowledge: 
Descriptive knowledge about system topology/structure. 
- Understanding of system purpose and system functioning. 
- Current (represented) state information (as perceived by the pilot; different from 
'actual' state) 
- Each of the scenarios that lead to future system states. 
Information on predicted future system states as a result of "running" the mental 
model. 
Further, I assume that a mental model must also contain the following kinds of procedural 
knowledge: 
Procedural knowledge to explain system topology/structure. 
- Procedural knowledge to interpret incoming information, relate it with knowledge 
of system topology/structure developed from schemata, and generate an 
explanation of current system state. 
Procedural knowledge to use this current system state, and (again with the help of 
schemata) "simulate" the system, thereby predicting a future system state. 
Procedural knowledge to appropriately store these future system states along with 
the actions (descriptions generated via simulations) required which result in the 
respective system states. 39 
4.1.8.2 Concluding remarks on mental models 
The above concludes the discussion on the subject of mental models for now. 
Although I have tried to neatly 'capture' the notion of mental models and attempted to 
define them in terms of the knowledge contained in them, we must not lose sight of the fact 
that the notion of mental models is by construction, a nebulous one. Finally, in conclusion 
I see it appropriate to remind the reader of Norman's (1983) six observations on mental 
models, in which he describes mental models to be "incomplete", "unstable", not having 
"firm boundaries", "parsimonious" and "unscientific" in the sense that "people maintain 
'superstitious' behavior patterns even when they are unneeded because they cost little in 
physical effort and save mental effort" (p. 8). 
The subsequent section examines the concept of Situation Awareness. I believean 
understanding of this concept will enhance the understanding of crew performance. 
4.2 Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness has a seemingly intuitive meaning; something to do with being 
aware of one's situation. A highly popular term in the field of aviation, its use, 
unfortunately, as Suter and Woods (1991) write, "...is often based on an intuitive, not 
necessarily appropriate, understanding" (p. 46). The concept of situation awareness is 
inextricably linked with performance. This section treats this concept in detail, but before 
doing so, it is examined briefly from the intuitive perspective. 
According to Schwartz (1991), "In simplest terms, it [situation awareness] is 
knowing what is going on around you a concept that is embraced in the need to think 
ahead of the aircraft." (p. 18). Wellens (1993) cites Press' (1986) review of the origins of 
the term situation awareness in the military flight environment in which he attributes the 
success of WWI flying aces to the "...ability to gain awareness of the enemy before the 
enemy became aware of him [them]" (p. 268). In loose terms, it is also referred to as the 
"big picture". In the old days, when flying used to be about flying in open cockpits with 
very little automation, the pilot was literally in control of the aircraft.  In a sense, it was 
thus easier for the pilot to achieve the "big picture" of the environment for survival. In 
today's aircraft, complex automation has changed the role of the pilot so as to have 
removed him/her from the 'inner control loop'. In fact, as Saner and Woods (1991) point 
out, "especially in the commercial aviation domain, there are concerns that advanced 
applications of flight deck automation may have a negative impact on the phenomenon" (p. 40 
45). Thus, according to Wellens who cites Ends ley (1988), "it has become a major design 
goal for the developers of new aircraft systems to help the pilot achieve a composite picture 
of the environment required for successful task performance" (p. 268). From an informal 
standpoint, it is not,losing sight of this big, composite picture so essential for task 
performance, that is implied by the term 'situation awareness'. 
4.2.1 Need for Studying Situation Awareness 
As Sarter and Woods (1991) correctly assert, "situation awareness is supposed to 
be an essential prerequisite for the safe operation of any complex dynamic system" (p. 45). 
It is not difficult to see the veracity of this statement. If a pilot does not know 'what is 
going on around him/her', there is little chance that he or she will be able to ensure safe 
task performance. In a modem aircraft, the reasons for a loss of situationawareness can be 
varied. Complex automation in modem commercial aircraft requires a lot of monitoring, 
and tends to remove the pilot from the 'inner control loop', leading to a loss of situation 
awareness. Sometimes, the pilot whose role is now reduced to that of a monitor instead of 
a controller, begins to rely too much on the automation and becomes complacent, again 
leading to a loss of situational awareness. There are a number of research programs 
specifically designed to address the issues of automation and the problems and concerns 
that arise from the interactions between the pilot and such automation (Billings, 1991). 
However, as Sarter and Woods point out, "a thorough understanding of the concept of 
situation awareness and its relation to automation is largely missing" (p. 45). Even so, the 
aviation community already has other concerns about situation awareness. Some analysts 
view situation awareness as a design criteria, while others are concerned whether it is an 
individual difference variable, whether it is something specific that can be trained or not 
(Pew, 1994). More importantly, while the reasons for the loss of situation awareness may 
be varied, the effects or the consequences are not; a loss of situational awareness can lead 
to a disaster. There exist innumerable instances where a loss of situation awareness has 
been cited as a major contributing factor in aircraft accidents and incidents. As Schwartz 
(1989) points out, "a distinct relationship exists between situational awareness and 
accidents. High situational awareness yields lower mishap potential, low situational 
awareness yields higher mishap potential" (p. 18). 
Given that situation awareness is so critically linked to system safety, it is examined 
in greater depth below. What exactly is meant by situation awareness; what are its 
components, what constitutes being 'situationally aware', how can it be measured? Some 41 
of the definitions of situation (or situational) awareness are first examined. The concept is 
then examined in the context of related psychological constructs such as mental models. 
4.2.2 Situation Awareness: Definitions 
Stein (1986) as cited in Harwood, Barnett, & Wickens (1988) defines situational 
awareness as: 
the knowledge available to the pilot on critical matters such as the overall 
tactical situation, his own mission profile, weapons status, the positions and 
objectives of friendly aircraft, disposition and apparent objectives of hostile 
flights, presence of threats, refueling rendezvous and other mission data. 
(p. 316) 
Airbus Training Center's Aircrew Integrated Manual (AIM) is cited by North 
(1992) to define situation awareness as "...an accurate perception of the factors and 
conditions that affect the aircraft and flight crew during a specific period of time" (p. 64). 
According to Wickens (1992), "situation awareness refers to the ability to rapidly 
bring to consciousness those characteristics that evolve during a flight" (p. 3). 
Sarter and Woods (1991) define situation awareness as "the accessibility of a 
comprehensive and coherent situation representation which is continuously being updated 
in accordance with the results of recurrent situation assessments" (p. 55). 
A generally accepted definition among the aviation community is that proposed by 
Endsley (1988) who defines situation awareness as "the perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and 
the projection of their status in the near future" (p. 791). 
Smith and Hancock (1993) define situation awareness as adaptive, externally-
directed consciousness. 
As might be obvious from the preceding sections, there remains considerable 
ambiguity regarding the concept of situation awareness. In fact, as Sarter and Woods 
(1991) remark, "it is not even clear whether situation awareness really denotes a distinct 
phenomenon" (p. 45). Even though the term 'situation awareness' has ubiquitously 
replaced 'workload' as the buzzword of the 90's, there exists a healthy skepticism about it, 
and some like Pew (1994) even wonder whether they should try to work with it as an 
overarching concept at all, "one that is anything more than what we think about in the 
traditional assessment of human performance requirements in any particular system" (p. 2). 
Some, like Flach (1994), refer to the concept as a "new fad" that has replaced workload ­42 
which is "no longer fashionable" (p. 241). In fact, given the current state of understanding 
of this relatively new concept, Flach finds it difficult to see how situation awareness is 
different from even skill or expertise. 
4.2.3 More about the Situation 
Situation awareness is about two concepts: the situation and awareness of the 
situation. In general, little attention has been devoted to understanding the 'situation' 
component of situation awareness. Flach (1994) believes that : 
the weak link in our human factors is not our failure to understand 'load' or 
'awareness' but our failure to understand 'work' or 'situations'... we must 
shift our emphasis from 'awareness' and we must begin to build theories 
and methodologies to attack the problem of 'situations'. (p. 243) 
Further, he writes, "our theories of 'situation awareness' must arise from an 
understanding of situations" (p. 244). Most definitions that center around the 'situation' 
component, according to Sarter and Woods, (1991) focus on determining what particular 
information the pilot has to pay attention to, as a result, "...little progress has been made 
with respect to important issues such as supporting the acquisition of information in general 
or supporting effective attention-filtering in changing, data-rich environments" (p. 47). 
Situation awareness, as Harwood et al (1988) write, "...refers to the pilot's 
knowledge of a dynamically changing situation" (p. 316). The flight deck is a dynamic 
environment. Therefore, as Sarter and Woods (1991) point out: 
Any attempt to define the critical components of situation awareness in 
general suffer from the fact that, given the dynamic environment of the 
flight deck, the relevance of data and events depends on their context and 
will therefore vary within and between flights as a function of specific task, 
the environment, and the tactical objective. (p.47) 
Further, as Sarter and Woods note, "on the other hand, attempts to define the 
'situation' component that are broad and account for the context-sensitivity of data, run the 
risk of being too general to really help in understanding the basis of situation awareness" 
(p. 47). 43 
4.2.4 The Components of Situation Awareness 
Harwood et al (1988) and Wickens (1992) seek to identify the critical components 
of situation awareness and provide some more insight into the phenomenon by outlining 
four basic components or dimensions of situation awareness. Each of these dimensions 
lead to certain kinds of information about the situation and are hence referred to as the 
contents of the situation. Harwood et al refer to these components as (a) spatial awareness 
- "the pilot's knowledge of his location in space and of the spatial relationships between 
objects"; (b) identity awareness  "the pilot's knowledge of the presence of threats or 
objectives ... the pilot's awareness of system state variables such as engine status and flight 
performance parameters"; (c) responsibility or automation awareness - "knowledge of 
who's in charge"; and lastly (d) temporal awareness "knowledge of the occurrence of 
events as the mission evolves" (p. 316). Wickens refers to the first three dimensions as 
navigation, systems, and task awareness respectively, while referring to the fourth one as 
temporal awareness. 
Of all these, it is 'temporal awareness' that Harwood et al (1988) refer to as the 
"hallmark" of situation awareness (p. 316) Suter and Woods (1991) remark that "temporal 
awareness is important for both the diagnosis and the prevention of problems" (p. 48). 
What exactly is meant by temporal awareness and why is it so important ? Perhaps this is 
better understood when we look first at Smith and Hancock's (1993) definition of situation 
awareness and then at Pew's (1994) further exploration of the 'situation'. As was 
mentioned earlier, situation awareness includes two components, a) the situation and b) 
awareness of the situation. The detailing of the four dimensions of the situation above 
provides some insight into what kinds of information evolve during the flight and what the 
pilot needs to be aware of. What exactly is a situation ? When does one situation end and 
when does the other begin? These are important questions and are addressed below. 
Smith and Hancock (1993) define situation awareness as adaptive, externally-
directed consciousness. By doing so, they view consciousness to be that part of an agent's 
knowledge-generating behavior that is within the scope of intentional manipulation. 
Further, they view situation awareness as being "directed toward achieving a goal in a 
specific task environment", i.e. goal-driven behavior, hence the part 'externally-directed' 
in the definition. Who specifies these goals ? Certainly not the agent itself - if that were the 
case, situation awareness would always be perfect. The authors argue that it is the task-
environment, an 'external arbiter' that specifies these task goal requirements. Further, 
since they submit that situation awareness is adaptive, and like adaptation, "is a dynamic 
concept that exists at the interface between the agent and its environment...", a notion 44 
"which implies complete and 'natural' adherence to task goals and to criteria for 
performance. This, in turn, implies the existence of a specification of the task the agent is to 
perform and of measures for evaluating that performance" (p. 29). In summary, the 
authors are saying that the environment [external-arbiter] imposes some task goal 
requirements on the agent. The agent, in order to possess situation awareness must 
"necessarily have developed a level of adaptive capability sufficient to match the 
specification of [these] task goals and of criteria for assessing performance variables" (p. 
29). Further, they maintain, "while individuals may exhibit situated, outwardly-directed 
consciousness, it is not until the externally - defined task is made explicit that their behavior 
achieves the status we wish to reserve for situation awareness" (p. 29). 
The ideas of Smith and Hancock regarding the goal-directed nature of situation 
awareness are reflected, albeit a little differently, by Pew (1994). If situation awareness 
literally refers to being aware of the situation, it becomes imperative to answer questions 
such as "what is a situation?" and "when does one situation end and the other begin?" In 
attempts to do so, Pew defines a situation as "a set of environmental conditions and system 
states with which the participant is interacting that can be characterized uniquely by its 
priority goals and response options" (p. 2). Pew is not explicit about where these priority 
goals and response options originate from, however, I believe that these priority goals and 
response options [that characterize the situation] are generated by virtue of the agent 
adapting to the 'environmental conditions' (or the external arbiter according to Smith and 
Hancock). As Smith and Hancock (1993) stated, "to qualify as situation awareness, the 
agent first must intend its goals, beliefs, and knowledge to match the task and performance 
specified by dicta from its environment and then, must succeed to some degree in meeting 
those expectations" (p. 29). 
Further, Pew (1994) and his colleagues believe that: 
...in complex decision-making situations, an individual has multiple goals 
in the priority stack. At any one time, one or two of those goals are 
paramount and those goals, and the response options associated with them 
provide the basis for defining situation awareness requirements. (p. 2) 
According to them, a situation is characterized by its priority goals and response 
options. A situation changes when the priority goals and response options accompanying it 
change, thereby changing the situation awareness requirements. These requirements, 
according to Pew, are "the essential elements of information and knowledge needed to cope 
with each unique situation" (p. 2). This understanding clarifies the need to not be "aware of 
all things at all times", which would have rendered useless the whole concept of situation 45 
awareness. Instead, by clarifying that a situation is characterized by its priority goals and 
options, it becomes possible to defme the requirements of what would constitute situation 
awareness. Also, as the situation as defined above changes, the priority goals and 
response options would change, which the 'adaptive' agent would become aware of and 
thereby redefine the requirements of being aware of one's situation. 
4.2.5 Temporal Awareness: The Hallmark of Situation Awareness 
Given this understanding of the situation, it is now possible to take a closer look at 
the temporal dimension of situation awareness. What is meant by it and why is it 
considered to be the "hallmark" of situation awareness? As mentioned above, Harwood et 
al (1988) defme temporal awareness as "...knowledge of the occurrence of events as the 
mission evolves" (p. 316). Suter and Woods (1991) explain further what is meant by 
temporal awareness. They write: 
In dynamic environments such as the flight deck, minor deviations or 
failures that are not critical in themselves may evolve or interact over time to 
become a major threat. It is therefore essential for the pilot to observe, 
integrate, and remember these events. (p. 47) 
The key word here that lends value to the temporal dimension is 'remember'. 
Temporal awareness plays an important role in the diagnosis of problems that might have 
been caused or influenced by events in the past. It is also important, according to Suter 
and Woods (1991) in "...the prognosis and prevention of potential future problems based 
on the analysis of currently available data" (p.4.9). Smith and Hancock (1993) stress the 
importance of the adaptive nature of the agent to match its goals, beliefs and knowledge 
with the task goal requirements specified by the environment or the external arbiter. Pew's 
(1994) definition of a situation elaborates upon this idea of situation awareness being goal-
directed behavior and that the awareness requirements are defined on the basis of priority 
goals and response options that characterize the situation, the requirements being the 
"essential elements of information and knowledge needed to cope with each unique 
situation" (p. 2). The concept of temporal awareness stresses the fact that for an accurate 
diagnosis of the problem, those "essential" elements of information and knowledge need 
not be currently available from the environment but would have to be recalled from 
memory, which in turn implies that the agent would have to integrate and remember the 
essential elements of a situation for future recall if necessary. In fact, that is partly what 46 
constitutes being 'aware' of the situation, and I shall say more about this when discussing 
'awareness'. In the words of Harwood et al (1988), "the past is important for 
disambiguating the present, and the past and present must be used to predict the future. 
The relationship of time with the other three components is what sets situational awareness 
apart as a unique concept" (p. 316). 
Having examined what is meant by 'situation', attention is now turned towards 
'awareness'. 
4.2.6 More about Awareness 
In the preceding section on 'situation', Smith and Hancock's (1993) views about 
situation awareness being 'externally-directed' or goal-directed behavior were discussed. 
However, while doing so, the authors "do not deny that there is internally-directed 
consciousness, but maintain that consciousness directed to internal representations (e.g., 
mental models) is a meta-construct that leads to a number of philosophical polemics that fail 
to help resolve current practical questions about situation awareness" (p. 29). Therefore, 
for "practical purposes", they have sought to impose some operational bounds in defining 
their terms. Hence, their claim that situation awareness is active, information-seeking, 
action-taking behavior; "a generative process of knowledge creation and informed action-
taking" (p. 29). While their definition helps to focus on the behavioral or performance 
aspect of situation awareness, it circumvents, for reasons quoted above, an analysis of the 
actual cognitive processes that underlie the processing of information acquired by situation 
awareness. Instead, they use the theme of distinction between 'performance' and 
'competence' as "leverage...to understanding the performance we observe  the 
normatively focused knowledge-generation and action-taking that characterize situation 
awareness" (p. 30). They define performance as action situated in the world which is 
contingent upon information made available by the environment while competence as 
knowledge that supports behavior but is independent of the situation, which is invariant of 
the particulars of the situation. Further, "an analysis of competence is unconcerned with 
the actual processes" (p. 30). Basically, they adopt Neisser's (1976) perception-action 
cycle as a framework for explaining how situation awareness works, without being 
concerned about the actual processes that produce the agent's performance. Briefly, 
information and action flow continuously around the perception-action cycle. Essentially, 
the environment which provides the information, the agent who possesses the knowledge, 47 
and the action taken by the agent constitute the components of the perception-action cycle. 
As the authors write: 
Starting arbitrarily at the top, the environment informs the agent, modifying 
its knowledge. Knowledge directs the agent's activity in the environment. 
That activity samples, and perhaps, anticipates or alters the environment 
which, in turn, informs the agent. The informed, directed sampling and/or 
anticipation capture the essence of the performance of situation awareness. 
(p. 31) 
Further, they believe that "situation awareness is the invariant at the core of an 
adapted agent's perceptual cycle that generates both up-to-the minute knowledge and action 
that anticipates signals in the environment" (p. 28), its function being to codify the 
information made available by the environment, the knowledge required by the agent to 
assess that information, and the action the knowledge will direct the agent to take to meet its 
goals. 
Viewing situation awareness as a facet of consciousness, as behavior which is 
externally-directed or goal-driven, may be a reasonable enough explanation for those 
concerned only with what may be called the 'observable' aspect of performance. 
However, it is believed that it would be worthwhile to also consider the other facet of 
consciousness, the 'internally-directed' aspect of situation awareness. This is, so as to 
speak, the cognitive aspect of situation awareness, which deals with those internal 
representations of knowledge and information processing, or mental models. 
A comparison of Rouse and Morris' (1986) definition of mental models (see section 
on Mental Models) and Endsley's (1988) defmition (above) of situation awareness shows 
remarkable similarity. Indeed, one of the questions that researchers debate about is 
whether the two are indeed different phenomenons or as Suter & Woods (1991) so aptly 
word as illustrations of "...the tendency of applied cognitive science to coin new 
terminology in the face of ill-understood issues" (p. 45). 
4.2.7 Situation Assessment and Situation Awareness 
An important aspect of Ends ley's (1988) defmition of situation awareness is 
'situation assessment'. Sarter and Woods (1991) who offer an excellent treatment of the 
concept, claim that "situation awareness is based on the integration of knowledge resulting 
from recurrent situation assessments." In other words, situation assessments lead to 
situation awareness. What exactly is 'situation assessment'? Endsley as cited by Sarter 48 
and Woods (1991) describes situation assessment as "a complex process of perception and 
pattern matching greatly limited by working-memory and attentional capacity" (p. 50). The 
process of situation assessment is considered to involve three different levels: 
a) Level I  Perception of situational elements. 
b) Level II - Information integration.
 
c) Level III - Projection of future status and actions of situational elements - or "the mental
 
simulation of future system state and behavior to eliminate surprises" (p. 51).
 
Earlier, Rouse and Morris (1986) defined mental models as "the mechanisms 
whereby humans are able to generate descriptions of system purpose and form, 
explanations of system functioning and observed system states, and predictions of future 
system states" (p. 351). There is obviously an overlap between the two psychological 
constructs of situational awareness and mental models. The issue is clarified below. 
4.2.8 Mental Models and Situation Awareness 
In clarifying the difference between mental models and situation awareness, Sarter 
and Woods (1991) see mental models as the basis for adequate situation assessments. 
Earlier, they were quoted to claim that situation assessments lead to situation awareness. In 
the words of Sarter and Woods (1991), "adequate mental models are one of the 
prerequisites for achieving situation awareness" (p. 49). Thus, mental models are the 
actual 'processes' (or mechanisms) which are responsible for generating descriptions of 
system purpose/form, explanations of system functioning and observed systems, and 
predictions of future system states. These are the basis for accurate situation assessments 
which in turn result in situation awareness. The adaptive, externally-directed 
consciousness that Smith and Hancock referred to as situation awareness, is in essence 
what cognitive psychologists refer to as situation assessments, which lead to the state of 
being situationally aware or 'situation awareness'. Harwood et al (1988) capture this same 
notion as follows, "...a pilot who is 'situationally aware' could also be described as 
possessing an accurate mental model of the situation. This model must be updated 
continuously in order to maintain situational awareness in the dynamically changing 
environment" (p. 318). To this should have been added, "which is done through accurate 
situational assessments." 49 
4.2.9 Approaches to Measuring Situation Awareness 
Although the concept of situation awareness remains shrouded in clouds of 
ambiguity, efforts are being made to measure and thus gain a better understanding of it. 
Harwood et al (1988) envision these approaches as "varying in the extent to which they tap 
explicit or implicit situational knowledge" (p. 318). They liken these to a continuum; the 
'probe technique' otherwise known as intrusive in-flight assessment techniques, lies on the 
'explicit' end of the continuum, while methods or approaches to 'capturing' the agent's 
mental model lie on the 'implicit' end of the continuum. Endsley's (1988) SAGAT or 
Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique is a classic example of those that lie on 
the explicit end. Basically, in such techniques, a simulated flight scenario is frozen at 
random intervals of time, all cockpit displays as well as the outside view are blocked out, 
and the pilot is asked a series of questions, as Sarter and Woods (1991) quote Endsley 
(1988), to "determine his [the pilot's] knowledge of the situation at that exact moment in 
time" (p. 54). Sarter and Woods (1991) point out that such techniques measure at best 
what information the pilot is able to 'recall' while being deprived of the dynamic flight 
context, which in the real world is a very important source of information for dealing with 
the situation. According to them, they do not provide data about the "natural character and 
occurrence of situation awareness" (p. 54). Harwood et al (1988) refer to the work of 
Marshak, Kuperman, Ramsey, and Wilson (1987) to measuring situational awareness in 
map displays, and group them as the 'probe technique', also lying on the 'explicit' end of 
the continuum. However, while referring to the same technique, Sarter and Woods believe 
that such "...after-the-fact data collection such as debriefing requires context-deprived 
intentional retrieval of information. Because situation awareness can comprise information 
that is unconscious in the first place until it becomes activated by incoming data patterns..." 
(p. 54). Thus, such techniques lead to a distortion in the assessment of pilot's situation 
awareness. 
As stated above, at the implicit end of the continuum are approaches to 'capturing' 
the agent's mental model. Harwood et al (1988) suggest that "mental models may be 
captured by tapping knowledge structures, represented as domain-specific procedural 
knowledge" (p. 318). The connection between situation awareness and mental models has 
already been established. Harwood et al infer that the "organization of this information 
[information regarding the four dimensions of situation awareness discussed above] in 
memory has a critical impact on the construction of an accurate situational representation, 
and on the resulting performance" (p. 318). By using techniques such as Multidimensional 
Scaling (MDS), Wickens (1992) and his colleagues are currently working on assessing the 50 
pilot's structural knowledge component in a dynamic environment, from which an inferred 
assessment of situation awareness can hopefully be made. Mental models and the 
difficulties, including the fundamental limitations of being able to 'capture' them, at least in 
totality, have already been discussed. 
This concludes the discussion on the concept of situation awareness. The next 
section treats Individual Factors and their relevance to crew performance. 
4.3 Individual Factors 
A goal of this research is to provide a better understanding of crew performance. 
With regards to pilot performance, Helmreich (1986) cites ability, personality, and 
attitudes to be three individual characteristics that are major determinants of pilot 
performance. 
Ability in this context refers to knowledge and skill. The preceding sections 
discussed in detail the two concepts of mental models and situation awareness. Both these 
concepts lay the foundation for understanding individual performance. Previously, it was 
noted that mental models are a way of representing individual knowledge. Essentially, they 
allow for a framework to understand human performance. Even Rasmussen (1990) in 
discussing human performance as being either skill-based, rule-based, or knowledge-
based, invokes the concepts of "...dynamic internal world model" and "...mental model 
[italics added] which may take several forms" (p. 63). Mental models thus provide a 
framework for understanding what Helmreich (1986) refers to as "ability". But what about 
personality and attitudes? 
This section is devoted to understanding the aspects of performance related to the 
concept of personality and attitudes. An overview of the theories of personality is 
presented, with the goal of providing a better understanding of this ambiguous concept. 
This is followed by an overview of current research concerning the role of personality and 
attitudes and their influence on pilot performance or behavior. Although personality and 
attitudes are thought to distinctly influence behavior by some, not everyone agrees with this 
notion. A summary of both viewpoints is presented. Finally, the understanding of the 
concepts of personality and attitudes is sought to be enhanced by offering an interpretation 
of these concepts in terms of the concept of mental models. 51 
4.3.1 Definition of Personality 
Hawkins (1993) describes personality as being "...deep-seated characteristics 
which constitute the essence of a person. They are stable and very resistant to change 
though certain traits seem to have some tendency to alter in middle age" (p. 172). An 
attitude according to him, "can be seen as a learned and rather enduring tendency to 
respond favorably or unfavorably to people, decisions, organizations, or other objects" (p. 
173). 
There are other definitions of personality, based on the theory or viewpoint 
adopted. These are better understood in the context of the specific theories which are 
discussed below. 
4.3.2 Theories of Personality 
Human beings respond to stimuli or changes in the environment. The concept of 
personality seeks to address both, how we react to these stimuli as well as why we react the 
way we do. Apparently distinct, these questions are actually interrelated. 
Personality, according to Carson (1969), generally "...refers to the regularities or 
inconsistencies that characterize a given individual's behavioral repertoire; these regularities 
are believed somehow to distinguish the individual as a person and to render his behavior 
predictable" (p. 9). The two theories of personality basically disagree over how these 
regularities or inconsistencies that characterize a person are acquired. 
As Carson (1969) notes, there are several ways that the above mentioned 
regularities of behavior can be sought to be explained or accounted for. One such set of 
explanations make up what Carson refers to as "inherited disposition theories" (p. 8). 
Since early days, psychologists have believed that there are some innate characteristics 
within an individual which cause him/her to consistently react in certain ways. These 
characteristics are very resistant to change, and typically remain stable throughout one's 
life. i.e. "...tend to suggest a permanent and static quality  a relatively invariant structural 
foundation" (p. 8). These characteristics, or the individual's makeup is known as 
personality. 
Inherited disposition theories are disputed by others who do not agree in attributing 
a static quality to personality. In the early days, proponents of the inherited disposition 
theories suggested a kind of inherited reaction pattern approach to explaining or predicting 
behavior. This strategy, as Carson points out, failed because in order to do so, one would 52 
have to postulate an indeterminate number of possible inheritance patterns. Further, as a 
social psychologist would argue, people change throughout their lives. Sometimes, 
dramatic alterations of behavior are seen as a result of a radical change in the individual's 
environment, for example as seen in prisoner-of-war camps. An opposite viewpoint of 
personality thus emerges, which recognizes the importance of the individual's environment 
and its tendency to make consistent or uniform demands upon him. The recognition of this 
aspect of behavior, as the author mentions has been responsible for the sociological 
theories of personality. A radical form of this view is that which "...asserts that personality 
is nothing more than the constellation of a person's social roles" (p. 8). 
But even such a theory is countered by empirical observations where people continue to 
display salient individual differences in behavior despite being subjected to the influence of 
powerful and uniform environmental demand characteristics, as in the military. 
While the above two theories present opposite ends of the spectrum, there is a 
middle-ground, as Carson (1969) refers to, which are known as interactional theories of 
personality. Carson's writings reflect the ideas of Sullivan (1953), the eminent American 
psychiatrist and social scientist, who defined personality as "...the relatively enduring 
pattern of recurrent interpersonal situations which characterize a human life" (p. 110). 
Reflecting upon the ideas of Sullivan, Carson writes that Sullivan "...regards personality as 
inconceivable other than in the context of interpersonal relations, except perhaps as a mere 
'hypothetical entity" (p. 25). As Carson further clarifies, personality can thus be 
conceived of "...as manifesting itself only in interpersonal relationships, whether real or 
illusory" (p. 26). 
The thrust of these theories is that dispositional tendencies do not exist within 
individuals (i.e., are not innate characteristics per se) but are acquired in the course of 
experience as a result of interactions with other individuals who are part of a stimulus 
providing environment. Another important feature that this view stresses upon is the fact 
that it is not so much the environment that determines the response, but one's perception of 
the environment that influences behavior. Perhaps this idea is best captured by the words 
of Kurt Lewin (1935) as cited in Carson (1969) who states, "a person's behavior in any 
situation is jointly determined by the characteristics of that situation, as he perceives them, 
and by the particular dispositions of which he is possessed at that time" (p. 9). 53 
4.3.3 Attitudes and Performance 
In discussing the role of personality and attitudes on individual performance, 
Helmreich, Chidester, Foushee, Gregorich and Wilhelm (1990) note that "...personality 
characteristics of crew members may be a limiting factor on the potential impact of crew 
coordination training" (p. 10). In addition to the use of personality tests traditionally used 
for pilot selection and training, Helmreich (1984) has developed a Cockpit Management 
Attitudes Questionnaire (CMAQ) as a tool to assessing the role of attitudes on flightdeck 
training. Since then research has been conducted by him and his colleagues to determine 
the correlation between measured attitudes and crew coordination capabilities as assessed 
by check airmen. (Helmreich, Foushee, Benson, & Russini, 1987). Results from their 
studies indicate that attitudes among crewmembers differ significantly on a number of 
issues regarding ffightdeck management. Further, as Helmreich (1986) notes, while 
attitudes are more amenable to change than basic personality traits, "...they [attitudes] also 
have considerable inertia and resistance to modification."  Further, as Helmreich et al 
(1990) note, "...while training can be shown to change attitudes (as on the CMAQ), it is 
not likely to alter deeply ingrained, stable, personality traits" (p. 10). Such studies have 
provided valuable guidelines for CRM training such as the importance of involving 
crewmembers in the development of CRM training programs and the reinforcement of 
training through recurrent means such as LOFT. 
4.3.4 Personality and Performance 
In a study of job performance by Helmreich, Sawin, & Carlsrud (1986), it was 
found that while personality factors did not predict performance in training, they were 
likely to influence performance in the long run (i.e., after the training was over). These 
results, as Helmreich (1986) notes, "...were interpreted in terms of a 'honeymoon effect' 
the tendency of all individuals to try hard during the excitement of training for a new 
position" (p. 17). 
Chidester and Foushee (1988) used statistical techniques such as cluster analysis 
for analyzing attitudinal data collected with the help of the CMAQ as part of the evaluation 
of a U.S. Air Force Military Airlift Command recurrent training program in CRM. They 
identified subgroups of pilots along performance-related personality dimensions. They 
identified three clusters or subgroups of pilots: positive instrumental/interpersonal, negative 
instrumental and low motivational. Subsequent studies involving full-mission simulations 54 
attempted to identify the impact of differences between pilot personalities and crew 
coordination training, using the results of the cluster analysis (Chidester, Helmreich, 
Gregorich, & Geis, 1991). Findings of these studies were consistent with those of 
Helmreich and his colleagues. Basically, Chidester et al identified consistent differences in 
crew performance based on the three discernible personality types of captains. They agreed 
that "personality appears to set some limits, is stable over time, and is resistant to change" 
(p. 41). Their fmdings appear to have significant implications for pilot selection and 
training. 
4.3.5 The Other Side 
Despite the apparently convincing empirical studies cited above, there are many 
among the aviation community who challenge the very hypothesis that personality traits and 
performance are related. While denying the existence of any useful relationships between 
personality traits and pilot performance, Besco (1994) writes, "The concept of 
performance-related personality traits is akin to the emperor's new clothes" (p. 24). He 
cites the work of Hunter and Burke (1990, 1992) who upon conducting a thorough search 
of the literature "...found no useful relationships between existing measures of personality 
and pilot performance" (p. 25). After all, "every human personality characteristic known to 
behavioral scientists can be found at all performance levels....[thus] what does distinguish 
good pilots from mediocre pilots is the results they achieve...not the personality traits they 
bring to the cockpit" (p. 27). 
Besco (1994) criticizes existing measures of pilot personality and their use in 
selection programs as being lacking in scientific validity and practical utility. When 
problems of validity do arise, he claims that most personality researchers tend to attribute 
these to "...poorly defined concepts as 'the honeymoon effect' and to the restricted range of 
personality characteristics found in the pilot population" (p. 25). On the basis of these 
observations, he cautions against using present personality screening instruments to 
improve the performance of pilot groups. Besco notes that most breakdowns in pilot 
performance that are sought to be linked with personality traits are actually more correctly 
categorized as cockpit resource management problems. In disagreeing with attributing 
CRM breakdowns to pilot personalities, he states: 
In the absence of data demonstrating that personality problems lead to 
resource management breakdowns, it seems that behavioral scientists who 
promote the personality difference theories have developed those theories 55 
based solely on personal biases, professional preconceptions, and academic 
armchair logic. (p. 25) 
4.3.6 Interpretation of Personality 
It is clear from the above paragraphs that there exist several viewpoints with regards 
to personality. To date, the very concept of personality remains a debatable issue among 
psychological and sociological circles. This is reflected in the disagreement in the aviation 
community with regards to the validity of the personality-performance connection and the 
utility of existing personality measures as applied to pilot performance and selection. 
It is not attempted to resolve this dilemma although for the purposes of this research 
it becomes important to clearly define what is meant by personality. Instead, it is believed 
that personality and attitudes are better understood by invoking the concept of mental 
models earlier discussed. 
Previously it was noted that Norman (1983) outlines the concept of mental models 
by stating, "In interacting with the environment, people form internal, mental models of 
themselves and of things with which they are interacting" (p. 7). Further he points out that 
these mental models provide predictive and explanatory power for the operator's 
understanding of the interaction between the operator and the system environment with 
which he/she is interacting. 
Although much of our discussion in the section on mental models might have 
appeared to center around systems involving things or equipment, Norman's (1983) 
definition reminds us that individuals may form mental models of more than just "things" in 
the environment, but of other individuals as well as of themselves. Although a simple 
premise, it is important to recognize that an individual's environment consists of more than 
just things or equipment. Thus, it is plausible that an individual holds a mental model of 
the interactions with those individuals, in fact he/she might hold several different mental 
models of interaction depending on the situation. Carson (1969) captures the interactional 
concept of personality as follows: 
The behavior of the two persons engaged in a typical dyadic interaction is 
determined by the dispositional tendencies inherent in each of them at the 
time and by their perceptions of their own and of each other's behavior, as 
well as their perceptions of other aspects of the situation  perceptions 
biased in turn by their dispositional tendencies. (p. 12) 56 
The concept of mental models offers an interpretation of the above concept of 
personality. A mental model of one's self would incorporate many of the responses to 
one's environment or dispositional tendencies, which would include a repertoire of 
responses to the other individual's in the environment as well as other aspects of the 
situation. In short, an individual's mental model of self and of others would include what 
is characteristically known as the individual's personality and attitude. 
Besides personality and attitudes there are other individual characteristics or factors 
that are uncontroversially linked with individual performance. Examples of these are 
fatigue, deterioration of the senses such as loss of sight, and incapacitation. I refer to these 
as the physiological component of individual factors. This physiological component is 
distinct from the cognitive or interpersonal components which are the focus of this thesis. 
Although they do affect performance, their further consideration is considered to be beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
This concludes the discussion on Individual Factors. The next section treats crew 
performance from a group perspective, as different from the individual perspective so far 
adopted. 
4.4 Crews and Teams 
The preceding sections discussed concepts underlying human performance, but 
focused on the individual. In other words, human performance with the individual 
perspective was discussed. Most modem commercial aircraft, however, are not flown by 
individual pilots, but by crews or groups of two or three pilots. In fact, an airline cockpit 
crew is a team (Hackman, 1993). Thus, as Hackman suggests, "...understanding the 
behavior and performance of cockpit crews requires careful attention to team-as-a-whole 
issues, not just to the behaviors of individual team members" (p. 47). But what is meant 
by crews, groups and teams? And what is meant by 'team-as-a-whole' issues? Do these 
terms really mean something different, or are they merely hypothetical constructs to account 
for some things inexplainable? This section addresses these questions and more. First, a 
closer look is taken at what is meant by the terms by examining some key definitions within 
the context of group theory. Some of the current research into crew performance from a 
group perspective is then briefly discussed. This is then followed by an interpretation of 
team building within the context of the theory of shared mental models. 57 
4.4.1 Group Dynamics 
Group theory is concerned with the study of groups and group processes. The 
field of group processes, also known as group dynamics, refers to the study of individuals 
interacting in small groups (Luft, 1984). Groups are ubiquitously present in every facet of 
society; no one denies their existence. If an individual is considered to be the basic unit of 
humanity, a group can be considered the basic unit of society. However, there exists 
considerable ambiguity surrounding the notion of groups. 
Various definitions of 'group' abound in the literature, depending on the context, 
viewpoint, and purpose of the definition. 
Vander Zanden (1977) define a group as "two or more people who share a feeling 
of unity and are bound together in relatively stable patterns of social interaction" (p. 400). 
In describing the characteristics of a group as being a product of social definitions, he 
clarifies that "...groups are states of mind mental models or images at varying levels of 
awareness" (p. 403). Further, he states that groups are intangible, without substance in the 
real world and are fabricated in the course of social interaction by clustering people together 
in social units. 
Luft (1984), as a basic point of reference, refers to a group as "...a living system, 
self-regulating through shared perception and interaction, sensing, and feedback, and 
through interchange with its environment" (p. 2). 
While definitions might differ, almost everyone, including Ginnett (1993) agrees 
that "...groups are something more than merely a collection of the individuals comprising 
them" (p. 76). It is this 'something more' that no one is quite clear about. The following 
section tries to explain what groups are really about. 
4.4.2 Groups and Crews 
According to Luft (1984), to constitute a group, a collection of people must meet 
certain criteria: 
1.	  Some interaction must take place. 
2.	  Some purpose or goal must be shared. 
3.	  Some differentiation of behavior or function must begin to emerge. 
4.	  There must be more worth or value in being within the group than 
being outside of it.  (p. 7) 58 
Comparing an airline cockpit crew with Luft's criteria, there is no doubt, as Ginnett 
(1993) states, that "A crew is a group..." (p. 71). During the course of performing its 
duties, crewmembers obviously interact with each other. They share many goals, at least 
one of them being to safely transport their passengers or payload from one destination to 
another. The functions of each crewmember are clearly defined, as are their behaviors. 
Each crewmember is highly trained and is aware of the role he/she plays as part of the 
crew. Thus, there already exists a differentiation of functions; there isn't a need for it to 
'emerge'. Most pilots take great pride in their work; indeed most of them fly for the "love 
of flying." Once irt the air, each crewmember does his/her best to accomplish the mission's 
goals. No matter which way one looks at it, pilots certainly attach a lot of worth to being a 
part of a crew. 
4.4.3 The Group as an Emergent Whole 
The 'something more' in groups is often explained through the understanding of a 
group as an emergent whole. The Merriam-Websters dictionary (1993) explains emergent 
as something that arises unexpectedly, something that is newly formed, which involves the 
appearance of complex new characters or qualities that cannot be predicted solely from the 
study of less complex levels. The group as an emergent whole gives rise to certain 
associated emergent properties which describe group behavior. In order to understand the 
theory underlying group dynamics, it is necessary to have an understanding of this 
concept. 
In contemporary group dynamics, one often comes across terms that seem to reflect 
the idea of a group as some kind of an entity distinct from each of the individual members, 
something more than their mere 'sum'. 
For instance, Vander Zanden (1977) notes that groups are social entities that exist 
"apart from the particular relationships that people have with one another" (p. 404). 
Further, he writes, "The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Groups have a 
distinctive character in their own right, a character that lies in the linking of people apart 
from the particular individuals who are linked" (p. 404). 
Luft (1984) cites several examples of terms such as herd instinct (Trotter, 1916), 
group mind (Le Bon, 1960) and syntality or group personality (Cattell, 1956), that have 
been around for decades, each attempting to capture a phenomenon distinct from those 
associated with individuals. Kurt Lewin (1948), who Luft notes is considered to be the 
father of group dynamics, attributed the success of a teacher in a classroom to 'group 59 
atmosphere'. According to Luft, "...all these showed the need for group-relevant terms to 
serve as intervening variables in the building of adequate theories" (p. 11). In defending 
the group perspective, Luft writes, "There is nothing mystical about assuming that a group 
(as well as a certain number of individuals) is present. The group perspective is but 
another way of approaching a familiar phenomenon" (p. 11). 
The idea of a group as an emergent whole may be difficult to grasp, at least initially. 
To do so, there has to be a paradigm shift in focus from the individual to the group. Part of 
the difficulty in understanding groups, as Luft (1984) writes, "...stems from the 
overemphasis on individual personality as well as in contemporary psychology" (p. 135). 
Further, on commenting upon the overemphasizing of egocentrism, he writes, "Whether 
we are attending to dyads, face-to-face groups, or larger communities, we tend to seek 
explanatory ideas by referring to individual personalities rather than to group 
characteristics" (p. 140). In fact, it is precisely such schools of thought that urge 
researchers like Besco (1994) in the aviation community to want to discard the ideas of 
using personality tests as measures for pilot selection and performance assessment. In the 
aviation context, Ginnett (1993) writes, "We are an individualistic culture...we do not 
focus as much attention on the accomplishments of groups as we do on the 
accomplishments of individuals" (p. 71). He mentions the importance assigned to the 
'solo' flight as the goal of a trainee pilot as a classic example of the individual focus. 
Luft (1984) asserts the importance of going beyond the individual focus to 
understand group behavior. He writes, "Understanding the isolated parts of a new 
phenomenon may not be sufficient to understand the whole. The principles of behavior of 
a group are best understood at the level of group activity rather than at the level of 
individual personality" (p. 11). 
4.4.4 Properties of Groups 
Having recognized the significance of seeing the group as an emergent whole, 
attention is now focused on understanding some of the emergent properties or 
characteristics of groups. It is much beyond the scope of this thesis to thoroughly examine 
all group properties, nevertheless, the basic ones are outlined here. An understanding of 
these is necessary to better understand group behavior and thereby crew performance. 
Freud (1922) first proposed the idea that the group as a whole was constantly in a 
state of (focal) conflict at any given time. Klein (1948) suggested that this conflict arose 
out of the wishes and fears of members at a particular stage in a group's development. The 60 
idea of central conflict at the group level is almost analogous to Sullivan's (1953) 
explanations of the driving forces of individual behavior as seen to be arising out of the two 
kinds of needs in individuals; the need for satisfaction and the need for security (avoidance 
of anxiety) (Carson, 1969). The notion of focal conflict has invoked some interesting 
psychodynamic concepts. Firstly, members of the group are not aware of this conflict. 
Secondly, in order to ensure the smooth performance of the group, someone has to bear the 
responsibility of helping to reduce this conflict. Typically, such a person is called the 
leader. As Luft (1984) writes, "The focal issue usually centers on questions surrounding 
authority, the leader, and intermember relationships" (p. 12). In an airline cockpit crew, 
the captain is supposed to be the leader of the group, and it is the captain's responsibility to 
ensure the smooth functioning of the group by reducing focal conflict. 
Luft (1984) distinguishes between group process and content. Content refers to the 
task at hand or the subject matter which the group is concerned with, while "Process refers 
to the real meaning of ongoing activity in a group, in a relationship, or in an individual" (p. 
13). Processes are subtle, difficult to identify, and are not made particularly explicit, yet 
they need to be learnt by experience and dealt with in order to reduce group conflict. 
Group processes,are better understood by examining them within the context of group 
structure. 
4.4.4.1 Boundaries 
Groups have boundaries; these define who belongs to the group and who does not. 
Those who are inside the group serve as reliable possibilities of interaction, while those 
who are outside do not. A boundary, like other properties being discussed, is an emergent 
socio-psychological property. As Vander Zanden (1977) writes, "Group boundaries act 
not as physical barriers, but as discontinuities in the flow of interactions" (p. 401). It is 
seldom explicitly defined, it evolves over the process of interaction. Milgram and Toch 
(1969) qualify boundaries as being penetrable or permeable. The boundary is imagined as 
a kind of mesh or screen which filters some people in and leaves others out. Generally 
speaking, the more permeable the boundary, the greater are the possibilities of interaction. 
As Ginnett (1993) writes, the boundary of an airline cockpit crew is defined to 
some extent by the technology. For example, a cockpit with two seats limits the expected 
boundary to Captain and First Officer. Despite this, the boundary does not have to be 
impermeable. In fact, in a study conducted by Ginnett (1987) at NASA, he found that 
captains who were ranked by other check airmen as being "highly-effective" tended to 61 
expand the group's boundaries to include cabin crewmembers, Air Traffic Control (ATC), 
gate and maintenance personnel and in some cases even the passengers. These captains 
tended to use "we" as against less-effective captains who used "us" for the cockpit crew 
and "you" for cabin crewmembers. 
Thus, one of the important functions of a captain in ensuring that the group 
performs effectively is to expand its boundaries, and include other personnel who can all be 
potentially valuable resources on the flightdeck. 
4.4.4.2 Group structure 
According to Luft (1984), "The structure of a group refers to the arrangement of its 
parts and how those parts relate to one another and to the group as a whole" (p. 16). Parts 
refer to persons, units, roles, status, and hierarchy of group subunits while relations of the 
parts to one another is explained in terms of group norms, rules, and procedures. Further, 
structure in a group is invisible, it has to be inferred. A group which has a task assigned 
will develop certain structure. In other words, "...structure grows out of a need for 
effective group work" (p. 16). A cockpit crew has a well defined task to perform. Much 
of its structure is defined prior to its formation but as the group evolves, its structure 
changes. 
4.4.4.3 Roles 
Luft (1984) defines a role as referring to "...a set of expectations shared by group 
members concerning the behavior of a person who occupies a given position in the group" 
(p. 21). As Luft points out, role is not to be confused with personality or an individual. 
Role is instead imposed by the context of the situation and is associated with a particular 
position. Ginnett (1993) defines a role as "a set of expected behaviors associated with a 
particular position (not a person) in a group or team" (p. 78). Roles evolve because group 
behavior is not random but involves patterns of behavior. Sometimes roles are not clear, or 
match the personalities of individuals occupying those positions either perfectly, partially, 
or not at all. 
In an airline cockpit crew, the roles are well defined. However, group members 
may assume alternating or multiple roles depending upon the situation. A captain is 
expected to assume the role of leader, the first officer and second officer assume the roles 
of followers. Sometimes however, conflicts do arise because of roles. 62 
As Luft (1984) notes, "role conflict arises out of discrepancies between how one is 
expected to behave and one's natural inclinations" (p. 21). Ginnett (1993) refers to this 
kind of conflict as person-role conflict. He also identifies three other kinds of role 
conflicts: intra-sender conflict, inter-sender conflict and inter-role conflict. Intra-sender 
conflict arises when the same person in a group provides another with conflicting signals 
about their expected role. Inter-sender role conflict arises when more than one person in a 
group provide another with conflicting signals on expected behavior. Finally, inter-role 
conflict arises because of two or more different roles played by the same person. 
It is again, the leader's (captain's) responsibility to ensure that role conflicts if any 
are resolved so that they do not manifest themselves in situations which can lead to a 
breakdown in performance. 
4.4.4.4 Status 
According to Ginnett (1993), "Status is the relative ranking of individuals within a 
group setting" (p. 81). As Luft (1984) notes, "Status (value, prestige, power) and 
hierarchy of group subunits are aspects of structure, and these may be established formally 
or informally" (p. 16). In the case of airline cockpit crews, status pre-exists with the 
position that each crewmember occupies. Conflict can arise as a result of incompatibility or 
incongruence in status, similar to role conflict. Assessing and taking appropriate action to 
resolve status conflict is thus also an important function that is the captain's responsibility. 
4.4.4.5 Authority 
Ginnett (1993) defines authority as "...the right to use power and influence" (p. 
81). Responsibility and authority go hand in hand. Authority is derived from the legal or 
legitimate power given to a crewmember and is associated with his/her position, but 
authority can also be derived or commanded from other group members based on expertise. 
For instance, the foreman in a group in an industrial setting is typically the one with the 
authority assigned to him/her but this authority, if not controlled or channeled properly, is 
easily eroded if the foreman lacks technical expertise, particularly if another group member 
demonstrates a higher level of expertise than the foreman. 
The same is true for an airline cockpit crew. The captain is the one assigned the 
authority. As Edwards (1988) writes, "Problems have arisen and have been reflected in the 
accident record, when the captain's role has been overemphasized and when it has been 63 
underemphasized" (p. 16). Edwards (1975) refers to the authority variable to be optimized 
as the trans-cockpit authority gradient (TAG) and notes that its appropriate establishment is 
necessary to ensure high standards of flight-deck management and interpersonal 
relationships. However, research in simulator studies shows that there is generally little 
danger of the captain's authority being usurped. On the contrary, it often becomes 
necessary for the captain to "lower" the TAG so as to encourage input from other 
crewmembers who may be reluctant to speak up. In fact, the focus of early CRM training 
was on "assertiveness training", or training the crewmembers to assert themselves, 
particularly under potentially critical conditions. The TAG is also known by some as the 
authority dynamic (Ginnett, 1993). Ginnett cites a study by Harper, Kidera, & Cullen 
(1971) in which first officers were reluctant to take over control even though the captains 
feigned incapacitation. From this study, he infers that "...the authority dynamic 
surrounding the role of the captain must be extremely powerful" (p. 81). Ginnett also 
notes that the authority relationship in airline crews is bound to factors such as aviation 
history, regulations and to individual crewmember characteristics. 
4.4.4.6 Norms 
Ginnett (1993) defines norms as "the informal rules that groups adopt to regulate 
group members' behavior" (p. 79). Hackman and Walton (1986) note that "Norms 
regulate many aspects of group life....for example, how members relate to one another or 
how much effort they expend on the task" (p. 84). Norms provide expectations about 
behavior. Like other emergent properties, they are not made explicit, but group members 
learn them as they evolve; typically they are established in the early stages of the group's 
life. Ginnett (1993) points out two important features of norms: 1) They do not govern all 
behaviors but just the ones the group feels are important, and 2) they are more likely to be 
noticed by an outsider than a group member. 
Ginnett (1993) notes that a captain may communicate norms in a variety of ways. 
For example, the captain may make explicit certain norms in the crew briefing or by talking 
explicitly about their importance, or the captain may communicate the norm by setting an 
example. In Ginnett's (1987) study, he noted that the most common norms made explicit 
by effective captains were those regarding the importance of safety, and the importance of 
effective communication and cooperation among crewmembers. Attention is now focused 
on teams. 64 
4.4.5 Teams 
Above were discussed preliminary concepts of group theory relevant to 
understanding crew performance from a group perspective. From this perspective, it is the 
group or the crew who flies the airplane and not just a collection of individual pilots. Since 
it is the group that is flying the airplane it is important to understand what makes the group 
effectively perform its duties, and in order to do so, some key group dynamic concepts as 
relevant to the crew were discussed. The responsibility of ensuring the smooth 
performance of a group is often referred to as the function of team-building and 
maintenance. Ginnett (1993) makes some specific recommendations for the group leader to 
ensure smooth group functioning while Hackman and Walton (1986) provide a discussion 
of the theory underlying team building and maintenance. Some elements of these are further 
elaborated upon below. 
Before proceeding with a theory of team building, a closer look is taken at teams. 
Why is an airline cockpit crew referred to as a team? Is team different from group? Some 
defmitions of teams are examined below. 
In discussing current research on group decision making, Orasanu (1990) points 
out two distinct lines which according to her, seldom interact. She notes that one line of 
research focuses on group deliberation, typically involving groups whose goal is to reach 
some kind of a consensus on a problem, for example faculty committees or jury trials. The 
other line of research, she notes, deals with groups who are involved in making decisions 
which play a role in ongoing behavior (i.e., are within the context of performing some kind 
of a task other than merely reaching a decision). Further, she writes, "Most often we 
would call these.groups teams or crews. They exist to perform some task...not just to 
make a decision, and possess knowledge and skill relevant to the task" (p. 3). 
Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Converse (1993) define a team as "A group of two or 
more individuals who must interact cooperatively and adaptively in pursuit of shared valued 
objectives" (p. 222). Further, in accordance with Orasanu's (1990) above definition, 
Cannon-Bowers et al note that members of a team are homogeneous with respect to 
expertise, roles and responsibilities i.e. "...have clearly defined differentiated roles and 
responsibilities, hold task-relevant knowledge, and are interdependent" (p. 222). 
Even though some researchers have attempted to delineate between a group and a 
team, the distinction remains fuzzy. Yet, this may not be as much of a dilemma as it might 
appear. After all, a team could be viewed as a "special case" of a group, with additional 
constraints or requirements. It is therefore concluded that there might not be a distinct cut­
off between the concept of group and team. In fact, they could be conceptualized to lie 65 
along a continuum, the team denoting a highly effective group in a task-performing 
environment (F. Bernieri, personal communication, June 29, 1994). 
4.4.6 Team Building and Maintenance 
Hackman and Walton (1986) propose a theory of team performance by applying a 
functional approach to analyzing team behavior. In maintaining that "...there is no single, 
unidimensional criterion of team effectiveness..." (p. 79), they define group effectiveness 
along three dimensions which briefly involve the degree to which the group performs what 
it was supposed to accomplish, the degree to "...which the process of carrying out the 
work enhances the capability of members to work together interdependently in the future" 
(p. 78), and the degree to which the group experience was personally rewarding or 
satisfying to each group member. For the sake of brevity, I refer to these three dimensions 
as the task dimension, the social dimension, and the personal dimension respectively. 
In recognizing the difficulties in using traditional cause and effect thinking in 
understanding group effectiveness, Hackman and Walton (1986) instead analyze group 
effectiveness in terms of necessary ingredients. Their result is a list of five conditions 
which they believe are the "...key to the effectiveness of task-performing teams in 
organizations..." (p. 87). These are listed below: 
1.  Clear, engaging direction. 
2.	  An enabling performance situation. 
A group structure that fosters competent task work. 
An organizational context that supports and 
reinforces excellence. 
Available, expert coaching and process assistance. 
3.  Adequate material resources. (p. 87) 
Hackman (1993) notes that "it is now generally recognized throughout the aviation 
community that cockpit crews are task-performing teams" (p. 54). In applying the 
conclusions of the above functional analysis to cockpit crews, he notes three important 
facts about cockpit crews: cockpit crews are teams, the captain is the team leader, and 
crews operate in an organizational context. Each of these facts have several implications 
for the organization, the captain, as well as the crewmembers for ensuring team-
effectiveness. Among the implications for the organization (senior managers) are its being 
able to provide clear direction i.e. "communicate to captains...what is expected of them and 
their crews and...the degree to which captains are given sufficient latitude to achieve those 66 
directions" (p. 57). The organization also bears ultimate responsibility for providing 
adequate material resources such as proper training, but both these points pertain to the 
conditions outside the cockpit. 
Ensuring team-effectiveness inside the cockpit consists of taking into consideration 
the implications of the second point noted above (i.e., providing an enabling performance 
situation). Primary responsibility for this essential function implicitly rests with the 
captain, but is nevertheless shared by all crewmembers. Hackman (1993) notes three team-
building activities that captains can and should perform. They are, establishing  group 
boundaries, "...helping the crew come to terms with any special requirements of the day's 
work, and establishing the basic norms of conduct that will guide behavior in the crew" (p. 
56). Ginnett (1993) confirms these activities in his observations of crew behavior. In 
addition to Hackman's suggestions for fine-tuning team performance he suggests the 
establishment of an appropriate authority dynamic as being an important team-building 
activity, particularly where airline crews are concerned. 
4.4.7 Team Building and Shared Mental Models 
Previously, it was noted that the concept of mental models has been invoked as a 
framework to explain the cognitive mechanisms underlying individual human performance. 
This notion of (individual) mental models has quite logically been extended by researchers 
to explain group or team performance. In doing so, researchers (Klein & Serfaty, 1989; 
Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993) have proposed the notion of shared mental models. In 
referring to the phenomenon of team performance and team decision making, Cannon-
Bowers et al. propose that conceptualizing teamwork in terms of shared mental models 
an effective means to understand this rather elusive phenomenon" (p. 222). 
Orasanu (1990) also invokes the concept of shared mental models by stating, "Shared 
Mental Models [italics added] are needed if all crewmembers are to work toward the same 
goal" (p. 4). 
Groups have traditionally been assigned emergent properties as discussed above. 
Likewise, the notion of shared mental models associated with teams may be viewed as an 
emergent property of teams. 
A fundamental purpose of mental models is to enable the prediction of the situation 
in the future (i.e., generate an expectation or projection of system state). The main purpose 
of shared mental models thus, is to generate common expectations among team members. 
Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993) hypothesize that "team effectiveness is a function of the 67 
compatibility of expectations generated from team members' mental models" (p. 228). 
Although the formation of shared mental models does imply the generation of common 
expectations among members, as Cannon-Bowers et al clarify, it does not mandate 
individual mental models held by team members to be identical. Cannon-Bowers et al 
define shared mental models as: 
lmowledge structures held by members of a team that enable them to form 
accurate explanations and expectations of the task, and, in turn, to 
coordinate their actions and adapt their behavior to demands of the task and 
other team members. (p. 228) 
Shared mental models are formed through effective communication between team 
members. The importance of effective communications in ensuring the efficiency and 
safety of operations has since long been recognized. With the advent of video-taped full-
mission simulation, several studies have been conducted to closely analyze communications 
under different situations and determine the link between communication patterns and 
performance (see section on 'CRM- Guidelines, research and training' in Chapter 3). A 
full-mission simulation study by Chidester, Kanki, Foushee, Dickinson, and Bowles 
(1990) and its subsequent analyses by Kanki, Palmer, & Veinott (1991) made interesting 
observations on the link between personality, communication patterns and performance 
(also see previous section on 'Personality and Performance'). As Kanki and Palmer 
(1993) note, "Negative expressive captains initiated less total speech than did other types of 
captains, and these were the same crews who made the most errors..." (p. 117). 
In an analyses of data collected from simulation studies conducted by Foushee, 
Lauber, Baetge, and Acomb (1986) and the Chidester et al. (1990) study mentioned above, 
Orasanu (1990) analyzed communications in crews determined as high and low 
performing. In doing so, she focused on the role of communication patterns in building 
shared situation models. On the basis of her observations, she suggests that "...the good 
captains, by articulating plans and strategies, create a context in which their commands and 
information requests take on meaning. This articulation helps to build a shared mental 
model for the situation" (p. 15). Finally, she concludes that "through communication 
crews develop a shared understanding of the nature of the problem, solution strategies, cue 
significance, and participant roles and responsibilities" (p. 15). 
Since a system can be understood at various levels, it is hypothesized that 
individuals hold multiple mental models of a system (Rouse & Moths, 1986). Based on 
the notion of multiple mental models, Cannon-Bowers et al (1993) suggest that team 
members interacting with a system may hold several mental models of the task at hand and 68 
of the team. Specifically, they outline four types of models that may be held by individual 
team members, namely (a) equipment model, (b) task model, (c) team-interaction model, 
and (d) team model. The equipment model refers to the dynamics and control of the 
equipment with which they are interacting. The task model refers to an understanding of 
task procedures, likely contingencies, likely scenarios, task strategies and environmental 
constraints. The team-interaction model refers to the individual's roles, responsibilities and 
role interdependencies, while the team model refers to familiarity with the knowledge, 
skills, abilities, preferences and tendencies of other team members. The team model is 
essentially the shared mental model that would be formed by a sharing of individual mental 
models of the self, previously discussed in the section on 'personality and mental models'. 
Further, as Cannon-Bowers et al note, these shared mental models are not independent of 
each other (i.e., they do interact with each other). 
Sharing of these four models held by individual team members would result in there 
being at least four shared situation models. This enables the defmition of the knowledge 
content of shared situation models. Cannon-Bowers et al (1993) hypothesize that for 
effective team performance, "...team members must share those mental models that 
describe when and how they must interact with one another in order to accomplish the task" 
(p. 234). They therefore conclude that individual team members may not need to share 
their individual equipment models, but they would need to share their other three mental 
models viz. those of the task, team-interaction, and of the team. 
From the above, it can be concluded that the building and maintenance of a team 
would comprise the formation of at least three 'shared situation models' as follows: 
Shared Task Model This would include knowledge about each other's tasks, task 
procedures, and task strategies. This would "...create expectations about how events are 
likely to unfold and how the team is likely to respond to task demands..." (p. 234). 
Shared Team-interaction Model This would include knowledge about how each 
team member must interact with the other. In terms of group theory, this would mean a 
shared understanding and acceptance of group characteristics such as norms, roles, status, 
and authority. This model would lead to the generation of expectations about behavior, 
enabling team members to effectively monitor each other's behavior and adequately 
respond to it. 
Shared Team Model - This would include information regarding the knowledge, 
skills, abilities, preferences, and tendencies of particular teammates so that behavior can be 
tailored accordingly. Essentially, this refers to a sharing of individual mental models of the 
self. In accordance with the discussion on 'mental models of the self and for the sake of 
consistency, these will be referred to as Shared Team-personal Models. 69 
4.4.8 Team performance and Group Situation Awareness 
Previously, it was noted that individual mental models are seen as being the basis 
for adequate situation assessments. Accurate situation assessments, in turn result in 
situation awareness, which is critically linked with performance. In other words, accurate 
individual situation models lead to individual situation awareness. (see section on Mental 
Models and Situation Awareness). 
Extending the concept of individual situation awareness to group settings, Wellens 
(1989) defines group situation awareness as "the sharing of a common perspective between 
two or more individuals regarding current environmental events, their meaning and 
projected future status" (p. 6). Further, he assumes that high degrees of group situation 
awareness results in high degrees of group coordination and task performance. 
The concept of extending the notion of individual situation awareness to group 
situation awareness is similar to the extension of the notion of individual mental models to 
that of shared mental models. As such, the distinction between (individual) mental models 
and (individual) situation awareness (Saner & Woods, 1991) is also relevant to the 
distinction between the concepts of shared mental models and group situation awareness. 
As was mentioned earlier, Cannon-Bowers et al (1993) clarify that the sharing of 
mental models does not mandate individual mental models to be identical. Wellens (1993) 
with regards to maintaining high degrees of group situation awareness notes, "This is not 
to say that all members of a group should strive to obtain totally overlapping SA [situation 
awareness] zones" (p. 272). Further, he notes that, "The key to optimal group SA appears 
to be arranging group members such that enough overlap occurs to maintain group 
coordination while allowing enough separation to maximize coverage of the relevant 
environment" (p. 272). 
The above views are briefly summarized as follows. Shared mental models lead to 
group situation awareness. The greater the sharing of mental models, the higher is the level 
of group situation awareness. This results in high degrees of group coordination and task 
performance, resulting in a high degree of team effectiveness. 
The above completes the interpretation of groups and teams in the context of mental 
model theory. This concludes the chapter on the theory underlying crew performance. In 
the next chapter, principles of systems engineering and modeling are applied towards 
developing a model of crew performance which creates a framework for its understanding. 70 
5. MODELING CREW PERFORMANCE
 
Chapter 4 presents elements of the theory underlying crew performance. In 
Chapter 2, it was noted that the concept of CRM remains fuzzy. Many of the issues 
surrounding CRM need more definition. An application of systems theory can lead to a 
better understanding of crew performance and consequently of crew coordination. 
This chapter details the approach and the specific methodology adopted to analyze 
crew performance. Briefly discussed below are fundamental concepts of systems theory, 
along with a discussion of their importance and relevance to crew performance. This is 
followed by a discussion of other concepts including system models and system modeling. 
A detailed description of the specific methodology adopted to analyze crew performance is 
then provided, followed by a detailed description of the model developed as a result of the 
analysis. 
5.1 System Concepts 
The concept of systems is fundamental to human factors. There are many 
viewpoints and thus definitions of systems. From the perspective of general systems 
thinking, Weinberg (1975) defines a system as "...a point of view....a way of looking at 
the world" (p. 52). Douglas Ross, in the foreword to the book by Marca and McGowan 
(1988) writes, "The world and everything in it, including our thoughts about it, can be 
viewed as a system of interacting systems of systems" (p. 
Bailey (1982) as cited in Sanders and McCormick (1993) defines a system as "an 
entity that exists to carry out some purpose" (p. 13). The concept of 'purpose' is 
fundamental to that of a system. As Sanders and McCormick state, "Every system must 
have a purpose, or else it is nothing more than a collection of odds and ends. The purpose 
of the system is the system goal or objective, and systems can have more than one" (p. 16). 
Marca and McGowan (1988) distinguish between natural and constructed systems 
in our world. Natural systems are those existing in nature, such as the solar system, 
whereas constructed systems are designed by human beings and serve to satisfy human 
needs. Almost every constructed system involves the interaction of one or more human 
beings with a machine or a physical component. As such, these systems are referred to as 
human-machine systems and the word system will primarily be meant to refer to these 
human-machine systems. Sanders and McCormick (1993) thus define a system as 71 
"composed of humans, machines, and other things that work together (interact) to 
accomplish some goal which these same systems could not produce independently" (p. 
14). 
From a systems perspective, an aircraft and its crew operating inside the cockpit 
form a complex human-machine system whose purpose is to safely accomplish the mission 
of transporting either a payload of passengers or cargo from one destination to another. By 
treating the crew as a system, it is possible to subject it to the analytic methods of systems 
engineering. 
5.2 Systems Engineering 
In earlier days, systems evolved largely due to a process of trial and error. Modern 
systems are far too complex and expensive to be simply allowed to evolve. Instead, they 
are analyzed and designed then implemented and tested and finally put into operation 
(Marca & McGowan, 1988). There exists no universally accepted definition of systems 
engineering. McGuire, Zich, Goins, Erickson, Dwyer, Cody and Rouse (1990) note that 
"System engineering specialists generally use the term to describe a rigorous and highly 
disciplined development process that is carefully structured to achieve optimum 
performance of the end product" (p. 4). Broadly speaking, system or systems engineering 
is the discipline that concerns itself with the analysis, design, implementation, integration, 
testing and operation of complex human-machine systems. While all phases in the system 
development process are important, the success of all constructed systems depends 
critically on the functions of analysis and design. 
Marca and McGowan (1988) define system engineering as a "discipline for 
specifying subsystems, components, and how they interconnect; for identifying the 
constraints under which a system must operate; and for deciding upon an effective 
combination of people, machine and software to realize a system" (p. xv). The process of 
system description is fundamental to the problem of understanding or the analysis of 
systems. In describing the problems involved in the analysis and design of complex 
systems, the authors write, "Our inability to easily describe, and hence understand, these 
kinds of systems makes their specification, development, and maintenance time-consuming 
and expensive, and increases the risk of failure" (p.7). 
Wymore (1976) distinguishes between system analysis and system design by 
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large-scale, complex, man/machine system that is already in existence....system design on 
the other hand, means to develop a model from which a new system will be created" (p. 1). 
5.3 Models and Modeling of Systems 
On models of performance, Wickens (1984) writes, "...models are theoretical 
representations of systems that specify the major components involved and the 
relationships among them" (p. 8). 
In Chapter 3, the topic of representation and mental models was discussed. 
Everything that was said about models in general still applies. A model, in general terms, 
is a representational system; a mental model is a specific case of a knowledge representation 
system. All models by themselves constitute a representational system that seeks to 
represent a represented world. Rumelhart and Norman (1988) were cited in Chapter 3 to 
define a representation as "something that stands for something else. In other words, it is a 
kind of a model of the thing it represents" (p.513). 
As noted above, the world is a system of interacting systems of systems. The goal 
of an analysis of any system is to better understand the interactions between and within 
systems. Typically, these interactions are better understood by creating a model of the 
system. Weinberg (1975) states, "The main role of models is not so much to explain and 
to predict - though ultimately these are the main functions of science - as to polarize 
thinking and to pose sharp questions" (p. 43). Further, he writes, "We do not create the 
world, we make a model....Every model is ultimately the expression of one thing we think 
we hope to understand in terms of another that we think we do understand" (p. 28). 
In less philosophical terms, a model as Marca and McGowan (1988) describe it, "is 
an understanding of a system" (p. 8). Further, modeling a system, is "...the act of 
developing an accurate description of a system" (p.7). 
There are many ways to develop a description or a model of a system. As Wymore 
(1976) writes, "The model can take several forms; it might be as simple as a written verbal 
description, or it might be a set of equations or it might be as complicated as a computer 
program by which the system is simulated" (p. 1). 
5.4 Structured Analysis and Design Technique (SADT) 
A primary goal of this research is to provide a better understanding of crew 
performance. To do so, the crew is viewed as a system as described above. It is hoped 73 
that a rigorous analysis of this system, based on the principles of systems engineering will 
provide this better understanding. The result of this analysis will be the model that is 
developed. 
In the following sections, a graphical model of crew systems, based on a structured 
analysis technique is developed. First, the specific methodology that was used to analyze 
the crew system is described. The application of the methodology to analyzing the crew 
system is described in subsequent sections along with a representation of the model 
developed. 
The Structured Analysis and Design Technique (SADT) is a system description 
language and methodology developed by Douglas T. Ross of Sof Tech, Inc. and first 
introduced in 1973. Although in use by Ross and his colleagues under differentnames and 
notations in unrefined forms even prior to its formal introduction for over a decade, SADT 
found its first major application in the United States Air Force's Integrated Computer-Aided 
Manufacturing Program (ICAM or AFCAM) where it was used to describe the functional 
architecture of manufacturing (Marca & McGowan, 1988). The U.S. Department of 
Defense recognizing the value of SADT made public a subset of SADT, which was known 
as the Integrated DEFinition Language Zero (IDEFO) (Triune Software, Inc., 1993). Since 
then, SADT under the name IDEFO has been used in various applications by both military 
as well as commercial organizations. In fact, a 1991 Small Business Innovative Research 
Program report on systems analysis quality metrics by Williamson (1991) states that 
"IDEFO is the most widely used systems analysis methodology throughout the DoD 
[Department of Defense] and industry" (p. 1). 
As the name suggests, SADT is an analysis tool based on structured logic. It is a 
graphic language and modeling methodology which uses a set of logical analysis 
procedures developed to help accurately describe and thus better understand constructed 
systems of medium complexity. SADT mainly involves two kinds of modeling, function 
or activity modeling and data modeling. Marca and McGowan (1988) describe activity and 
data models as follows: 
Activity models present system activities in a successively detailedmanner, 
and they define the relationship among those activities through the things of 
the system. Data models are the duals of activity models and thus presenta 
continually detailed description of system things interrelated by system 
activities. (p. 8) 
IDEFO is the activity modeling subset of the SADT methodology, and is the one 
adopted for the purpose of analysis of crew systems. Activities are also known as 74 
functions, hence IDEFO modeling is also referred to as a structured functional modeling 
technique. 
5.5 Concepts of IDEFO Modeling 
IDEFO is a structured, graphic modeling methodology which seeks to describe a 
particular system by focusing on system activities as against system things. 
5.5.1 Purpose and Viewpoint 
Above, it was noted that the concept of purpose is fundamental to the concept of 
system. Inextricably linked with purpose is the concept of viewpoint. Another look at the 
definitions of system would serve to clarify this point. Weinberg (1975, p. 52) states, "A 
system is a point of view....a way of looking at the world" (p. 52). Bailey (1982) as cited 
in Sanders and McCormick (1993) defmes a system as "an entity that exists to carry out 
some purpose" (p. 13). Marca and McGowan (1988) write, "The purpose of the model is, 
by defmition, answering a set of questions" (p. 8). The modeling process is thus stopped 
when the model is considered to have adequately answered a set of questions implicit in the 
purpose. IDEFO also stresses the importance of viewpoint, or the perspective from which 
the system is being modeled. Marca and McGowan further write, "Viewpoint [italics 
added] is best thought of as a place, person, or thing one can stand in to view the system in 
operation" (p. 9). A single viewpoint is important for a consistent system description. It is 
important to note that the same system modeled from a different viewpoint may result in a 
different model or description of the system. In IDEFO, system purpose and viewpoint are 
given due importance by requiring the analyst (one who models the system) to explicitly 
define these. 
5.5.2 Subject and Boundary 
No system exists in isolation. Depending on how the system is defined, it can 
always be seen as being part of larger systems. Similarly, a particular system can be 
viewed as being composed of several smaller subsystems. This would depend on one's 
viewpoint. What is considered inside the system, and what is considered outside of it 
would thus depend on how one defmes the boundary of the system (Sanders & 75 
McCormick, 1993} Defining the boundary of the system is referred to as 'bounding the 
subject' in SADT modeling. (Marca and McGowan, 1988). Marca and McGowan write, 
"By bounding a subject, an SADT model helps focus attention on just the system being 
described and avoids introducing extraneous subjects" (p.8). Sanders and McCormick 
(1993) refer to all that is outside the boundaries of the system as its environment. 
5.6 SADT/IDEFO Models 
IDEFO modeling begins with the definition of system subject, purpose and 
viewpoint. Marca and McGowan (1988) describe the process as: 
The subject defines what to include in, and exclude from, the model. The 
viewpoint guides the SADT model builder in selecting the right things to say 
about the subject and staying focused within them. The purpose becomes 
the criterion for determining when to stop the model. The end result of this 
process is a collection of carefully coordinated descriptions, starting from a 
very high -level description of the entire system and ending with detailed 
descriptions of system operation. (p.9) 
An SADT model is essentially a hierarchically organized collection of coordinated 
descriptions of system operation. IDEFO refers to each of these descriptions as a diagram, 
which is the basic work unit of the model. An IDEFO diagram consists of only boxes and 
arrows. Below is presented an overview of the characteristics of boxes and arrows, syntax 
and semantics. The goal is to provide a basic understanding of the IDEFO modeling 
methodology. 
5.6.1 Boxes 
An IDEFO diagram box is drawn as a rectangle (see Figure 1). Each box represents 
a system function or activity. Boxes represent functions or active parts of a system, hence 
boxes are named with verbs or verb phrases. Each side of a box has a specific meaning, 
the left side being reserved for inputs, the top side for controls or constraints, the right side 
for outputs and the bottom side for mechanisms. Each box has arrows touching the 
respective four sides which define the interconnections between boxes. Arrows are 
discussed in further detail below. CONTROLS 
INPUTS 
FUNCTION 
OUTPUTS 
AO 
MECHANISMS 
Purpoie:  To demonstrate an IDEFO model 
I 
The FUNCTION transforms INPUTS into OUTPUTS 
subject to CONTROLS (CONSTRAINTS) with the help 
of MECHANISMS 
Viewpoint:  Tutor 
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The box forms the universal unit for structured analysis in SADT (Marca & 
McGowan, 1988). Each box bounds a well- defined subject (the name of the box). Each 
subject can be divided into its structured pieces; the boxes and arrows that make up a 
diagram. A division of a box into its structured pieces is called decomposition. IDEFO 
models evolve through a process of top-down or hierarchical decomposition. At the top 
level, there is only one box, along with the arrows which touch its four sides. This box 
defines the overall system task to be accomplished, and thus bounds the model. 
Everything inside the box is part of the system to be described and everything outside it 
forms the system's environment. This box is then decomposed into its constituent system 
activities or boxes along with the arrows that interconnect them. 
5.6.2 Arrows 
Arrows in an IDEFO model are single lines with arrowheads at their ends. The tail 
of an arrow is known as its source and its head (with the arrowhead) is known as its 
destination or sink (Marca & McGowan, 1988; Williamson, 1991). Each arrow represents 
a thing or a collection of things. A thing in SADT modeling has a general meaning and can 
mean either a physical entity such as raw materials, products, a crewmember or even 
information presented in any form. In IDEFO, things are also referred to as data and are 
labeled with nouns or noun phrases. There are four kinds of arrows or things : Inputs, 
Controls, Outputs, and Mechanisms. An arrow represents a relationship between boxes 
i.e. data represents interconnections among activities, each relationship or interconnection 
being represented by an arrow connected to one particular side of a box. Input arrows 
enter the function (box) from the left; Output arrows leave the function from the right. 
Control arrows enter the function from the top while Mechanism arrows enter the function 
from the bottom. 
The basic IDEFO activity-data unit of analysis is thus the box along with the 
arrows, the concept being that the function transforms the Inputs into Outputs by 
Mechanisms, subject to the constraints imposed by Controls. (McGuire et al., 1990) As 
Marca and McGowan (1988) clarify, "Input arrows represent those things used and 
transformed by activities....Control arrows represent the things that constrain 
activities....Output arrows represent those things into which inputs are 
transformed....Mechanism arrows represent, at least in part, how activities (i.e., the 
functions of the system) are realized" (p. 15). 78 
5.6.3 Diagrams 
Williamson (1991) notes that there are two kinds of diagrams in IDEFO modeling : 
Context diagrams and decomposition diagrams. "Context diagrams are diagrams which are 
thought of as being 'above the top' of the hierarchical decomposition....the latter 
terminology [decomposition diagrams] is our own invention for 'diagrams other than 
context diagrams' (p. 30). Every IDEFO model requires one context diagram. This is 
known as the A-minus-zero (A-0) diagram. 
The A-0 diagram contains only one box which bounds the subject of the model. 
The A-0 diagram, Williamson notes, is the only diagram in an IDEFO model having a 
specific requirement for textual material, indicating the purpose and viewpoint of the 
model. 
Decomposition diagrams as noted above, are all diagrams which are not context 
diagrams. By definition, a decomposition diagram will contain more than one box. In 
order to keep the diagram simple, SADT methodology requires that each diagram has no 
fewer than three and no more than six boxes. Boxes on a diagram are not placed 
randomly. Instead, they are ordered in terms of functional dominance. According to 
Marca and McGowan (1988), "Dominance can be thought of as the influence one box has 
over other boxes in a diagram....the most dominant box is placed in the upper left-hand 
corner of the diagram, the least dominant box in the lower right-hand corner..." (p. 13). It 
is important to note that IDEFO does not address time or sequence (McGuire et a1.,1990), 
hence the ordering of the boxes in a particular way does not imply that the functions take 
place in that particular sequence. Boxes are also numbered according to their dominance, a 
larger digit implying greater functional dominance. The solitary box on the A-0 context 
diagram is numbered AO (digits are preceded by the letter 'A' to indicate 'activity'). 
5.6.4 Diagram Identification 
A decomposition diagram is formed by the division of a subject as defined by a 
box, into its structured pieces. The box which has been decomposed is called the parent 
box and its containing diagram is called the parent diagram. Likewise, the diagram formed 
by its decomposition is called the child diagram. 
Models are typically assigned a unique name, usually in abbreviated form. For the 
purpose of individual identification, decomposition diagrams are numbered as well as 
titled. The name of the parent box becomes the title of the child diagram. The number of 79 
the parent diagram (also known as 'node number'), along with the number of the parent 
box, form the basis of identification of diagrams in IDEFO. 
The node number for the context diagram, as already noted, is A-0. Node numbers 
are usually preceded by the model name and a slash. Thus for a model whose name was 
'CRM', the context diagram would have 'CRM/A-0' as its node number. The node 
number for the diagram that decomposes the context diagram is the same node number 
without the hyphen. Using the same example, the node number of the diagram that 
decomposes the context diagram would be CRM/AO. All other node numbers are formed 
by taking the node number of the parent diagram and appending it to the number (as 
determined by functional dominance) of the box that is being decomposed. 
5.6.5 More on Boxes and Arrows 
Williamson (1991) notes that there are no specific syntax rules for diagram boxes 
specified in what he refers to (and so shall I) as the IDEFO Users Manual (Air Force Wright 
Aeronautical Laboratories, 1981). The two rules or guidelines for drawing IDEFO boxes 
have already been noted above, however, for the sake of being explicit, they are 
enumerated as: 1) The three-to-six box rule which suggests that any IDEFO decomposition 
diagram contain no less than three and no more than six boxes, 2) Boxes are laid out in a 
diagonal from top-left to bottom-right, to denote functional dominance as well as to reduce 
clutter. 
As noted previously, arrows represent things or collection of things. It thus 
follows that an arrow can be formed by a combination of two or more arrows (known as 
bundling or joining) and it can also be decomposed into its constituent components (known 
as branching or splitting). Marca and McGowan (1988) write, "Arrow branches and joins 
are the syntax that allows one to describe the decomposition of arrow contents" (p. 31). 
Marca and McGowan (1988) outline the rules for the labeling of bundled and 
branched arrows. These rules are intuitive and easy to follow. As a common rule for both, 
an arrow is always labeled before a branch and after a join. Labels on the arrow branches 
(after a split) make explicit the contents of the branches. An unlabeled branch is assumed 
to contain all the things indicated by the label before the branch. Similarly, labels on each 
branch (before a join) make explicit the contents of these individual branches. If a branch 
is not labeled, it is "...assumed to contain all the things contained by the aggregate label 
after the join..." (p. 17). 80 
Arrows can also be tunneled (i.e., have a hidden source or a destination). Tunneled 
arrows that appear from an unknown or hidden source have their tails parenthesized. This 
indicates that they have a source either from some other part of the model or from outside 
the model directly. Similarly, as Marca and McGowan (1988) write, "tunneled arrows that 
go to an unknown destination have their heads parenthesized, indicating that they go to 
some other part of the model or to outside the model directly, or are not further treated in 
the model" (p. 34). 
It was previously noted that input arrows represent things that are transformed by 
the function. Control arrows on the other hand constrain or limit the activities that perform 
this function. According to Marca and McGowan (1988), they contain "...the rules and the 
facts that constrain the operation of a function" (p36). As they further note, "by 
emphasizing the difference between inputs and controls, SADT gives an analyst the 
capability to describe explicitly the constraints imposed on transformation functions" (p. 
34). The emphasis on distinguishing between inputs and controls is one of the strong 
points of IDEFO. Another characteristic feature of SADT is the importance it places on 
mechanism arrows. Initially, the system is described from a functional viewpoint hence the 
specification of mechanism arrows is not mandated, "...but ultimately it [the system] must 
be realized (i.e., it must be made operational)..." which is where mechanism arrows play 
an important role in giving "...an analyst the ability to precisely define how a particular 
function will operate,..." (p. 35). Besides these broad guidelines, there are no formal rules 
to distinguish between inputs, controls and mechanisms or specify the utilization of 
mechanisms. As a result, distinctions between inputs, controls and mechanisms remain 
fuzzy and tend to depend strongly on the analyst's point of view. Williamson (1991) in 
attempting to arrive at substantive quality metrics for IDEFO notes several such 
shortcomings and offers valuable insights into possible refinement of IDEFO. A few 
relevant ones are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. 
As an example, SADT requires every box to have at least one control arrow, and at 
least one output arrow. It does not however mandate inputs. In fact, as Williamson (1991) 
notes, the IDEFO Users Manual states, "If it is uncertain whether an arrow is a control or 
an input, make it a control" (p. 26). In such cases, since the function is producing an 
output, it is obviously transforming something, which implies the transformation of either a 
control or a mechanism. As Williamson further notes, "It is quite common for a control to 
be manipulated to produce an output....this causes almost everything to be characterized as 
a control..." (p. 32). 
Further, in talking about box semantics and the difficulty in distinguishing between 
controls and mechanisms, Williamson (1991) ponders, "A control is a constraint which is 81 
not transformed by the activity. So is a mechanism! Is the distinction merely intuitive?" 
(p. 32). Also, eventhough it is clear that an activity cannot be performed without a 
mechanism, IDEFO does not require a mechanism arrow on every box. In summary, as 
Williamson notes, "IDEFO provides structure without restraint" (p. 62). 
Despite its lack of formalization of certain issues, IDEFO offers a powerful, 
structured analysis methodology which finds applicability in a variety of domains. As 
Williamson (1991) notes, "we believe this structure without restraint characteristic is the 
primary reason for IDEFO popularity" (p. 62). 
5.7 A Model of Crew Performance: Description 
The preceding sections discussed the SADT methodology. In the following 
sections, the application of the SADT methodology to the domain of crew performance is 
discussed. The format essentially consists of a detailed node-by-node description of the 
model developed. The model is named CRM because of the crew coordination focus 
adopted. 
The model was developed using the Automated Business Logic Engineering 
Process Modeler or ABLEpm software developed by Triune Software, Inc. (1993), 
hereafter referred to as Triune. ABLEpm runs on an IBM compatible computer in a 
Microsoft Windows environment. ABLEpm is a tool for developing IDEFO models. It 
provides easy to use graphic capabilities for the drawing of models along with several 
strong features that facilitate the modeling process. For example, changes made to a higher 
level data item are "rippled" or automatically propagated to lower levels. ABLEpm also has 
a glossary feature which provides easy access to the meanings or definitions of activities 
and data elements on any particular diagram. 
The primary reading rule for SADT diagrams, according to Marca and McGowan 
(1988) is, "...read the diagram first, and only then read the matching SA [Structured 
Analysis] text for that diagram" (p.  The matching text corresponds to ABLEpm's 
glossary feature mentioned above. The glossary provides a comprehensive listing of the 
definitions or meanings of every data item (arrows) in the model. The complete model is 
shown in Appendix II. 
A node-by-node description of the model follows. The description is mainly in 
narrative form, describing the system in a top-down fashion (i.e., starting at the highest 
level diagram and proceeding with lower level of decomposition). The model relies mainly 
on the theory described in Chapter 4, and should be self-explanatory. Even so, examples 82 
to illustrate the modeling logic are included where necessary. Redundancies in 
explanations are omitted, as in when the same control appears on lower levels. 
5.7.1 CRM/A-0 
Node CRM/A-0 (Figure 2) represents the context diagram which bounds the system 
by a solitary box having a single subject. The activity bounds the subject of accomplishing 
the commercial transport mission and is numbered as AO. The title of the diagram is 
Accomplish Commercial Transport Mission. 
The general purpose of the commercial transport mission is to transport a payload 
of either passengers or cargo, from one destination to another. This is accomplished by 
two to three pilots who are assisted in doing this by a modern commercial airplane 
(Billings, 1991). 
The function Accomplish Commercial Transport Mission transforms the inputs 
Situation Information, Crewmembers, and Aircraft (A/C) State into the outputs Team, and 
Altered A/C State subject to the constraints Environmental Factors, Organizational Factors, 
and Individual Factors with the help of the mechanism Hardware/Aircraft Systems. 
The purpose of the model is to describe crew performance with an emphasis on 
crew coordination or CRM related activities. It is intended to be a normative description of 
the activities that an airline crew engages in during the process of accomplishing a 
commercial transport mission. By describing the activities, the model will answer 
questions pertaining to what limits or constrains the execution of activities and thus provide 
a framework for better understanding crew performance. 
Aviation researchers constitute a mix of professionals from a variety of disciplines 
like Psychology, Sociology, and Human Factors Engineering whose primary focus is 
Aviation. The viewpoint adopted is that of an aviation human factors researcher. 
The controls to the function are (a) Environmental Factors, (b) Organizational 
Factors, and (c) Individual Factors. 
Environmental Factors include temperature, humidity, pressure, wind direction and 
velocity, visibility, runway conditions, and other meteorological conditions liable to affect 
or constrain the accomplishment of the overall mission. Environmental 
Factors 
Organizational 
Factors 
Individual 
Factors 
Situation Information 
Crewmembers 
A/C State 
Accomplish 
Commercial 
Transport 
Mission 
AO 
Team 
Altered A/C State 
Hardware /Aircraft 
systems 
Purpose:  To describe. crew performance with an emphasis on crew coordination or CRM related activities 
Viewpoint:  Aviation human factors researcher 
Figure 2. CRM/A-0 Accomplish Commercial Transport Mission 84 
Organizational Factors refer to all factors related to the organization that can affect 
crew performance such as company policies, rules and regulations, and special 
requirements. These are also considered to include the designated flight plan for a 
particular mission, local operating procedures, federal aviation regulations (FAR's), and 
advisory circulars. 
Individual Factors refer to those characteristics of the individual crewmembers that 
potentially constrain the function. These include individual knowledge, skills, attitudes, 
fatigue, and personality (see section on Individual Factors, Chapter 4). 
Hardware/Aircraft systems aid the accomplishment of the commercial transport 
mission and are hence mechanisms to the crew system. 
Inputs to the function are (a) Situation Information, (b) Crewmembers, and (c) A/C 
State. Outputs from the function are (a) Team, and (b) Altered A/C state. 
Situation Information refers to all information about the situation that is potentially 
available for the accomplishment of the mission. Situation Information includes 
information about the environment, information about the aircraft, and information about 
crewmembers. It also includes information made available through and/or about the 
environment of the crew system under consideration (refer to section on System Concepts), 
such as ATC/maintenancelgate personnel communications, cabin crewmembers and 
passengers. 
Crewmembers refers to cockpit crewmembers. The number of crewmembers 
typically ranges from two to three (Captain, First Officer (F/O), and Second Officer (S/0)), 
depending on the type of aircraft. For example, older aircraft such as the Boeing 727 have 
three crewmembers while the newer Boeing 747-400's have only two crewmembers. 
Aircraft State refers to the current actual state of the aircraft. 'State' is a systems 
concept. According to Wymore (1976), "A description of what is going on inside the box 
[the system under consideration] is called the state of the system" (p. 17). If the aircraft 
were viewed as a system, then its state would be a description of changes in the aircraft and 
its subsystems. In this case, the system under consideration is not the aircraft itself but the 
crew system, to which aircraft state is an input. 
Funk (1991) defines state as "...the set of system attributes at a given time" (p. 
272). Examples of Aircraft State include aircraft position, altitude, airspeed, fuel level, and 
position of flaps. Accomplishing the commercial transport mission results in transforming 
the values of these parameters, or results in the output Altered Aircraft State. 
The process of accomplishing the mission transforms the crewmembers into a 
Team, which is shown as an output. Team and Altered Aircraft State are better understood 
when lower levels of decomposition are described. 85 
5.7.2 CRM/AO 
Node CRM/AO (Figure 3) shows the decomposition of the parent box AO and is 
titled Accomplish Commercial Transport Mission. 
Accomplish Commercial Transport Mission (AO) is decomposed into three 
functions (a) Maintain Individual Situation Awareness, (b) Build and Maintain Team, and 
(c) Accomplish Technical Tasks. The functions are numbered Al, A2, and A3 respectively 
and denote order of functional dominance. The functions are described below. 
(a)  Maintain Individual Situation Awareness (Al) 
This function transforms the input Situation Information into the output Individual 
Situation Models subject to the constraints Individual Factors, Organizational Factors, and 
Environmental Factors with the help of the mechanism Hardware/Aircraft Systems. 
Situation Information was discussed at the A-0 level above. Situation Awareness 
was elaborated upon in Chapter 4. Crew performance depends vitally on this activity and 
Maintain Individual Situation Awareness is therefore depicted as being the most 
functionally dominant activity. Ends ley's (1988) previously discussed definition of 
situation awareness clearly alludes to perception, which in turn is affected by several 
individual characteristics, such as "...information that is unconscious in the first place until 
it becomes activated by incoming data patterns..." (Suter & Woods, 1991, p. 55). It 
depends on individual factors such as personal biases of perception and decision making, 
on the individual's pre-existing knowledge, and even on attitudes. In addition to the 
individual cognitive and interpersonal components, physiological components such as 
fatigue also (negatively) affect the function of maintaining individual situation awareness. 
Therefore, Individual Factors are a control to maintaining situation awareness. 
Organizational Factors also constrain this function. The primary purpose of 
information automation is to assist the pilot in maintaining situation awareness (Billings, 
1991), but there has been considerable concern generated in the aviation community that 
thereliance on automation and the very use of it, particularly under high workload 
conditions which tend to further increase pilot workload (a term referred to as "clumsy 
automation" by Wiener, 1988, 1989) can adversely affect the function of maintaining 
situation awareness (Sarter & Woods, 1991). For instance, empirical studies by Sarter and 
Woods (1992) conducted to obtain data about the Flight Management System (FMS), a 
core system of cockpit automation, have shown that pilots can lose situation awareness 
concerning FMS status and behavior. Environmental Factors 
C3Organizationalci
Individual Factors 
Factors 
C2 
II 
Situation Information  Maintain 
Individual 
Individual 
Situation Models 
Situation 
Awareness 
Al 
12 
Crewmembers  Build 
and 
Maintain 
Team 
01 
Team  2 
A2 
Shared Situation 
Models 
Altered Shared-
NC State  Accomplish 
' Situation Models 
13  Technical 
Tasks 
Altered A/C Stale 
02 
3 
Crew  (1)  A3 
Hardware/Aircrall 
systems 
MI
 
Figure 3. CRM/AO Accomplish Commercial Transport Mission 87 
The problem of situation awareness and pilot-automation interaction is only exacerbated 
when airlines have policies that insist on the pilot's usage of automation features, 
particularly during situations when it would be far more beneficial for pilots to resort to 
"lower-levels" of control automation (Wiener, 1985; Billings, 1991). As Wiener (1985) 
notes, such company policies are aptly captured by what crews call "we bought it, you use 
it" (p. 92). 
Any combination of environmental factors (such as reduced visibility and abnormal 
meteorological conditions) are adequate to influence the maintenance of individual situation 
awareness. Environmental Factors are thus shown as a constraint to this function. 
Individual Situation Models is the output of this function. It acts as a control to 
Build and Maintain Team and to Accomplish Technical Tasks. It is important to understand 
what is meant by Individual Situation Models. In simple terms, these refer to mental 
models of the situation. 'Mental models' as well as 'situation' have both been discussed in 
detail in preceding sections. 
Modern aircraft are equipped with a host of automated features. As earlier 
mentioned, a primary goal of automation is to assist the pilot in doing whatever he/she is 
supposed to be doing. Automation, in plain terms, is supposed to make the life of a pilot 
easier. Displays and controls in the cockpit provide the pilot with a host of information, 
potentially aimed at helping the pilot maintain situation awareness (the fact that advanced 
automation may instead be negatively contributing to the phenomenon is what is referred to 
(Billings, 1991) as the 'automation paradox'). Nevertheless, the aircraft hardware and its 
subsystems assist the pilot in maintaining situation awareness. Hardware/Aircraft systems 
are thus shown as mechanisms to the function. 
The process of maintaining individual situation awareness is, by nature, iterative. 
Maintaining situation awareness in a task-performing dynamic environment such as flying 
an aircraft invariably leads to changes in the person's environment, which result in a 
change in the situation and consequently lead to an update of the individual's mental 
models. This concept is better understood by a decomposition of the function at lower 
levels (see below). 
(b)  Build and Maintain Team (A2) 
This function transforms Crewmembers into Team subject to Individual Situation 
Models and Altered Shared Situation Models. 88 
'Crewmembers' has been defined at the A-0 level. Individual Situation Models are 
a constraint to this function and have been discussed while considering the function 
Maintain Individual Situation Awareness above. 
Shared Situation Models are formed through specialized communication (Orasanu, 
1990). Like individual mental models, they are updated or altered as a result of interactions 
between crewmembers which involve further sharing or communication of information. 
The difference is that the updating of individual situation models is an unconscious 
process, whereas shared situation models are formed as a result of explicit sharing of 
information or patterns of communication. Accomplishing the technical task may result in 
changes in task priorities and team assignments depending on the current situation. These 
changes are shared or explicitly communicated as part of the Accomplish Technical Task 
function described below. This communication alters the (existing) Shared Situation 
Models, resulting in an Altered Shared Situation Models which consequently act as a 
control to Build and Maintain Team. 
Team is the output of this function. It is defined by this function as: A crew with a 
shared task model, a shared team-interaction model, and a shared team-personal model. 
These have been discussed in the section on Team Building and Shared Mental Models 
Chapter 4). The team's shared situation models affect the accomplishment of technical 
tasks and are shown as a control to Accomplish Technical Tasks'. 
(c)  Accomplish Technical Tasks (A3) 
This function transforms A/C State into Altered A/C State and Altered Shared 
Situation Models subject to Shared Situation Models, Environmental Factors, and 
Individual Situation Models with the help of the mechanisms Crew and Hardware/Aircraft 
Systems. 
Shared Situation Models, Individual Situation Models, and Environmental Factors 
have been discussed in preceding paragraphs. A/C State, Altered A/C State, and Altered 
Shared Situation Models have also been discussed. 
The Crew is shown as a branch of Team and is tunneled at its destination on 
entering Accomplish Technical Tasks. Crew represents the members of the group working 
together as a team. It is shown as a tunneled mechanism merely to highlight the 
significance of the fact that ultimately it is the Crew that performs the function of 
Accomplish Technical Tasks. Since it is tunneled, it will not appear on lower levels of 
decomposition. 89 
Hardware/Aircraft Systems are the means by which Aircraft State is altered. It is 
thus depicted as a mechanism to this function. 
The AO is essentially the first layer or level of decomposition. Subsequent levels of 
decomposition are formed by decomposing each of the three functions on the AO. These 
decompositions are described in the following sections. 
5.7.3 CRM/A1 
Node CRIA/A1 (Figure 4) shows the decomposition of parent box Al and is titled 
Maintain Individual Situation Awareness. 
Maintain Individual Situation Awareness (Al) is decomposed into three functions 
(a) Assess Situation, (b) Acquire Information and (c) Update Situation Models. The 
former two functions are numbered Al 1 and Al2 respectively. According to the IDEFO 
methodology, Update Situation Models would have been numbered A13. However, since 
Update Situation Models is not decomposed any further, ABLEpm does not number it on 
the diagram. The layout of the functions and their numbering denote functional dominance. 
These functions are described as follows: 
(a)  Assess Situation (A11) 
This function transforms Acquired Situation Information into Situation 
Assessment, subject to Individual Situation Models. 
In the section on Situation Awareness in Chapter 4, it was noted that situation 
assessments play an important role in maintaining individual situation awareness. Sarter 
and Woods (1991) noted that "situation awareness is based on the integration of knowledge 
resulting from recurrent situation assessments" (p. 50). Assess Situation which generates 
the output Situation Assessment is thus ranked highest in functional dominance and is 
placed at the node's top-left corner. The control to this function is Individual Situation 
Models generated as an output of Update Situation Models. r 
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In the preceding section on Mental Models and Situation Awareness (Chapter 4), 
Sarter and Woods (1991) were cited to have stated that, "...adequate mental models are one 
of the prerequisites for achieving situation awareness" (p. 49). The discussion concluded 
that mental models in turn were the basis for accurate situation assessments, which in turn 
resulted in situation awareness. Thus, Individual Situation Models are depicted as a control 
to Assess Situation. 
Situation Information refers to all information about the situation that is potentially 
available for the accomplishment of the mission. However, not all information that is 
potentially available becomes actually available to the pilot. Smith and Hancock's (1993) 
definition of situation awareness as being adaptive, externally directed consciousness that is 
within the scope of intentional manipulation directly alludes to the point being made that the 
process of maintaining situation awareness, by definition, focuses on potentially available 
information, thereby making the agent "aware" of the information. Only when the agent 
becomes "aware" of the information does potentially available information become actually 
available to him/her. This actually available information is depicted by the data element 
labeled Acquired Situation Information, which is an input to Assess Situation. 
(b)  Acquire information (Al2) 
This function transforms the Situation Information into Acquired Situation 
Information subject to Situation Assessment, Environmental Factors, Organizational 
Factors, and Individual Factors with the mechanism Hardware/Aircraft Systems. 
Situation Information and Acquired Situation Information, inputs and outputs of 
this function, respectively, have both been discussed above. 
An aspect of assessing the situation involves determining the need for additional 
information. Thus, depending on the assessment of the situation, the agent (pilot) may 
actively direct his consciousness (attention) to acquiring information from the situation. 
Situation Assessment is thus a control to Acquire Information. 
Individual Factors also have a constraining effect on this function. As Sarter and 
Woods (1991) write, "On the one hand, the resulting expectancies [a result of situation 
assessments] may facilitate perception...On the other hand, they involve the potential for 
ignoring or misinterpreting the unexpected" (p. 51). Thus, individual factors such as one's 
pre-existing knowledge (schemata) are liable to induce biases which constrain the execution 
of this function. Individual Factors is therefore shown as a control to Acquire Information. 
The process of acquiring information is also constrained by Environmental and 
Organizational Factors. Poor visibility, or abnormal meteorological conditions may restrict 92 
the pilot's ability to acquire information from the environment (outside the aircraft) while 
turbulence may constrain the ability to acquire information from displays (inside the 
aircraft). Organizational Factors like certain company policies which require strict channels 
of communication between crewmembers may also constrain this function. Company 
policies dictating the use of certain levels of automation during certain phases of flight also 
serve to constrain the acquisition of information. Another example is company policies that 
do not allow for pilots to access maintenance records, thus constraining the function. 
Environmental Factors and Organizational Factors are therefore depicted as controls to 
Acquire Information. 
An important role of automation in the cockpit is to provide the pilots with a lot of 
information about the environment, the aircraft, and the automation itself. Billings (1991) 
refers to such automation as information automation. The pilot acquires information with 
the help of the aircraft and its display and control subsystems. These systems do not 
change or are not transformed in any way. Hardware/Aircraft Systems is thus shown as a 
mechanism to Acquire Information. 
(c)  Update Situation Models (A13) 
This function transforms the tunneled input Existing Situation Models into 
Individual Situation Models subject to Situation Assessment and Individual Factors. 
The process of updating a situation model (mental model of a situation) is an 
unconscious one, which is interpreted as being the internally-directed facet of situation 
awareness as against Smith and Hancock's (1993) view of situation awareness being 
externally directed and intentionally-manipulable. The concept of mental models as well as 
that of the situation have both been dealt with in great detail in their respective sections in 
Chapter 4. 
Essentially, a mental model of a situation is one that is continuously being updated 
through the individual's interaction with his/her environment. The updating is an iterative 
process, one which the agent adapts to unconsciously. Accurate mental models are the 
basis for accurate situation assessments (Suter & Woods, 1991) which in turn are updated 
as a result of the situation assessment. However, the situation assessment also serves to 
constrain the updating of the mental models, similar to how Situation Assessment acts as a 
control to Acquire Information. Situation Assessment is thus shown as a control to Update 
Situation Models. This represents the idea captured in the earlier section on Mental models 
and Situation Awareness in Chapter 4, in which Wickens (1988) states that a situationally 
aware pilot could also be described as possessing an accurate mental model of the situation, 93 
which must be continuously updated in order to maintain situation awareness in a 
dynamically changing environment. 
Individual Factors include the individual's pre-existing knowledge. This pre­
existing knowledge influences how an individual's situation model is updated. Individual 
Factors should thus be a control to Update Situation Models. As noted previously, mental 
models are a form of knowledge representation, which would imply that they are a part of 
Individual Factors. By definition, it is the mental model itself which is being transformed 
by the function Update Situation Models. Since a function transforms an input into an 
output, mental models would thus have to be an input to Update Situation Models. This 
would imply that Individual Factors are a control as well as an input to Update Situation 
Models! To resolve this dilemma, the IDEFO methodology would dictate that Individual 
Factors be shown as a control (see 'More on Boxes and Arrows' above). However, in 
order to be explicit, Existing Mental Models are shown as an input to the function. Since 
Existing Mental Models appear out of context, they are shown as a tunneled input. 
Node CRM/All (Figure 5) shows the decomposition of the Assess Situation (Al) 
function and is titled Assess Situation. 
Assess Situation (Al 1) is decomposed into three functions (a) Perceive Current 
Situation, (b) Integrate/Comprehend Situation, and (c) Project Situation. According to the 
IDEFO methodology, these functions would be numbered as A111, A112, and A113. 
However, since they are not decomposed any further in the analysis, they are simply 
numbered as 1, 2, and 3 respectively. These functions are described below. 
Assessing the situation or situation assessment, according to Endsley (1988) 
involves perception of the situational elements, information integration, and the projection 
of future status and actions of situational elements (see section on Situation Assessments 
and Situation Awareness' Chapter 4). 
(a)  Perceive Current Situation 
This function transforms Acquired Situation Information into Perceived Information 
subject to Individual Situation Models. 
Acquired Situation Information is perceived by the individual and results in 
Perceived Information. Previously, potentially available information was distinguished 
from actually available information. This actually available information is first perceived by 
the individual as part of the process of assessing the situation. 
Individual Situation Models include biases of perception and are thus shown as a 
control to Perceive Current Situation. II 
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(b)  Integrate/Comprehend Situation 
This function transforms Perceived Information into Integrated Situation 
Information subject to Individual Situation Models. 
Integrated Situation Information represents the current understanding of the 
situation. After information is perceived, it is integrated with pre-existing information and 
the individual actually makes sense of the information or comprehends it. 
Once again, the process of integration/comprehension is limited by the person's 
skills included in Individual Situation Models. Rasmussen (1990) notes that "...skill-based 
behavior represents sensory-motor performance....depends upon a very flexible and 
efficient dynamic internal world model." (p. 63). Individual Situation Models is therefore a 
control to the function Integrate/Comprehend Situation. 
(c)  Project Situation 
This function involves transforming Integrated Situation Information into Projected 
Situation Information constrained by Individual Situation Models. 
Once information is integrated and comprehended, future status is projected, which 
forms the basis for comparing current state with expected state and deciding on further 
action. Some of these actions may be involuntary, may involve the action of acquiring 
further information or may require active planning and decision making. Since they are 
actions taken by the agent, they are considered under the function Accomplish Technical 
Tasks discussed in subsequent sections. 
A primary purpose of the mental model is to simulate future situations (known as 
"running" the mental model). Individual Situation Models are therefore a control to Project 
Situation. 
Node CRM/Al2 (Figure 6) shows the decomposition of Acquire Information (Al2) 
and is titled "Acquire Information". 
Acquire Information (Al2) is decomposed into three functions (a) Acquire 
Information from Environment, (b) Acquire Information from Aircraft, and (c) Acquire 
Information from Crewmembers. According to the IDEFO methodology, these functions 
would be numbered as A121, A122, and A123 respectively. However, since they are not 
decomposed any further in the analysis, they are simply numbered as 1, 2, and 3 
respectively. These functions are described below. ct 
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(a)  Acquire Information from Environment. 
This function transforms Situation Information into Acquired Information from 
Environment subject to Situation Assessment, Individual Factors, and Environmental 
Factors with the mechanism Hardware/Aircraft Systems. 
Situation Information is the input to this function. Specifically, this refers to all 
information about the situation potentially available directly from the environment. 
Situation Assessment and Individual Factors, controls to this function, have already 
been discussed while discussing node CRM/A 1. 
In this case, environment refers to the system environment as distinct from an 
individual's environment. Based on the situation assessment, information is (actively) 
acquired from the environment. Information acquired is broadly of three types (a) spatial 
or navigational information (i.e., knowledge of the aircraft's location in space), (b) 
information about traffic, and (c) information about abnormal weather conditions. 
Acquisition of spatial or navigational information is very important. By looking out 
of the window, the pilot may be able to tell whether the aircraft is at a high or low altitude, 
whether it is too close to the ground or in danger of crashing into mountainous terrain. 
There have been numerous instances when the pilot, either because of weather conditions 
or 'distractions', allowed the aircraft to collide with terrain. Such accidents have been 
termed controlled flight into terrain or CFTT's. According to Learmount (1993), "the term 
implies either that the pilot does not know the impact is coming or realizes too late to 
prevent it" (p. 27). Learmount (1994, p.42) further notes that CFTT's have been 
"...revealed as the single greatest killer in air accidents..." involving 21 accidents and 706 
fatalities in the year 1992 alone ( Learmount, 1993). 
Due to the possibility of a mid-air collision, the pilot needs to keep a constant watch 
for other aircraft, particularly so when in the vicinity of airports. Thus, obtaining 
information about traffic by keeping a vigilant watch outside the aircraft becomes an 
important component of the pilot's maintaining situation awareness. Abnormal 
meteorological conditions such as thunderstorms and windshear (changes in wind strength 
leading to potentially dangerous situations) can have disastrous consequences for aircraft 
Although windshear alerting systems are being used in some aircraft, sometimes such 
situations can be avoided if the crew is alert to warning cues from the environment 
From the above, it is clear that Environmental Factors constrain Acquire 
Information from Environment. 
The cockpit of a modem commercial airliner is designed to maximize the pilot's 
ability to acquire information from the environment. The cockpit is strategically located at 98 
the front of the aircraft thus providing the pilot with a vantage view of the environment. It 
has a plexi-glass windshield and is fitted with seats with six degrees of freedom, all 
designed to allow the pilot to get an all round view of the outside environment. 
Appropriately located lights under the wings and near the wheels enhance the pilot's ability 
to see during bad weather and at night. Hardware/Aircraft systems are thus a mechanism to 
Acquire Information from Environment. 
(b)  Acquire Information from Aircraft 
This function transforms Situation Information into Acquired Information from 
Aircraft subject to Environmental Factors, Situation Assessment, Individual Factors, and 
Organizational Factors with the help of the mechanism Hardware/Aircraft Systems. 
A primary purpose of automation should be to assist the pilot in maintaining 
situation awareness. The aircraft, along with its displays and controls provides, or makes 
available, all kinds of information which the pilot needs to maintain awareness. 
Hardware/Aircraft Systems are thus the mechanism by which the crewmembers acquire 
information from the aircraft. 
Situation Information is the input to this function. Specifically, this refers to all 
information about the situation potentially available from the aircraft. Situation information 
potentially available from the aircraft includes information about the environment and 
information about aircraft subsystems. Note that some information about the environment 
is directly acquired from the environment (as in Acquire Information from Environment 
discussed above) while some information about the environment may be acquired through 
the aircraft. In order to acquire information from the aircraft and its instruments, the pilot 
would need to actively monitor them. Also included in this category is information 
received by the crew over the radio (ATC communications) or via data link (since they are 
part of the aircraft's Radio-Communications system). 
The environment can have an adverse effect on the aircraft and its subsystems. 
This may result in partial or complete failures of aircraft displays, severely limiting the 
ability of the crewmembers to acquire information from the aircraft. Despite the reliability 
of the aircraft and its automation, the aircraft remains a vulnerable piece of equipment. 
Lightning, thunderstorms, and other electrical activity (even the use of onboard personal 
computers!) have been known to affect the complex circuitry of onboard navigation 
displays and controls. Turbulence may limit the crewmember's ability to read displays, 
again limiting his/her ability to acquire information from the aircraft. Environmental 
Factors is thus a control to Acquire Information from Aircraft 99 
Situation Assessment is a control to this function and has already been discussed at 
the CRM/A1 level. 
Physiological factors such as fatigue and vision also constrain the ability of 
crewmembers to acquire information from the aircraft Individual Factors are thus a control 
to Acquire Information from Aircraft (also see discussion of Individual Factors to Acquire 
Information at CRM/A1 level). 
The role of Organizational Factors as controls to Acquiring Information from 
Aircraft (company policies dictating the use of varying levels of automation) has been 
discussed at the CRM/A1 level. 
c)  Acquire information from crewmembers. 
This function transforms Situation Information into Acquired Information from 
Crewmembers subject to Situation Assessment, Individual Factors, and Organizational 
Factors. 
Valuable information regarding the situation can also be obtained from other 
crewmembers, simply by observing the other's actions. Wiener (1993) provides further 
insight into the challenges posed by advanced automated cockpits with regards to this 
aspect of crew coordination. He notes that in the cockpit of advanced aircraft, "...it is 
physically difficult for one pilot to see what the other is doing....it is more difficult for the 
captain to monitor the work of the first officer and to understand what he is doing, and 
vice-versa" (p. 209-210). 
The controls to the function have all been discussed at the CRM/A1 level. 
5.7.4 CRM/A2 
Node CRM/A2 (Figure 7) shows the decomposition of parent box A2 and is titled 
"Build and Maintain Team". 
The forming of shared mental models and their development is essential to team 
effectiveness. Build and Maintain Team (A2) is thus decomposed into three functions (a) 
Develop Shared Task Model, (b) Develop Shared Team-interaction Model, and (c) Develop 
Shared Team-personal Model. 
In the section on Team Building and Maintenance (Chapter 4) Hackman and Walton 
(1986) were cited to define group effectiveness along three dimensions. These dimensions 
were referred to as the task dimension, social dimension, and the personal dimension. C2 
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Further, they noted that the relative weights that would be assigned to these dimensions 
would vary as a matter of circumstances, they state, "...it appears that one of the most 
powerful ways to help a team on the latter two dimensions [social and personal] is to foster 
its standing on the first" (p. 79). Interpreting this to denote functional dominance, the 
functions are numbered A21, A22, and A23, respectively. These functions are described 
below. 
Individual Situation Models and Altered Shared Situation Model are the two 
controls that constrain these three functions. Both of these controls have been discussed at 
the CRM/AO level. 
(a)  Develop Shared Task Model (A21). 
This function transforms Crewmembers into a Crew with Shared Task Model and 
is constrained by Individual Situation Models and Altered Shared Task Model, a 
component of Altered Shared Situation Models. 
It is important to note that individual crewmembers are transformed into a crew a 
group which is more than just a collection of individual crewmembers (see 'Groups and 
Crews'  Chapter 4). 
A Shared Task model would include knowledge about each other's tasks, task 
procedures, and task strategies. According to Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993), it creates 
expectations "...about how events are likely to unfold and how the team is likely to respond 
to task demands..." (p. 234). 
The Shared Task Model of an airline crew would contain shared knowledge and 
understanding of tasks that need to be accomplished. Kanki and Palmer (1993) note that 
"communication processes are of central importance to group activities that rely on verbal 
exchanges" (p. 109). Development of a shared task model is a group activity. Shared 
mental models are a result of effective communication (see discussion on Team Building 
and Shared Mental Models'). 
(b)  Develop Shared Team-Interaction Model (A22). 
This function transforms crewmembers into a Crew with a Shared Team-interaction 
Model and is constrained by Individual Situation Models and the Altered Shared Team-
interaction Model, a component of the Altered Shared Situation Model. 
A Shared Team-interaction Model is developed through the sharing of individual 
team-interaction models. A Shared Team-interaction Model would include knowledge 102 
about how each team member must interact with each other. Shared Team-interaction 
Model implies a shared understanding and acceptance of group roles, norms and the 
authority gradient. 
(c)  Develop Shared Team-Personal Model (A23). 
This function transforms Crewmembers into a Crew with a Shared Team-personal 
Model and is constrained by Individual Situation Models and the Altered Shared Team-
personal Model, a component of the Altered Shared Situation Model. 
As noted previously, the Shared Team-personal Model would include information 
regarding the knowledge, skills, abilities, preferences, and tendencies of particular 
teammates so that behavior can be tailored accordingly. 
It is important to note the distinction between the Shared Team-interaction Model 
and the Shared Team-personal Model. The Shared Team-interaction Model includes a 
shared understanding of emergent group properties such as roles, norms, and authority 
status, while the Shared Team-personal Model provides for an understanding of each 
other's personal likes, dislikes, and tendencies. While the Shared Team-interaction Model 
is representative of group properties, the Shared Team-personal Model is representative of 
an understanding of characteristics of the specific individuals involved. 
Node CRM/A21 (Figure 8) shows the decomposition of parent box A21 and is 
titled Develop Shared Task Model. 
Develop Shared Task Model (A21) is decomposed into four functions (a) Assess 
Shared Task Model, (b) Clarify Goals, (c) Discuss Contingencies/Plans, and (d) Discuss 
Task Strategies. According to the IDEFO methodology, these functions would be 
numbered as A211, A212, A213, and A214 respectively. However, since they are not 
decomposed any further in the analysis, they are simply numbered as 1, 2, 3, and 4, 
respectively. These functions are described below. 
(a)  Assess Shared Task Model 
This function has no inputs but generates the output, Task Model Assessments 
(analogous to Situation Assessments) subject to Individual Situation Models and Altered 
Shared Task Model. The Altered Shared Task Model represents the "current" Shared Task 
Model which has been changed as a result of Accomplish Technical Tasks. It is this 
current model that is assessed by this function. Altered Shared Task Model  Individual Situation Models 
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Assessing the current shared mental model is a fundamental part of developing a 
shared mental model, just as situation assessment is fundamental to the updating of an 
individual mental model which leads to situation awareness. 
Two factors affect the development of an adequate shared task model. Firstly, 
individual task models must be complete and correct. These are a result of maintaining 
individual situation awareness discussed previously. Further, developing a shared task 
model requires effective communication. Effective communication depends on factors such 
as individual communication skills (a part of individual mental models). Secondly, an 
adequate shared task model depends on an accurate assessment of the current shared task 
model. Thus, Individual Situation Models and Altered Shared Task Model are the two 
constraints to this function. 
The assessment of the Shared Task Model results in Task-model Assessments 
which drives the development or refinement of the Shared Task Model. Typically, such 
development takes place through explicit and effective communication in the form of verbal 
exchanges. In such cases, Individual Situation Models, which include crewmembers' 
models of the task and equipment, play an important role. In the process of development, 
they are shared to varying degrees and lead to a shared task-model. In this sense, they are 
themselves transformed, however the IDEFO methodology recommends that they be treated 
as controls instead of inputs. Thus, Individual Situation Models are shown as controls to 
all these three functions. Task-Model Assessments are the other control to each of these 
three functions 
(b)  Clarify Goals. 
The function Clarify Goals transforms crewmembers into a Crew (group) with 
Clarified Goals subject to Task-Model Assessments and Individual Situation Models. 
Depending on the assessment of the shared task-model, the crew may see a need to clarify 
goals. The Crew with Clarified Goals becomes an input to the function Discuss 
Contingencies/Plans. 
(c)  Discuss Contingencies/Plans. 
The function Discuss Contingencies/Plans transforms the Crew with Clarified 
Goals into a Crew with Discussed Contingencies/Plans subject to Task-Model Assessments 
and Individual Situation Models. 105 
Only when a crew has clarified its goals can it discuss plans and contingency 
situations, essential for the development of a shared task-model. The output of this 
function, Crew with Discussed Contingencies/Plans, is an input to the function Discuss 
Task Strategies. 
(d)  Discuss Task Strategies. 
The function Discuss Task Strategies transforms Crew with Discussed 
Contingencies/Plans into Crew with Discussed Task Strategies subject to Task-Model 
Assessments and Individual Situation Models. Through the discussion of contingency 
situations and the making of plans, task strategies are discussed. 
The combination of the outputs of all the above functions leads to a Crew with 
Shared Task Model, the output of the function Develop Shared Task Model. Crew with 
Shared Task Model is thus defined as the combination of a Crew with Clarified Goals, a 
Crew with Discussed Contingencies/Plans and a Crew with Discussed Task Strategies. 
Node CRM/A22 (Figure 9) shows the decomposition of parent box A22 and is 
titled Develop Shared Team-interaction Model. 
Develop Shared Team-interaction Model (A22) is decomposed into four functions 
(a) Assess Shared Team-interaction model, (b) Expand Group Boundaries (c) Refine 
Group Norms, and (d) Establish Appropriate Authority Dynamic. According to the IDEFO 
methodology, these functions would be numbered as A221, A222, A223, and A224 
respectively. However, since they are not decomposed any further in the analysis, they are 
simply numbered as 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. These functions are described below. 
(a)  Assess Shared Team-interaction Model. 
This function has no inputs but generates the output, Team-interaction Model 
Assessments (analogous to Situation Assessments) subject to Individual Situation Models 
and Altered Shared Team-interaction Model. The Altered Shared Team-interaction Model 
represents the "current" Shared Task Model which has been changed as a result of 
Accomplish Technical Tasks. It is this current model that is assessed by this function. 
The justification for Individual Situation Models and Altered Shared Team-
interaction Model as controls to this function is along the lines for the function Assess 
Shared Task Model discussed above. Individual Situation Models 
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The assessment of the Shared Team-interaction Model drives its further 
development or refinement. Characteristic group properties such as boundaries and norms 
are rarely explicitly communicated. The development of the Shared Team-interaction 
Model thus typically takes place through implicit, non-verbal communication. In such 
cases, individual situation models, which include crewmembers' models of the self and of 
interaction play an important role. In the process of development, they are shared and lead 
to a shared team-interaction model. Individual Situation Models are shown as controls to 
all these three functions for the same reasons as explained above (see Assess Shared Task 
Model). Team-interaction Model Assessments are also a control to each of these three 
functions. 
(b)  Expand Group Boundaries. 
The function Expand Group Boundaries transforms Crewmembers into a Crew 
with Expanded Boundaries (see Boundaries under Groups and Crews, Chapter 4), subject 
to Team-Interaction Model Assessments and Individual Situation Models. Depending on 
the Team-Interaction Model Assessments, the group may see a need to expand its 
boundaries, as was the case noticed by Ginnett (1993). The output of this function, Crew 
with Expanded Boundaries, becomes an input to the function Refine Group Norms. 
(c)  Refine Group Norms. 
The function Refine Group Norms transforms the input Crew with Expanded 
Group Boundaries into a Crew with Refined Norms subject to Team-interaction Model 
Assessments and Individual Situation Models. The output of this function, Crew with 
Refined Norms, becomes an input to the function Establish Appropriate Authority 
Dynamic. 
Perhaps the importance of this function is best illustrated by means of an ASRS 
incident report as cited by Kanki and Palmer (1993). The incident is reported by the F/O 
who recalls how the aircraft was off course by about 10 miles before ATC had to remind 
them they were drifting. According to the report, the F/O did notice the problem and tried 
to draw the Captain's attention to it, but each time the captain tried to reply to the F/O's 
query, the Captain was interrupted by the flight attendant who was in the cockpit at the 
time, insisting that the Captain radio ahead about connections since they were behind 
schedule. The exasperation of the F/0 is best captured by the following remark made in the 
report as: 108 
It was no problem, just embarrassing to have Center [ATC] tell you that you 
are starting to go off in the wrong direction. We should have handled it by 
not being nice guys and telling the flight attendant in a loud voice to "shut 
up, we are trying to fly the plane". 
(p. 111) 
In this case, had the group refined its norms, either one of the crewmembers might 
have assertively cut short the flight attendant and dealt with the important business of 
correcting their course. 
(d)  Establish Appropriate Authority Dynamic. 
The function Establish Appropriate Authority Dynamic transforms Crew with 
Refined Norms into a Crew with Appropriate Authority Dynamic subject to Team-
Interaction Model Assessments and Individual Situation Models. 
The importance of this function is highlighted by another ASRS incident report, one 
which has been cited by many in the literature as an example of the negative effects of a 
high TAG (see Kanki and Palmer, 1993). Ginnett (1993) cites the report as follows: 
I was the first officer on an airline flight into Chicago O'Hare. The captain 
was flying, we were on approach to 4R [particular runway] getting radar 
vectors and moving along at 250 knots. On our approach, Approach 
Control told us to slow to 180 knots. I acknowledged and waited for the 
captain to slow down. He did nothing, so I figured he didn't hear the 
clearance. So I repeated, "Approach said slow to 180," and his reply was 
something to the effect of, "I'll do what I want." I told him at least twice 
more and received the same kind of answer. Approach Control asked us 
why we had not slowed down yet. I told them we were doing the best job 
we could and their reply was, "You almost hit another aircraft." They then 
asked us to turn east. I told them we would rather not because of the 
weather and we were given present heading and to maintain 3000 ft. The 
captain descended to 3000 ft. and kept going to 2500 ft. even though I told 
him our altitude was 3000 ft. His comment was, "You just look out the 
damn window". (p. 74) 
The combination of the outputs of the above three functions leads to a Crew with 
Shared Team-interaction Model, the output of the function Develop Shared Team­
interactiOn Model. Crew with Shared Team-interaction Model is thus defined as the 
combination of a Crew with Expanded Group Boundaries, a Crew with Refined Norms, 
and a Crew with Appropriate Authority Dynamic. 109 
Node CRM/A23 (Figure 10) shows the decomposition of parent box A23 and is 
titled Develop Shared Team-personal Model. 
Develop Shared Team-personal Model (A23) is decomposed into three functions (a) 
Assess Shared Team-personal model, (b) Share Knowledge about Selves, and (c) Express 
Selves. According to the IDEFO methodology, these functions would be numbered as 
A231, A232, and A233, respectively. However, since they are not decomposed any 
further in the analysis, they are only numbered as 1, 2, and 3, respectively. These 
functions are described below. 
(a)  Assess Shared Team-personal Model. 
This function has no inputs but generates the output, Team-personal Model 
Assessments (analogous to Situation Assessments) subject to Individual Situation Models 
and Altered Shared Team-personal Model. The Altered Shared Team-personal Model 
represents the "current" Shared Team-personal Model which has been changed as a result 
of Accomplish Technical Tasks. It is this current model that is assessed by this function. 
The justification for Individual Situation Models and Altered Shared Team-personal 
Model as controls to this function is along the lines for the function Assess Shared Task 
Model discussed above. Development of the Shared Team-personal Model would include 
both verbal as well as non-verbal exchanges between crewmembers. In such cases, 
Individual Situation Models, which include crewmembers' models of the self and of 
interaction play an important role and are thus shown as controls to all three functions for 
the same reasons as explained above (see Assess Shared Task Model). 
The assessment of the Shared Team-personal Model drives its further development 
or refinement. The Shared Team-personal model essentially is formed by sharing of 
individual models of the self. Development of the Shared Team-personal Model takes place 
as a result of crewmembers sharing information about themselves, their knowledge, skills, 
and past experiences as related to flying, as well as their likes, dislikes and tendencies. 
This kind of sharing would be expected during the initial briefings and during low 
workload phases such as cruise, but would not be expected to occur in high workload 
conditions. In common parlance, such sharing would be referred to as "getting to know 
you" conversation. cI 
Individual Situation Models 
Altered Shared Team-personal Model 
Assess  Team-personal model assessments
Shared
 
Team-personal
 
Model
 
V 
II 
Crewmembers  Share 
Knowledge 
about 
Selves  2 
Crow aware of team-members' 
knowledge/skills 
Express 
Selves 
Crew with shared 
Team-Personal Model 
oI 
3 
Crew aware of team-members' 
attitudedtendeneies 
Figure 10. CRM/A23 Develop Shared Team-Personal Model 111 
(b)  Share Knowledge about Selves. 
The function Shared Knowledge about Selves transforms Crewmembers into a 
Crew aware of team-members' Knowledge/Skills subject to Team-personal Model 
Assessments and Individual Situation Models. The output becomes an input to the function 
Express Selves. 
(c)  Express Selves. 
The function Express Selves transforms Crewmembers into a Crew aware of team-
members' Attitudes/Tendencies subject to Team-personal Model Assessments and 
Individual Situation Models. 
The combination of the outputs of the above three functions leads to a Crew with 
Shared Team-personal Model, the output of the function Develop Shared Team-interaction 
Model. Crew with Shared Team-personal Model is thus defined as the combination of a 
Crew aware of team-members' Knowledge/Skills, and a Crew aware of team-members' 
attitudes/tendencies. 
5.7.5 CRM/A3 
Node CRM/A3 (Figure 11) shows the decomposition of parent box A3 and is titled 
Accomplish Technical Tasks. 
Accomplish Technical Tasks (A3) is decomposed into four functions (a) Prioritize 
Tasks, (b) Allocate Resources, (c) Share Task Information, and (d) Execute Tasks. 
According to the IDEFO methodology, these functions would be numbered as A31, A32, 
A33, and A34 respectively. However, since they are not decomposed any further in the 
analysis, they are only numbered as 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. These functions are 
described below. 
The decomposition of Accomplish Technical Tasks is based upon Funk's (1991) 
theory of Cockpit Task Management (CTM). 
In discussing the development of the Shared Task Model, it was noted that the crew 
clarifies goals, discusses contingencies/plans and task strategies. Clarification of goals lead 
to the definition of tasks. Funk (1990) defines a task as "...a process completed to cause a 
system to achieve a goal" (p. 229). C5  Ct 
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Since flying an airplane is a dynamic multi-tasking environment, Accomplish Technical 
Tasks implies that there are many goals to be achieved simultaneously, which means there 
are many tasks to be defined and executed. This leads to the notion of a hierarchy of tasks 
and the creation of an agenda of tasks. Funk (1991) defines an agenda as "...a hierarchy of 
tasks to be completed during a mission" (p. 275). Further, Funk (1990) notes that the 
process of creating the agenda of tasks "...involves the selection and specification of a 
suitable task to achieve each goal and the defmition of an event to initiate that task" (p. 
229). 
(a)  Prioritize Tasks. 
This function transforms the Task Agenda (output of Execute Tasks) into a set of 
Prioritized Tasks (a prioritized agenda of tasks) subject to Individual Situation Models, and 
Shared Situation Models. 
The Task Agenda needs to be prioritized depending upon the situation. Although 
there may be a number of tasks to be simultaneously accomplished, each task can be 
assigned a weight in terms of importance and urgency, thereby allowing for the agenda to 
be ordered or prioritized. 
Task prioritization requires a shared understanding of the situation. Shared 
Situation Models are thus a control to this task. A variety of decision-making and judgment 
skills are involved in task prioritization. Individual Situation Models is thus the other 
control to this function. The Prioritized Tasks then become an input to the function 
Allocate Resources. 
(b)  Allocate Resources. 
This function generates Allocated Resources subject to Prioritized Tasks, Shared 
Situation Models, and Individual Situation Models. 
Once tasks are prioritized, resources need to be allocated for their execution. 
Resources are allocated to tasks on the basis of the urgency and importance assigned to 
them (Prioritized Tasks). Resource allocation in terms of the crew system essentially 
involves assignment of tasks to crewmembers. These task assignments depend upon a 
shared understanding of who is currently doing what (Shared Situation Models), and upon 
cognitive skills involving decision-making (Individual Situation Models). Thus, Prioritized 
Tasks, Shared Situation Models, and Individual Situation Models are controls to this 
function. 114 
(c)  Share Task Information. 
The function of sharing task information transforms the inputs which are Prioritized 
Tasks and Allocated Resources into an Altered Shared Situation Model subject to Shared 
Situation Models and Individual Situation Models. 
The Shared Situation Model, especially the Shared Team-interaction Model will 
influence how well the information about the prioritized tasks and team assignments 
(allocated resources) is communicated to each other. This sharing of task information 
changes the Shared Situation Model to result in the Altered Shared Situation Model, which 
is what controls Execute Tasks. The Altered Shared Situation Model is now the current 
Shared Situation Model which is what is assessed in the Build and Maintain Team function 
described previously. 
(d)  Execute Tasks 
This function transforms Aircraft State into Altered Aircraft State and Task Agenda, 
subject to Shared Situation Models, Individual Situation Models, and Altered Shared 
Situation Models, with the help of Hardware/Aircraft Systems. 
Aircraft State and Altered Altered Aircraft State have been defined previously. The 
function Execute Tasks includes the "physical" execution of tasks, which leads to a change 
in the Aircraft State, as well as the creation of the agenda of tasks. Hence the outputs of 
the function are Task Agenda and Altered Aircraft State. Task Agenda becomes an input to 
Prioritize Tasks. 
The Altered Shared Situation Model along with the Individual Situation Models 
control Execute Tasks. In addition to these, Environmental Factors also control this 
function. After all, it is the environment over which the crew has minimal control over. 
This concludes the description of the model of crew performance. This also 
concludes the chapter on Modeling Crew Performance. Chapter 6 discusses Model 
Application. 115 
6. MODEL APPLICATION
 
Chapter 5 described the model of crew performance developed using the 
SADT/IDEFO methodology. The primary purpose of the model is to model crew 
performance and describe the activities or functions involved in crew performance. Since 
the model is supposed to be a description of performance, it should also be able to explain 
breakdowns in crew performance. An example of a breakdown in crew performance is an 
aircrash. However, an accident represents the harshest example of such breakdowns; not 
all breakdowns in performance may result in accidents. For example, unsatisfactory 
accomplishment of activity A22 (Develop Shared Team-Interaction Model) results in an 
inadequately developed shared team-interaction model, and ultimately in a less effective 
team. However, not all aircraft flown by less effective teams will crash. Likewise, 
accidents can occur in cases where the team might have performed well by all standards, 
yet, the situation was beyond human control because of say, limiting environmental 
factors. 
The crew performance model is useful because it can provide valuable insight into 
these interactions. It goes beyond helping to identify which activities were not 
accomplished. It helps the analyst to pose important questions such as: why was a 
particular activity not accomplished? If it was limited in some way, how so? Through 
controls or inputs? If so, where did the control or the input come from? Were they 
boundary inputs or controls or were they the output of another activity? By posing such 
questions, the analyst is forced to look "deeper" into the accident, thereby gaining insight 
beyond the superficial causes. Such insight is valuable not just to the accident investigator 
interested in determining the cause of the accident, but also to those interested in the design 
of aircraft and crew systems. In the following sections, the utility of the model is 
demonstrated by applying it to analyze two aircraft accidents. 
Accidents occur because of a number of reasons, but since the model was 
developed with an emphasis on crew coordination related activities, the demonstration of 
the model is restricted to applying it to those accidents that are supposedly CRM related. 
Prior to 1979, the NTSB made no mention of CRM in its accident reports. As was 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the NTSB's first explicit mention of 'poor CRM' was in its report 
after the crash of a United Airlines flight, in 1978 in Portland, Oregon. Since then, there 
have been several accidents and incidents in which "good CRM" and "bad CRM" have 
been implicated, both by the NTSB as well as the operational community. 116 
6.1 Bad CRM 
On December 29, 1972, an Eastern Airlines, Lockheed Tristar L-1011 plane (an L­
1011 has three jet engines one each under a wing and one mounted on the tail) crashed 
into the Florida Everglades primarily because the crew was distracted by two burnt out light 
bulbs of the nose landing gear position indicating system. Although this accident occurred 
much before the concept of CRM, as Kayten (1993) writes, "This accident has come to 
represent the classic CRM accident [italics added]" (p. 291). The entire aviation 
community has come to recognize this accident as a typical example of bad CRM as is 
evident from the numerous references to it in the literature. This view is even shared by the 
airline industry (P. Russo, personal communication, 1993). Because of its significance, 
this is one of the accidents that will be analyzed. 
6.2 Good CRM 
On July 19, 1989, a United Airlines, McDonnell Douglas DC-10 (also a three 
engined aircraft with engines mounted in a configuration similar to the L-1011) attempted a 
landing at Gateway Airport in Sioux City, Iowa after almost 45 minutes of a complete 
hydraulic system failure following a mid-air explosion in the aircraft's tail section. This 
accident has been recognized by the aviation community as an example of good CRM, a 
fact documented by NTSB's (1990) explicit commendation of the crew that "...greatly 
exceeded reasonable expectations....indicative of the value of cockpit resource management 
training, which has been in existence at UAL [United Airlines] for a decade" (p. 76). The 
surviving captain, Al Haynes, himself has attributed the success of the crew's preparation 
to United's CRM training program known as Command Leadership Resource Training or 
CLR (Haynes, 1991). This is the other accident that will be analyzed in this chapter. 
6.3 Analysis Strategy 
The primary source of information about an aircraft accident is that provided by the 
NTSB accident report following the crash. Consequently, the analysis of the two CRM 
examples mentioned above will be based upon the respective NTSB accident reports. 
Communications play an important part in team performance and are hence important for an 
analysis. Some accident reports provide a detailed transcript of the CVR recordings, while 117 
some provide only pertinent communications. The information provided in the accident 
report along with the transcript of CVR recordings will be the sole basis of data or 
information for the analysis. 
The general format for the analysis will follow one of questions and answers. 
Madhavan (1993), in his analysis of aircraft incident reports cites the use of Crouch's 
(1992) 'Five Whys Deep' concept as being "Central to the theme of going beyond 'pilot 
error' as a causal factor for error committal..." (p. 27). The approach used in this analysis 
is akin to his approach. However, instead of the use of an error taxonomy, this analysis 
makes use of the crew performance model which is based on a functional approach. 
6.4 Analysis: Example of Bad CRM 
The synopsis of the Eastern 401 crash as taken from the NTSB (1973) accident 
report (NTSB-AAR-73-14) is as follows: 
An Eastern Air Lines [EAU Lockheed L-1011 crashed at 2342 
eastern standard time, December 29, 1972, approximately 18 miles west-
northwest of Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida. The aircraft was 
destroyed. There were 163 passengers and a crew of 13 aboard the aircraft; 
94 passengers and 5 crewmembers received fatal injuries. All other 
occupants received injuries which ranged in severity from minor to critical. 
The flight diverted from its approach to Miami International Airport 
because the landing gear position indicating system of the aircraft did not 
indicate that the nose gear was locked in the down position. The aircraft 
climbed to 2,000 feet mean sea level and followed a clearance to proceed 
west from the airport at that altitude. During this time, the crew attempted to 
correct the malfunction and to determine whether or not the nose landing 
gear was extended. 
The aircraft crashed into the Everglades shortly after being cleared 
by Miami Approach Control for a left turn back to Miami International 
Airport. Surviving passengers and crewmembers states that the flight was 
routine and operated normally before impact with the ground. 
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the 
probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flight crew to monitor 
the flight instruments during the 4 final minutes of flight, and to detect an 
unexpected descent soon enough to prevent impact with the ground. 
Preoccupation with a malfunction of the nose landing gear position 
indicating system distracted the crew's attention from the instruments and 
allowed the descent to go unnoticed. 
As a result of the investigation of this accident, the Safety Board has 
made recommendations to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
Administration. (p. 1-2) 118 
A graph of the CVR recordings of the last 10 minutes of communications prior to 
impact, plotted against an altitude trace derived from the DFDR is provided in Appendix D 
of the NTSB accident report. These communications are illustrated in very fine print on the 
graph. For the sake of legibility, the transcribed communications from the graph were re­
typed into standard text format without the altitude trace. This verbatim transcript is shown 
in Appendix 1 and was used for the analysis. 
A condensed version of the sequence of events along with some transcriptions of 
the recording of the events during the crucial last six minutes before impact is included 
below. 
The cockpit crew consisted of a Captain, a First Officer, and a Second Officer. 
Also present was an Eastern Airlines Maintenance specialist who happened to be in the 
forward observer seat in the cockpit. The F/0 was flying the aircraft which had reached an 
altitude of 2,000 feet 
2336:04	  Captain directs F/O to engage autopilot. 
F/O removes nose gear light lens assembly, attempts to replace it but it 
jams. 
2337:08	  Captain instructs Second Officer (S/0) to enter 'forward electronics bay' to 
check visually the alignment of the nose gear indices. 
(Proper nose gear extension is indicated by the physical alignment of two 
rods on the landing gear linkage that can be observed by means of an optical 
sight when the nose wheelwell light is illuminated. This observation is 
done from the forward electronics bay, an area below the cockpit and just 
forward of the nose wheelwell.) 
Flightcrew continues attempts to free nose gear position light lens from 
retainer without success (since it is jammed) 
2338:34	  Captain again instructs 5/0 to descend to forward electronic bay to check 
the alignment. 
2338:56	  Captain and F/O discuss faulty nose gear position light lens to and how it 
might have been reinserted incorrectly. 119 
2341:05 
At 2340:38 - half second C-chord sounds (to indicate a deviation of +/-250 
feet from selected altitude. 
No comment by any of flightcrew on sounding of C-chord. 
No pitch change to correct loss of altitude. 
After 2341 
S/O comes up to cockpit to say he couldn't see it since it was pitch dark. 
Flightcrew and EAL maintenance specialist occupying forward observer 
seat discuss operation of nose wheelwell light. 
Maintenance specialist goes to help S/O into electronics bay. 
2341:40	  Tower asks EAL 401 "how are things comin' along out there?" 
Controller notes 900 feet alphanumeric display on radar screen, but does not 
think flight is in danger - momentary deviations in altitude information on 
the radar display were not uncommon and more than one scan on display is 
required to verify a deviation requiring controller action. 
2342:05  F/O " We did something to the altitude" 
Capt. "What?" 
2342:07  F/O "We're still at 2000 feet, right?" 
Capt. "Hey, what's happening here?" 
2342:10  First of six altimeter warning "beep" sounds begin. 
Cease immediately before sound of initial ground impact. 
2342:12  Aircraft crashes into everglades. 
In the conclusions made by the NTSB, four of the seventeen findings are very relevant to 
their determination of the probable cause. These four are listed below: 
1.  The three flight crewmembers were preoccupied in an attempt to ascertain the 
position of the nose landing gear. [no. 10] 
2.  The flightcrew did not hear the aural altitude alert which sounded as the aircraft 
descended through 1,750 feet m.s.l. [no. 13] 
3.  The flightcrew did not monitor the flight instruments during the fmal descent until 
seconds before impact. [no. 16] 120 
4.  The captain failed to assure that a pilot was monitoring the progress of the aircraft at 
all time. [no. 17] (p. 23). 
The probable cause of the accident is cited in the latter half of the synopsis above. 
The fact that the aircraft crashed implies that somewhere along the line there was a failure or 
breakdown of the function Accomplish Technical Tasks (A3 on node CRM/A0, Figure 3). 
Why was there a breakdown? The answer to this lies in a closer look at this function, or its 
decomposition as shown on node CRM/A3 (Figure 11). 
Finding 1 above provides some insight into what happened during accomplishing 
the technical tasks. It states that "the three flight crewmembers were preoccupied in an 
attempt to ascertain the position of the nose landing gear" (p. 23). This coupled with 
finding 4 (the captain failed to assure that a pilot was monitoring the progress of the aircraft 
at all time) leads to two important inferences (a) tasks were misprioritized and (b) resources 
were improperly allocated. At 2,000 feet, the most important task that needs to be paid 
attention to is to fly the airplane. And nobody was flying the airplane. Although the 
autopilot was engaged, the NTSB report notes that "...good pilot practices and company 
training dictate that one pilot will monitor the progress of the aircraft at all limes and under 
all circumstances" (p. 21). The non-illumination of the nose landing gear position 
indicating system should indeed have been a matter of concern. Nevertheless, all three 
pilots need not have been involved in diagnosing the problem. Thus, the two functions that 
were inadequately accomplished were (a) Prioritize tasks and (b) Allocate Resources. 
Why was there a misprioritization of tasks? The Prioritize Tasks function is 
controlled by Individual Situation Models and Shared Situation Models. It can thus be 
inferred that these models were either incorrect or inadequate given the demands of the 
situation. The same can be said about Allocate Resources. Even if the problem of burnt out 
light bulbs was assigned a higher priority, all the crewmembers need not have attempted to 
solve it. By taking a closer look at the functions that generated these models, it may be 
possible to infer what was lacking. Individual Situation Models are the output of Maintain 
Individual Situation Awareness (Al) while Shared Situation Models are the output of Build 
and Maintain Team (A2). The performance of both these functions is therefore analyzed. 
Maintain Individual Situation Awareness is decomposed into Assess Situation, 
Acquire Information, and Update Situation Models (node CRM/A1, Figure 4). Finding 3 
states that the flightcrew did not monitor the flight instruments during the final descent until 
seconds before impact. The crew thus failed to Acquire Information (Al2). A closer look 
is taken at the function Acquire Information (node CRM/Al2, Figure 6). 121 
Acquire Information (Al2) has Individual Factors, Environmental Factors, 
Organizational Factors, and Situation Assessment as controls and Hardware/Aircraft 
Systems as a mechanism. It is decomposed into Acquire Information from the 
Environment, Acquire Information from the Aircraft, and Acquire Information from 
Crewmembers. 
The accident occurred at night (close to midnight); the outside environment was not 
illuminated. Although the aircraft was at 2,000 feet it is not clear from the report if the 
pilots could have acquired valuable information from the outside (e.g., runway landing 
lights, other landmarks). The plane descended into the Everglades; it is thus probable that 
very few visual cues could have been acquired from outside the cockpit. Acquire 
Information from Environment is therefore ruled out. Acquire information from 
Crewmembers is also irrelevant in this case; the crew appeared to all be working together 
trying to fix the light bulb problem. What was lacking was the acquisition of information 
from the aircraft instruments. A closer look is thus taken at Acquire Information from 
&Tragft. 
One of the findings of the NTSB was, "There was no failure or malfunction of the 
structure, powerplants, systems, or components of the aircraft before impact, except that 
both bulbs in the nose landing gear position indicating system were burned out" (p. 22). 
Thus, there was no problem with the mechanism, Hardware/Aircraft Systems. All pilots 
were well experienced and possessed the requisite skills and knowledge. In fact, the 
Captain in his most recent flight check had received the comments, "Good knowledge of 
aircraft and procedures" (p. 27). Although a post-mortem discovered a tumor in the brain 
of the captain, the NTSB concluded that this had no effect on the pilot's motor skills. In 
any case, motor skills were irrelevant to the unfolding of the circumstances. Organizational 
factors are not indicative of having any effect on this function. The weather conditions 
were normal, there was no windshear or other abnormal meteorological conditions that 
could have affected the crew's ability to acquire information from the aircraft. The only 
other control that affected the acquisition of information was thus Situation Assessment, 
which resulted in inadequate Acquired Situation Information. Situation Assessment is an 
output of Assess Situation (A11). A closer look is therefore taken at this function (see 
node CRM/A 1 1, Figure 5). 
Assess Situation has Acquired Situation Information as the input and Individual 
Situation Models as the control. It was concluded in the above paragraph that the Acquired 
Situation Information was inadequate. Preoccupation with the light bulbs led the flightcrew 
to ignore important aspects of the situation. The pilots' focus of the situation centered 
around the light bulbs; other aspects of the situation, such as the aircraft instruments, were 122 
ignored. As a result, their perception of the situation might have been correct, but it was 
inadequate since the pilots did not even notice that the aircraft had started on an 
unintentional descent. They comprehended the "narrow view" of the situation correctly, 
but only to the extent that their individual situation models suggested based on the 
perceived situation. As far as they were concerned, removing the bulb was the problem 
and they proceeded to determine how it could be taken care of. But this comprehension 
lacked integration of all aspects of the situation, therefore their projections of the situation 
were also inadequate. Individual Situation Models are the only control to Assess Situation, 
hence it is inferred that these were inadequate. Thus, the combination of inadequate 
Individual Situation Models with inadequate Acquired Situation Information resulted in 
inadequate Situation Assessment which in turn controlled the Acquire Information function 
and Update Situation Models function, resulting in inadequate or incorrect Individual 
Situation Models. 
Shared Situation Models are an output of the function Build and Maintain Team 
(A2). A closer look is taken at its decomposition (see node CRM/A2, Figure 7). Build and 
Maintain Team has three functions (a) Develop Shared Task Model, (b) Develop Shared 
Team-interaction Model, and (c) Develop Shared Team-personal Model. 
There is insufficient information available to make any inferences about the Shared 
Team-interaction Model and the Shared Team-personal model (only the last 10 minutes of 
communications are available). In any case, from the last 10 minutes of data, there is no 
indication that these limited performance in any way. The remaining function is Develop 
Shared Task Model (A21). A closer look is thus taken at this function (see node 
CRM/A21, Figure 8). 
Crewmembers are an input to A21; its controls are Altered Shared Task Model and 
Individual Situation Models, and its output is a Crew with Shared Task Model. Sharing of 
mental models requires effective communication. The effectiveness of the communication 
is however, irrelevant if the "content" that is being shared is deficient. In this case, the 
Individual Situation Models themselves were inadequate, which was the primary reason 
why the crew had an inadequate Shared Task Model. An inadequate Shared Task Model 
resulted in an inadequate Shared Situation Model, which adversely affected the Accomplish 
Technical Task function as examined previously. From this it can be inferred that 
inadequate Individual Situation Models were the primary cause that led to a breakdown in 
the function Accomplish Technical Tasks. 123 
6.5 Analysis: Example of Good CRM 
A portion of the Executive Summary of the United Airlines crash as cited in the 
NTSB (1990) accident report (NTSB-AAR-90-06) is as follows: 
On July 19, 1989, at 1516, a DC-10-10, N1819U, operated by 
United Airlines as flight 232, experienced a catastrophic failure of the No. 2 
tail-mounted engine during cruise flight. The separation, fragmentation and 
forceful discharge of stage 1 fan rotor assembly parts from the No. 2 engine 
led to the loss of the three hydraulic systems that powered the airplane's 
flight controls. The flightcrew experienced severe difficulties controlling 
the airplane, which subsequently crashed during an attempted landing at 
Sioux Gateway Airport, Iowa. There were 285 passengers and 11 
crewmembers onboard. One flight attendant and 110 passengers were 
fatally injured. 
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the 
probable cause of this accident was the inadequate consideration given to 
human factors limitations in the inspection and quality control procedures 
used by United Airlines' engine overhaul facility which resulted in the 
failure to detect a fatigue crack originating from a previously undetected 
metallurgical defect located in a critical area of the stage 1 fan disk that was 
manufactured by General Electric Aircraft Engines. The subsequent 
catastrophic disintegration of the disk resulted in the liberation of debris in a 
pattern of distribution and with energy levels that exceeded the level of 
protection provided by design features of the hydraulic systems that operate 
the DC-10's flight controls. 
Unlike the Eastern Airlines report, this accident report does not provide a complete 
transcript of the CVR recordings as a single appendix. Instead, details of communications 
including paraphrased versions interspersed with actual transcriptions are provided in 
different sections of the report. For example, details of communications between the 
aircraft and United Airlines' San Francisco Maintenance facility are included under section 
1.9.1 while details of cockpit communications are included under section 1.11.1 (p. 19­
23). For the purposes of this analysis, a summary of events compiled by combining the 124 
communications provided under different sections of the report was prepared. This 
summary is as follows: 
[Aircraft cruising at 37,000 feet - F/O flying aircraft] 
1516:10	  Loud bang/explosion is heard, followed by vibration and shuddering of 
airframe. 
Crew checks instruments and determines the No. 2 (tail-mounted) engine to 
have failed.
 
Captain (Capt.) asks for engine shutdown checklist.
 
S/O observes airplane's normal systems hydraulic pressure and quantity
 
gages are indicating zero.
 
F/O reports he cannot control airplane; airplane enters right descending turn.
 
Capt. takes control but the aircraft does not respond to control inputs.
 
Capt. reduces thrust on No.1 engine (mounted under left wing) and aircraft
 
rolls to level attitude. 
Crew deploys air driven generator (ADG) as backup to restore auxiliary 
hydraulic power, but the attempt is in vain. 
1520  Crew contacts Minnesota Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and 
requests emergency assistance and vectors to nearest airport. ARTCC 
suggests Des Moines airport. 
1521  Crew sends Aircraft Communications and Reporting Systems (ACARS) 
message to UAL Central Dispatch requesting a call on frequency 129.45. 
No contact yet. 
1522  ARTCC informs UA 232 they were proceeding towards Sioux City, and if 
they would prefer vectors to Sioux City crew responds "affirmative." 125 
1523  UAL dispatch initiates contact with UA 232. 
1525	  UA 232 requests dispatch connect flight with UAL's San Francisco 
Maintenance (SAM) "...immediately, its a MAYDAY" 
1526:42	  CVR recording begins - Capt. talking to ARTCC (probably confirming 
vectors to Sioux city) 
1527	  Crew contacts SAM - advises SAM of loss of all hydraulic systems and 
quantities and requested whatever assistance SAM could provide - SAM 
unable to provide any new instructions. (see 1530:35  crew here implies 
S/O) 
Meanwhile (shortly after no. 2 engine failure) passengers informed of no. 2 
engine failure, senior flight attendant called to cockpit - was told to prepare 
for a "quick and dirty" (i.e., an emergency landing). 
1529:15	  A flight attendant relays a message to the Capt. - advising the Capt. that a 
UAL DC-10 training check airman who was off duty and seated in the first-
class cabin section, had volunteered his assistance. 
Capt. responds "Okay, let'em come up" to flightdeck. 
1529:35	  Check Airman (CA) arrives on deck. 
1529:41	  Capt. (to CA) "We don't have any controls" 
1529:55	  Capt. directs CA to return to cabin to assess external damage. 
1530:32	  F/O "What's the hydraulic quantity?" 
S/0 reports zero. 
F/O "on all of them?" 
S/0 confirms the status. 
Capt. "quantity is gone?" 
1530:35	  Capt. to S/0 "you got a hold of SAM?" 
S/0 "he's not telling me anything" 126 
1533 
Capt. " We're not gonna make the runway fellas" 
[ Believed that CA returns to the deck at this juncture] 
Capt. "We have no hydraulic fluid, that's part of our main problem."
 
CA "Okay both your inboard ailerons are sticking up that's as far as I can
 
tell.  I don't know"
 
CA asks Capt. for instructions.
 
Capt. tells him which throttle to manipulate.
 
1532:02	  CA reports that the flight attendants were slowly securing the cabin. 
Capt. reports that "they better hurry we're gonna have to ditch I think" 
1532:16	  Capt. reports to approach controller that the flight had no hydraulic fluid and 
therefore no elevator control and that the flight might have to make a forced 
landing. 
1532:18	  CA states "get this thing down we're in trouble" 
SAM informs UA 232 it was making contact with UAL flight operations. 
1534:27	  Capt. decides to attempt a landing at Sioux City. 
Capt. asks S/0 for information to make a no-flap, no-slat landing. 
Capt. also asks controller for ILS frequency heading to runway and length 
of runway. 
Controller provides frequency and reports runway 31 to be 9,000 feet long. 
[ Airplane is now 35 miles northeast of the airport ] 
1535:36	  Capt. instructs S/O to start dumping fuel by using the quick dump. 
1537:55	  Capt. asks CA if he could manipulate the throttles to maintain a 10 to 15 
degree turn. 
CA replies that he "would try" 127 
1538:55  One of the pilots says that 200 Knots would be the "clean maneuvering 
airspeed"
 
F/O responds "two hundred and one eighty five on your [speed]bugs Al"
 
1540	  SAM advises UA 232 that 'Operational Engineering' department had been 
contacted to lend assistance. 
1540:39	  Capt asks senior flight attendant if everyone in the cabin was ready. 
Capt explains to the flight attendant that they had very little control of the 
airplane because of the loss of hydraulic flight controls and that they were 
going to attempt to land at Sioux City, Iowa. He mentions that it would be 
a difficult landing and that he had doubts about the outcome and the crew's 
ability to carry out a successful evacuation. He also mentions that there 
would be the signal "brace, brace, brace" made over the P.A. system to alert 
the cabin occupants to prepare for the landing. 
1541:09	  Approach controller informs UA 232 that emergency equipment would be 
standing by. 
1541:52	  S/O reports that a flight attendant said she observed damage on one wing. 
S/O asks if he should go aft and look. 
Capt authorizes S/O's absence from flightdeck to investigate. 
1543  S/O returns to report damage to tail of airplane. 
Capt. reports "...that's what I thought" 
1545	  SAM informs UA 232 that "engineering is assembling right now and 
they're listening to us." 
Crew advises SAM that the flight was at 9,000 feet and that they were 
planning to land at Sioux City. 
1548:43	  Landing gear is extended (by means of the alternate gear extension 
procedure) 
1549:11	  Capt directs flightcrew to lock their shoulder harnesses and to put 
everything away. 128 
UA 232 informs SAM that they has just completed the alternate gear 
extension procedure. (last communication recorded between UA 232 and 
SAM) 
1551:04	  ATC reports flight was 21 miles north of the airport. 
Controller requests flight to widen its turn slightly to the left in order to 
make a turn onto its final approach and keep airplane away from the city. 
Capt. responds "whatever you do, keep us away from the city" 
Controller gives flight a heading of 180 degrees. 
1552:19	  Controller alerts crewmembers to a 3,400 ft tower 5 miles to right. 
F/O acknowledges alert. 
Capt. responds they were trying to make a 30 degree. bank. 
A crewmember comments "I can't handle that steep of bank...can't handle 
that steep of bank." 
1553:35	  F/O states "...we're gonna have to try it straight ahead Al" 
1553:37  Controller advises crew that if they could hold altitude, their right turn to 
180 degree would put flight 10 miles east of airport. 
Capt. states "that's what we're tryin' to do" 
F/O recommends they try to establish a shallow descent 
1553:57	  Captain states he wants to get as close to airport as possible. 
Captain (few seconds later) states "get on the air and tell them we got about 
4 minutes to go" 
F/O so advises the controller. 
Capt corrects him "tell the passengers" 
A crewmember (presumably the Captain) makes a PA announcement 
1555:44	  Capt. reports a heading of 180 degrees. 
Controller reports that if the altitude could be maintained, the heading, "will 
work fine for about oh 7 miles" 129 
1557:07  Controller reports that the airport was "...twelve o'clock and one three 
miles." 
1558:11	  Capt. reports the runway in sight and thanks controller for his help. 
Capt. instructs the S/O to make a PA announcement which was believed to 
be a 2-minute warning. 
Controller reports winds as 360 degrees at 11 knots and cleared flight to 
land on any runway. 
Crew attempts to turn airplane to the left slightly. 
1558:59	  Capt. reports "we're pretty well lined up on this one here...think we will 
be..." 
Controller states that the runway the flight was lined up on was runway 22, 
which was closed, but added "that'll work sir, we're gettin' the equipment 
off the runway, they'll line up for that one." 
Capt. asks its length  controller reports it as 6,600 ft long 
1559:11	  Controller states that there was an open field at the end of runway and that 
the winds would not be a problem. 
[Crew's attention is directed to manipulating the throttles] 
1559:29	  One of the crewmembers makes announcement to brace for the landing. 
1559:44	  First of several Ground Proximity Warning Signal (GPWS) alerts begin. 
1559:52	  GPWS warnings end. 
1559:58	  Capt. states "close the throttles" 
1600:01	  CA states "nah I can't pull'em off or we'll lose it, that's what's turnin' ya" 
1600:05	  F/0 "left Al" "left throttle" "left" (repeated several times) 130 
1600:09  Second series of GPWS alerts. 
F/O "we're turning" or "we're tryin'" 
1600:16  Impact. 
United 232 crashed killing 110 of 285 passengers and one crewmember. Yet, it is 
considered to be an exemplar of good crew coordination. Breakdowns in crew 
performance may lead to accidents. However, not all accidents may be caused by a 
breakdown in crew performance. The performance of the crew of United 232 serves to 
highlight this fact. 
This fact is also clarified by a look at the A0 node of the crew performance model 
developed. The controls to the function Accomplish Technical Task include Shared 
Situation Models, Individual Situation Models, and Environmental Factors. The 
mechanism to the function is Hardware/Aircraft systems. In the Eastern Airlines case, 
Individual Situation Models were determined to have been the limiting factor. In the case 
of United 232, it is clear that the mechanism, rather its partial loss, was responsible for 
affecting the Accomplish Technical Tasks function. Despite this, crew performance was 
better than what could be expected under such conditions. The NTSB complimented the 
crew for saving the lives of more than half the people on board the aircraft. A lot more 
lives could have been lost were it not for the crew of United 232. The focus of this 
analysis is thus different from Eastern Airlines. Instead of bad performance, the crew 
performance model will serve to show how the crew performed in a manner commended 
by the NTSB to have "...greatly exceeded reasonable expectations" (p. 76). 
When the explosion occurred in the tail of the DC-10, the aircraft lost all three 
hydraulic systems. In the absence of hydraulic power, the plane did not respond to the 
control inputs made by the crew; the plane was out of control. As the crew soon 
discovered, they could have a minimal degree of control on the aircraft's attitude and 
heading by manipulating the thrust on the remaining two engines. There were a number of 
things the crew could have done wrong soon thereafter. Instead, the Captain immediately 
took charge and prioritized tasks and allocated resources. 
The most important task was to try to keep the plane under control. After assessing 
the situation, the crew determined that the aircraft was not responding to any control inputs 
(All  Assess Situation). Based on the Situation Assessment, they decided that they 
needed more information (see node CRM/A1, Figure 4). Based on the prioritization of 
tasks, (see node CRM/A3, Figure 11) the Capt. and the F/O took charge of the task of 
controlling the airplane while the Capt. assigned the task of contacting Minneapolis 131 
ARTCC to (Allocate Resources) the S/O to acquire information (Acquire Information) 
about alternate landing sites. Barely minutes after the explosion, the Captain accurately 
assessed the situation and based on the projection of its future status (Project Situation - see 
node CRM/All, Figure 5), the crew contacted United Airlines Central Dispatch for further 
assistance and declared an emergency. 
Through explicit sharing of information, the Captain proceeded to build and 
maintain his team. Perhaps the most obvious of these functions was the crew's 
development of a Shared Task and Team-interaction Model (see nodes CRM/A21- Figure 
8, CRM/A22 - Figure 9). An emergency situation is not the time to be developing a Shared 
Team-personal Model, although it could be inferred that the crew already had a fairly well 
developed Shared Team-personal Model given the fact that "The accident occurred on the 
third day of a 4-day scheduled trip sequence" and that they "...had flown together six times 
in the previous 90 days" (p. 11). 
An assessment of the Shared Team-interaction Model determined the need to 
further expand the group's boundaries. The Captain informed the senior flight attendant of 
the criticality of the situation, while asking the 5/0 to get any information he could from 
San Francisco Maintenance and UAL Central Dispatch. Making the cabin crew aware of 
the emergency, led to the refinement of the norm, "yes, we are in this together and we can 
use your help". When a cabin crew member informed the captain of the United Airlines 
Check Airman seated in the first-class section, the Captain did not hesitate to invite him into 
the cockpit. He knew the crew could need all the help it could get. The Check Airman 
proved to be of invaluable help. 
Once the Check Airman arrived in the cockpit, the Captain briefly apprised him of 
the situation (see details of communications above Check Airman arrives at 1529:35, at 
1529:41 Captain informs him "We don't have any controls") and the crew thus developed a 
Shared Task Model. Meanwhile, the Captain had already assigned the S/0 with the task of 
maintaining communications with San Francisco Maintenance, while the F/O tried to 
maintain control of the airplane. Having an extra person in the cockpit, the Captain 
immediately made use of this resource by asking the Check Airman to return to the cabin to 
assess external damage (Acquire Information from Environment). By assigning this task to 
the Check Airman, who was a Captain himself, the Captain clearly established the authority 
dynamic between them (Develop Team-interaction Model). 
During the time the CA went into the cabin and returned, the Captain discussed the 
situation with the F/O and the S/O (Develop Shared Task Model). As soon as the Check 
Airman returned to the cockpit, the Captain once again apprised him of the situation 
(1530:35  Capt. "We have no hydraulic fluid, that's part of our main problem"). He then 132 
assigned the difficult task of trying to manipulate the throttles to the Check Airman 
(1537:55) who by standing between the Captain and F/O's seats and using both hands, 
was able to manipulate the throttles so as to maintain the aircraft's attitude (Allocate 
Resources). Having thus assigned the task of controlling the airplane to the Check Airman 
and the F/O, the Captain freed himself for further decision making tasks. All along, the 
Captain apprised the cabin crew about what was going on, and despite the critical situation 
took the time to make announcements over the Public Address system to inform the 
passengers. 
It is clear from the above that all along, the crew maintained a level of group 
situation awareness by maintaining adequate levels of individual situation awareness, 
through explicit and effective sharing of information leading to the development of shared 
task and team-interaction models. The adequate Individual and Shared Situation Models 
thus formed were helpful in Accomplishing Technical Tasks. 
The model of crew performance has been demonstrated to be applicable towards 
analyzing two salient examples of crew coordination. In the "Bad CRM" case, the model 
by posing questions such as "Why was there a misprioritization of tasks?" leads to the 
conclusion that the crew made an incorrect or inadequate assessment of the situation which 
was largely a consequence of their holding inadequate situation models, which were again 
because they failed to maintain individual situation awareness. In the "Good CRM" case, 
the model is able to highlight aspects of performance that led to the crew being able to 
effectively manage their resources through proper allocation and good coordination. By 
doing so, the model has been demonstrated to provide a useful framework for 
understanding crew performance from a CRM perspective. 133 
7. DISCUSSION
 
The primary objective of this research has been to gain a better understanding of 
crew performance. In order to meet this objective, a framework for understanding crew 
performance was developed with an emphasis on crew coordination related activities. 
Chapter 4 laid the foundation for the development of the framework, while Chapter 5 
described the modeling methodology used to develop the framework. In addition to the 
model's primary purpose of being a descriptor of crew processes, its ability to be 
applicable to the analysis of accidents was demonstrated in Chapter 6. 
The discussion in this chapter pertains to the research as a whole. First, the overall 
research approach is discussed; the problems encountered, solutions adopted, and their 
limitations. This is followed by a discussion of the modeling methodology adopted for the 
purpose of modeling the crew system. The model is then discussed with an emphasis on 
its strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the usefulness of the model, and its validity is 
discussed. 
7.1 Overall Approach 
For more than a decade, the aviation industry has recognized, at least conceptually, 
the need for CRM. Presently, the industry is in the process of validating the effectiveness 
of CRM training. Meanwhile the challenge to regulatory agencies like the FAA is the 
development of objective measures of CRM evaluation, which was the vision goal of this 
research. It was believed that the development of a coherent framework for understanding 
the issues involved in CRM would lead to their better definition, thereby setting the stage 
for the development of objective performance measures. This led to the formulation of this 
research's primary objective: The development of a coherent framework for understanding 
crew performance with an emphasis on crew coordination. 
The research proceeded with the hypothesis that the application of systems 
engineering principles to crew performance may result in a better understanding of crew 
coordination, an integral component of crew performance. The concepts underlying 
systems engineering may seem intuitive, yet because of their rigor, they force the analyst to 
think about issues in a logical and consistent manner. As a result, the principles of systems 
engineering have been traditionally applied in various domains, ranging from 134 
manufacturing systems to social systems (Wymore, 1976). This was the rationale behind 
applying systems theory to analyze crew performance. 
Two ingredients are essential for a successful systems analysis: (a) a fi rm grasp of 
the concepts underlying systems engineering, and (b) domain knowledge or information 
about the system being modeled. One of the goals that this research accomplished was to 
gain an understanding of systems theory and of the SADT/IDEFO modeling methodology 
used to analyze crew performance (this is further discussed in the following section, 
Modeling Methodology). This was then applied to the domain of crew performance. 
A couple of points with regards to domain knowledge in general, and specifically 
with regards to crew performance are worth mentioning. While it is important to have a 
consistent viewpoint in the modeling of a system, it is always beneficial to have a wider 
perspective during the acquisition of domain knowledge. It is for this reason that modern, 
large-scale, complex systems are modeled not by a single individual but by a team of 
interdisciplinary professionals who provide input all along the modeling process (Wymore, 
1976). Domain knowledge about crew performance can be acquired through the available 
research literature, or it can be acquired through the systematic study of crews and airline 
operations. A systematic study of actual operations would involve observations of either 
"line" crews (i.e., crews actually conducting a real-life transport mission), or simulator 
studies such as those conducted in LOFT sessions. However, access to airline crew 
operations is restricted, particularly within the United States. Firstly, it requires the 
establishment of a rapport with an airline that is open to an outside researcher. There are 
stringent FAA regulations regarding the observation of line crews in operation; even the 
casual ride in the "jumpseat" (an extra seat in the cockpit, usually to accommodate a check 
airman or technician) by unauthorized personnel is forbidden. Obtaining permission to 
observe simulator training sessions if also very difficult, partly because of the 
competitiveness among industry, and for reasons of confidentiality. 
For the purpose of this research, initial contact was established with Evergreen 
Airlines of McMinnville, Oregon. At the time, Evergreen was in the process of developing 
an in-house CRM training program, and I am grateful for having had the opportunity to be 
present for at least one of their CRM sessions. Through my interactions with Evergreen, I 
gained valuable insight into line-based CRM, however, for reasons discussed above, I was 
unable to ride jumpseat and observe actual line operations or full-mission simulator 
training. Consequently, most of my domain knowledge about crew performance was 
acquired through available research literature in aviation psychology and related disciplines. 
It is thus possible that inadequate knowledge from operational sources could have 
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7.2 Modeling Methodology 
As previously noted, systems engineering is a very broad discipline. Although 
rigorous in principle, there isn't any one prescribed methodology that can be universally 
applied to all domains. There are many methods by which one can go about describing a 
system. Yet, the underlying principles of systematic and consistent analysis are 
paramount. Perhaps it is this intrinsic flexibility that accounts for the versatility of systems 
engineering. 
One approach to designing or analyzing a system is the functional approach which 
focuses on system activities instead of system elements. Such an approach is especially 
useful in the design of human-machine systems, in which functions are to be allocated 
between human and automation based on the relative capabilities and limitations of these 
resources. A functional approach is useful because it does not restrict the analyst, at least 
initially, to prescribing specific methods of performing system activities and thereby 
accomplishing system goals. Such an approach is not restricted to any particular kind of 
system. For instance, in talking about the application of the functional approach to 
analyzing leadership performance (social systems), Hackman and Walton (1986) write, 
"Because the functional approach leaves room for an indefinite number of specific ways to 
get a critical function accomplished, it avoids the need to delineate the specific behaviors 
that a leader should exhibit in given circumstances..." (p. 77). 
SADT is one such structured analysis technique which utilizes the functional 
approach for analyzing and designing systems. Because of its proven applicability in 
various domains, SADT/IDEFO was adopted to analyze the crew system. 
IDEFO's uniqueness and strength lies in the fact that it forces the analyst to identify 
the activities and the transformations involved in the system. In addition to doing so, it 
also forces the analyst to think about what limits these activities; the controls. Further, 
IDEFO allows for the identification of mechanisms to perform these activities. In the 
design of human-machine systems, this facilitates the crucial task of function allocation; the 
assignment of system tasks to either the human or the machine. Another important feature 
which is unique to IDEFO modeling is the Author/Reader cycle in which the model being 
developed by the Author (typically a team of analysts) is iteratively reviewed by the Reader 
(typically a team of reviewers). The validity of the model is thus continuously checked at 
all stages of model development (Marca & McGowan, 1988). More is said about this in 
the section on Model Application. Because of these features, the IDEFO methodology has 
repeatedly proven to be useful in modeling systems, particularly in the design of 136 
manufacturing systems where task allocation decisions significantly influence the 
economics of design. 
Despite its strengths, the IDEFO modeling methodology has its limitations. 
Although based on a rigorous framework of analysis based on the concepts of inputs, 
outputs, controls and mechanisms, the IDEFO methodology lacks formalization on several 
issues. For example, there are no well - defined rules for defining mechanisms, for 
distinguishing between inputs and controls, or for the use of tunneled arrows. A detailed 
discussion on some of these relevant issues as based on the work of Williamson (1991) has 
already been presented in the section, More on Boxes and Arrows, in Chapter 5, and is not 
further belabored. Some of these limitations led to conceptual problems in modeling crew 
performance. These are discussed in the following section. 
7.3 The Crew Performance Model 
In my opinion, there are four factors that significantly influenced the development 
of the model. These are (a) my lack of prior expertise in IDEFO modeling, (b) the fact that 
domain knowledge about crew performance was acquired primarily through available 
research literature, (c) the lack of formalization of some issues in IDEFO, and (d) 
disagreement among the different disciplines about fundamental issues underlying human 
behavior. 
The overall objective or goal of the research is to provide a better understanding of 
crew performance. The purpose of the model thus was to provide a framework for the 
better understanding of crew performance with an emphasis on crew coordination. The 
fact that domain knowledge about crew performance was acquired through research 
literature on aviation psychology certainly influenced its viewpoint. Since the model was 
developed from the perspective of an aviation researcher, it quite understandably reflects 
contemporary views about crew performance amongst aviation researchers. However, as 
noted above, the model was developed with an inadequate emphasis on knowledge 
acquired from an operational perspective. Consequently, the model might lack the 
operational emphasis, and subsequently affect its "usefulness" to the operational 
community. 
Chapter 4 presented an overview of the theory underlying human performance. It 
drew upon various disciplines such as psychology, sociology, and human factors 
engineering to present an understanding of contemporary psychological constructs such as 
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models. As might have been apparent, many of these issues remain fuzzy, each attempting 
to explain a particular aspect of human performance from their own perspective; their own 
view of reality. One of the objectives of the review of the literature was to integrate these 
perspectives in a logical and consistent manner. When it was not possible to do any more 
than present the different views, it was not attempted to resolve the dilemma per se, but the 
discussion was concluded by recognizing the fact that there may be disagreement over its 
representation. By doing so, concepts and terms were better defined, thus allowing for the 
development of a consistent model, which sets the stage for a coherent theory of crew 
performance. 
The difficulty in the development of the model due to different perspectives was 
only exacerbated by the inherent limitations of IDEFO. For instance, IDEFO lacks 
formalization on the distinction between an input, a control, and a mechanism. The only 
broad distinction offered is the fact that inputs are transformed by functions while controls 
are generally not transformed; they remain unchanged. This is obviously contradicted 
when a function has no inputs and only a control. Consider the case of mental models and 
maintaining individual situation awareness. The process of maintaining situation 
awareness is an iterative process of continuous adaptation, one which constantly results in 
an updating of the mental model. But the mental model also influences situation 
awareness. Should the mental model be a control or an input? It is true that part of this 
dilemma stems from the fuzziness surrounding the very concept of situation awareness and 
mental models. Obviously, there is a lot of room for further research in these areas, and a 
need for the further refinement of these concepts, a point made in the preceding section. 
But it may also be that the IDEFO methodology is not adequate for modeling human 
performance; an inherent limitation of the modeling process. Indeed, as some sociologists 
would argue, it may not be possible to model human behavior, particularly group behavior, 
on the basis of systems concepts such as inputs and outputs (Richard Mitchell, personal 
communication, May 1994). In other words, they would argue that the hypothesis, that the 
application of systems engineering principles to crew performance can result in a better 
understanding of crew coordination, is in essence incorrect! However, I do not subscribe 
to this view. I maintain that the model of crew performance developed bears testimony to 
the fact that it is possible to apply systems theory to establish a framework for 
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7.4 Model Application 
Chapter 6 described the application of the crew performance model to the analysis 
of two aircraft accidents. Since the model is a descriptor of the normative process of crew 
performance, it was supposed that it should be able to identify breakdowns in performance. 
Accident reports were used as the source of information for demonstrating the 
applicability of the crew performance model as a descriptor of crew processes. However, 
there are a number of drawbacks with using accident reports, some of which were 
mentioned earlier. Firstly, an accident is a 'harsh' example of a breakdown in crew 
performance. Not all accidents are caused due to inadequate accomplishment of CRM 
related activities, and not all breakdowns in CRM necessarily lead to an accident. For 
example, developing a Shared Team-interaction Model is one of the activities necessary to 
build a team that safely carries out the mission. However, a crew with a poorly developed 
Shared Team-interaction Model, may also manage to safely accomplish a mission. But, 
given a contingency situation, there is a good chance that a crew with a well-developed 
Shared Team-interaction Model will perform better than a crew with a poorly developed 
Shared Model. 
Many crew coordination activities are not directly observable. In most cases, they 
have to be inferred from other directly observable activities. Accident reports, however, do 
not provide adequate information about these subtle, non-observable processes. They 
focus on providing information about recorded verbal communications and behavior has to 
be inferred only on the basis of those communications. For example, it is difficult enough 
to infer if a crew has a well developed Shared Team-interaction Model. It becomes almost 
impossible to do so, given the limited information, if any, about team-building activities 
provided in an accident report. An accident report only provides CVR recordings of verbal 
communication. Yet, group processes, such as sharing of norms and the establishment of 
an authority dynamic, are communicated subtly, and in many cases, non-verbally. In other 
words, an accident report is not the best source of information to be using to authenticate or 
demonstrate the utility of a model of crew performance that has been developed with an 
emphasis on CRM related activities. A far better source would undeniably have been direct 
observation, either from the jumpseat or in a simulator. However, because of the 
difficulties involves in obtaining access to better sources of information, such as video 
taped recordings of LOFT training scenarios, I used accident reports as the primary source 
of information. 
The crew performance model was used to analyze one good, and one bad example 
of CRM. "Bad CRM" implied that a breakdown in crew coordination resulted in a 139 
breakdown in performance, which resulted in the accident. The demonstrations in both 
cases proceeded along different lines. In the case of the bad CRM example, a "bottom-up" 
approach was used to demonstrate the model. Bottom-up means that the analysis began at 
a lower-level (more easily observable) activity, and proceeded upwards to higher level 
activities. In this case, the accident report specifically mentioned the mis-prioritization of 
tasks to be a contributing factor to the accident. The function Prioritize Tasks thus served 
as an easy "starting-point" to begin the demonstration of the process. 
In the case of the good CRM example, there was no breakdown in crew 
coordination. In fact, the performance was considered to be exemplary. In this accident, 
the crew was faced with known contingency situation. Given a situation of good 
performance, the analysis proceeded in a "top-down" manner. Top-down means that the 
analysis started at the highest level of activities, and proceeded to lower levels of 
decomposition. The feasibility of using both approaches to analyze crew performance may 
be a testimony to the strength of the model. 
7.5 Model Utility and Validity 
Referring to an SADT/IDEFO model, Williamson (1991) writes, "...model utility is 
comprised of two factors: model validity and model quality" (p. 3). Model quality is 
concerned with level of detail, expressiveness, and syntactic and semantic compliance. Of 
the two, "...model validity takes precedence over model quality..." because "...an invalid 
model is useless, regardless of its quality" (p. 3). The focus of this discussion will 
therefore be model utility and validity. 
By definition, model utility and model validity are inextricably linked with each 
other. Merriam-Webster's (1993) defines valid as, "well grounded or justifiable: being at 
once relevant and meaningful...logically correct...appropriate to the end in view" (p. 
1304). This meaning is reflected in Marca and McGowan's (1988) definition of an SADT 
model as, "M is a model of a system S if M can be used to answer questions about S..." 
(p. 8). With reference to purpose or utility, Weinberg (1975) was earlier cited to have 
stated that "The main role of models is not so much to explain and to predict - though 
ultimately these are the main functions of science - as to polarize thinking and to pose sharp 
questions" (p. 43). The utility and validity of the IDEFO crew performance model is 
discussed on the basis of these meanings. 
The primary purpose of the crew performance model is to describe crew 
performance with an emphasis on crew coordination or CRM related activities. The IDEFO 140 
model is a subset of SADT, a logical, structured analysis and design technique. The 
model was developed on the basis of knowledge acquired from multiple sources of 
research literature (limitations of this have been discussed in the preceding sections). 
Further, as stated previously, the model was intended to answer questions pertaining to 
what limits or constrains the execution of activities and thus provide a framework for better 
understanding crew performance. As was demonstrated in the application of the model to 
the accidents, the model does assist in posing questions and seeking answers to the limits 
of crew performance. By doing so, I believe that the model serves its purpose and 
therefore fulfills the criteria of model utility, thereby laying the basis for its validity. 
Creswell (1994) in discussing verification steps for results of qualitative research 
notes that there is "...no single stance or consensus on addressing the traditional topics 
such as validity and reliability in qualitative studies" (p. 157). Further, Creswell cites 
several methods for determining the issue of "...internal validity, the accuracy of the 
information and whether it matches reality..." (p. 158) based on Merriam (1988). These 
include discussing "...plans to triangulate, or find convergence among sources of 
information...", and discussing "...plans to receive feedback from informants..." (p. 158). 
Earlier, it was acknowledged that the failure to have acquired knowledge from the 
operational community (i.e., airlines) may have resulted in limitations to the applicability or 
usefulness of the model. However, the review of the research literature did comprise the 
consideration of a multitude of information sources. It is thus claimed that the resulting 
model which represents an integration of different views represents a convergence among 
these different sources of information. 
Previously, the SADT Author/Reader cycle was mentioned. The cycle is so 
designed as to ensure the checking of model validity at all stages of the development 
process. During the course of the crew performance model, every attempt was made to 
adhere to this cycle, albeit the author and the reader (Kenneth Funk, personal 
communication, 1992-1994) were both individuals as against a team of analysts and a team 
of readers. 
Despite the case being made that the SADT methodology as well as the actual 
modeling process followed tends to ensure the validity of the model, it could always be 
argued that the model is merely the analyst's representation of the system, which is but a 
perspective of reality. Because each individual's perception of reality differs, each 
person's representation of reality will also be different. Determining the accuracy or 
legitimacy of a model thus translates into asking, "how can one be certain that the model 
developed is an accurate representation of reality?" This is not an easy question to answer, 
and can easily lead to a philosophical argument about the very purpose or futility of 141 
modeling a system. The matter is particularly difficult when dealing with qualitative 
representations of a system such as the crew performance model developed. In the case of 
quantitative models, it may be possible to simulate the model on a computer and contrast 
the results of the simulation with actual observations of the system. If the results agree, the 
model is considered valid. It is possible to attempt to validate a qualitative model by way of 
simulations too, but this would involve the development of another model of the model, so 
as to be possible to simulate on a computer. Because of the scope of this research, I did 
not pursue the validation of the crew performance model by any such technique(s). 
Another way of determining the accuracy or legitimacy of the model is, as noted 
above, through feedback from key informants. Since a model is essentially an individual's 
view of reality, the question of accuracy boils down to one of determining if that view of 
reality is shared among others in a population. Evidently, this is a debatable method and 
has obvious drawbacks. Firstly, it is important to ensure that the reviewers belong to the 
end-user population from whose viewpoint the model was developed. Secondly, 
individuals vary in their perception of reality; consequently, their representations of the 
world may not be similar. Despite these inherent drawbacks, the accuracy of the crew 
performance model was validated by having it reviewed by an expert, Kathy Mosier, 
Senior Research. Scientist at NASA-Ames Research Center. In evaluating the model from 
the perspective of an aviation researcher, Mosier concludes that, "...it seems to reflect all of 
the facets of excellent crew performance in a logical, coherent form..." (K. Mosier, 
personal communication, August 3, 1994). The model was also sent to Beth Lyall of 
America West Airlines for evaluation. In evaluating the model from an operational 
perspective, Lyall comments, "I don't have any problems with the model as it is presented. 
I think the real test of its viability is going to be its utility in assessing situations for an 
evaluation of CRM effectiveness" (B. Lyall, personal communication, August 10, 1994). 
By providing a useful and coherent framework for understanding performance, I 
believe that the Crew Performance model developed is a significant step towards better 
understanding crew coordination. Hopefully, this model can be refined and in some way 
be more useful towards establishing measures of performance, leading to the establishment 
of CRM standards. This concludes the discussions. In Chapter 8, a summary of the 
research is provided, conclusions are drawn, and recommendations for further research are 
made. 142 
8. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
8.1 Summary 
When the airline industry realized that most errors made by airline crews could be 
traced to breakdowns in communication and coordination, a concept called Crew Resource 
Management soon evolved. CRM implies a paradigm shift from a focus on the individual 
pilot to the crew as a team that flies the airplane. CRM has been conceptually accepted by 
most of the airline industry, although the issue of evaluation remains unsolved. An 
evaluation of performance implies a means to measure it. Before CRM training can be 
made mandatory, it becomes necessary to arrive at objective criteria by which crew 
coordination behavior can be measured. Once objective performance measures are arrived 
at, standards of performance can be established. 
Presently, one of the primary objectives of the airline industry is to come up with 
objective measures of crew performance, particularly the crew coordination aspects of 
performance. This research was based on the premise that objective criteria of measuring 
crew coordination aspects of crew performance cannot be reached unless there exists a clear 
understanding of the issues surrounding crew coordination. Crew coordination is one 
aspect of crew performance. This research proceeded with the conviction that a good 
understanding of crew coordination or CRM could only be achieved through a good 
understanding of crew performance. In other words, it is infeasible to think of determining 
performance measures to evaluate CRM related behavior without thoroughly understanding 
the broad context of performance in which CRM is observed. 
The primary goal of this research was to provide a better understanding of crew 
coordination or CRM by providing a framework to better understand crew performance. It 
was believed that the application of systems engineering to crew performance would result 
in its better understanding. 
Chapter 4 discussed the theory underlying crew performance. Concepts underlying 
crew performance such as (a) mental models, (b) situation awareness, (c) individual 
factors, and (d) groups and teams were analyzed in detail. A broad perspective was 
ensured by drawing upon various sources of research literature. 
In Chapter 5, key concepts of systems engineering were discussed. This chapter 
also included an overview of the SADTADEFO methodology adopted for the systematic 
analysis of crew performance. The result of this analysis was the formal IDEFO model of 
crew performance. Essentially, this model is a framework which is the result of a 143 
functional analysis of crew performance. The development of the model resulted in a 
concrete definition of the issues surrounding the concept of CRM. 
The IDEFO model is the result of an analysis of normative crew performance. To 
the extent that the model adequately describes the process of crew performance, it has 
served its purpose. The application of the model to analyze two accidents, examples of 
good and bad CRM, served to further demonstrate the utility of the model in serving as a 
descriptor of crew processes. This was discussed in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 7 discussed the strengths and weaknesses of various aspects of the 
research. 
8.2 Conclusions 
A conclusion of this research is that it is possible to systematically analyze crew 
performance through the application of systems engineering. Through such an application, 
valuable insight into the process of crew coordination is gained. The model of crew 
performance developed bears testimony to this conclusion. The research concludes that 
although the application of systems theory to the domain of crew performance may pose 
some conceptual problems, it is possible to overcome these through the refinement of the 
methodology as well as through further research aimed at better understanding the cognitive 
and interpersonal aspects of human behavior. 
8.3 Recommendations 
Previously, in the discussion on Model Utility and Validity, some of the limitations 
of the model were discussed. Although the model is a descriptor of crew processes, and 
grounded in contemporary theory of aviation psychology, the model as it exists may be 
limited in its applicability to the operational domain. Although this is understandable, given 
the aviation researcher's viewpoint, a recommendation would be that the model be refined 
so as to be directly useful as an instructional system tool. The most obvious way of 
ensuring this would be to incorporate an operational viewpoint along with the current 
researcher's viewpoint. Further, it was acknowledged that the limited applicability may be 
a result of the limited perspective adopted at the knowledge acquisition stage. A 
recommendation would thus be to ensure knowledge acquisition from the operational 
community as well. To ensure this, a desirable pre-requisite would be the establishment of 
appropriate contacts in the aviation community. 144 
With regard to model validation, it was noted that there have been attempts made to 
validate qualitative models by modifying them so as to be able to simulate them on a 
computer. Mosier informs me that such an approach is currently underway at NASA-
Ames. It would indeed be prudent to explore this avenue in the future. 
With regard to the SADT/IDEFO methodology, it was noted that IDEFO lacks 
formalization on certain important issues. This was partially responsible for some of the 
conceptual problems encountered. Further research into forma1i7ntion of SADT concepts 
would be an obvious recommendation. Given the possibility that the IDEFO modeling 
lacks rigor required for the modeling of complex human behavior, it was acknowledged 
that perhaps its not the best methodology to have adopted for such modeling. A 
recommendation would be the exploration of other systems methodologies that would 
enable a rigorous, systematic treatment of the issues involved in crew coordination. 
Almost all of the concepts studied in Chapter 4 remain poorly defined. Clearly, 
there is a need for more research into those concepts. However, if the industry aims to 
develop objective measures of performance, it should focus more on developing theories of 
human performance which can be empirically verified. The research community has to 
gear its efforts to go beyond the development of theoretical measures of performance to 
more practical, operational measures. 145 
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APPENDIX I
 
Eastern Airlines Transcript (NTSB-AAR-73-14) 
Flight:  Eastern Airlines flight 401 
Lockheed L-1011 (3-engined Tristar) 
From:  JFK to Miami International Airport, Florida. 
Date:  December 29, 1972 
Crash:  Crashed at 2342 hrs (11.42pm) in the Everglades. 
Pax:  94/163 passengers and 5/13 crewmembers fatally injured. 
Complete transcript (Appendix D) 
CAM- Cockpit Area Microphone voice or sound source 
RDO- Radio transmission from 
1- Captain 
2- F/O 
3- S/O 
4- Observer seat occupant 
MIA AAPR - Miami approach control 
MIA TWR - Miami control tower 
************************************************************************ 
2332:19	  MIA APP 
Eastern Four-oh-one, left heading one zero three from the marker cleared to 
*** nine left approach, tower one one eight point three, good morning. 
2332:26	  RDO-1 
One one eight point three, eastern four oh one, so long. 
2332:35	  CAM 
Sound of warning horn (sound similar to 180-knot gear warning horn 
approximately one second duration.) 
2332:39	  RDO-1 
Miami Tower Eastern four oh one just turned on final 
2332:45	  MIA TWR 
Who else called ? 
2332:48	  CAM-1 
Go ahead and throw'em out 156 
2332:52  RDO-1 
Miami Tower, do you read eastern four oh one ? Just turned on fmal. 
2332:56	  MIA TWR 
Eastern four oh one heavy, continue approach to one nine left. 
2333:00	  RDO-1 
Continue approach, roger 
2333:00.5	  CAM-3  Continuous ignition 
CAM-3  **smoke 
CAM-1  Coming on 
CAM-3  Brake system 
CAM-1  Okay 
CAM-3  Radar 
CAM-1  Up off 
CAM  Sound of click 
CAM-3  Hydraulic panels checked 
CAM-2  Thirty-five thirty three 
CAM-1  (immediatetly after 'thirty-three') Bert, is that 
handle in? 
CAM  ****
 
CAM-3  Engine crossfields are open
 
2333:22	  CAM-?  Gear down 
CAM-?  *** 
CAM-1  I gotta. 
CAM-2  No nose gear. 
2333:25	  CAM-1  I gotta raise it back up 
2333:26	  CAM  Sound of flap position warning horn begins
**** it. CAM-1 
2333:47	  CAM-1  Now I'm gonna try it down one more time. 
CAM-2  All right 
2333:58.5	  CAM  Sound of altitude alert horn. 
2333:59.5	  CAM  Sound of flap position warning horn ceases. 
CAM-2  (Right) gear. 
CAM-2  Well, want to tell'em we'll take it around and 
circle around and around ? 
2334:05	  RDO-1 
Well, ah, tower this is eastern, ah, four zero one, it looks like we're gonna 
have to circle, we don't have a light on our nose gear yet. 
2334:14	  MIA IWR 
Eastern four oh one heavy, roger, pull up, climb straight ahead to two 
thousand. Go back to approach control, one twenty eight six. 157 
2334:10  CAM-2  Twenty-two degrees 
CAM-2  Twenty-two degrees, gear up 
CAM-1  Put power on it first Bert thata boy. 
CAM-1  Leave the *** gear down til we found out 
what we got. 
CAM-2  All right. 
CAM-3  You want me to test the lights or not? 
CAM-1  Yeah. 
CAM-?  **** Seat back 
CAM-1  Check it. 
CAM-2  Uh Bob, it might be the light, could you jiggle tha, the light? 
CAM-2  (or CAM-3) It's gotta, gotta come out a little bit and then 
snap in. 
CAM-2  I'll put'em on 
2334:21	  RDO-1  Okay doing up two thousand, one twenty eight six 
2334:58	  CAM-2  We're up two thousand... 
CAM-2  You want me to fly it Bob ? 
CAM-1  What frequency did he want us on Bert ? 
CAM-2  One twenty eight six 
CAM-1  I'll talk to 'em. 
CAM-3  Its right above that, ah, red one, is it not? 
CAM-1  Yeah, oh, I can't get it from here 
CAM-3  I can't make it pull out either 
CAM-1  We got pressure? 
CAM-3  Yes sir, all systems 
CAM-1  *** 
2335:09	  RDO-1 
All right, ah approach control, eastern four zero one , we're right above the 
airport here and climbing to two thousand feet, in fact, we've just reached 
two thousand feet and we've got to get a green light on our nose gear. 
2335:20	  MIA APPR 
Eastern four oh one, roger, turn left heading three six zero. Maintain two 
thousand, vectors to nine left fmal. 
2335:28	  RDO-1  Left three six zero 
************************************************************************ 
2336:04  CAM-1  Put the **** on autopilot here. 
CAM-2  All right 
CAM-1  See if you can get that light out 
CAM-2  All right 
CAM-1  Now push the switches just a *** forward. 
CAM-?  *** 
CAM-1  You gotta turn it one quarter turn to the left 
2336:27	  MIA APPR 
Eastern four oh one, turn left heading three zero zero. 
RDO-1	  Okay. 
2336:37	  RDO-1  Three zero zero eastern four oh one. 158 
2337 : 08  CAM-1 
CAM-1 
CAM-2 
CAM-3 
CAM-2 
CAM-1 
CAM-? 
CAM-1 
CAM-? 
CAM-1 
CAM-2 
CAM-2 
CAM-3 
CAM-2 
CAM-3 
Hey hey get down there and see if that *** 
nose wheel's down. 
You better do that. 
You got a handkerchief or something so I can get a little 
better grip on this. anything I can do with. 
Then pull down and turn to your right. Now turn to your 
left one time. 
It hangs out and sticks. 
*** get down there and see if that, if that thing... 
Try my way 
What ? 
Try my way 
Okay 
This won't come out Bob 
If I had a pair of pliers, I could cushion it with that kleenex. 
I can give you pliers but if you force it, you'll break it, just 
believe me. 
Yeah, I'll cushion it with the kleenex. 
Oh we can give you pliers. 
2337:48  MIA APPR 
Eastern, uh, four oh one, turn left heading two seven zero. 
2337:53  RDO-1  Left two seven zero, roger. [selection of the 
new heading would have required action by the first Qfficerl 
2338:34  CAM 
To *** with it, to *** with this, go down and see if its lined up with that 
red line. Thats all we care. *** around with that *** twenty cent piece of 
light equipment we got on this ***. 
CAM  Ha ha ha 
2338:46  RD0-1 
Eastern four oh one'll go ah, out west just a little bit further if we can here 
and ah see if we can get this light to come on here. 
2338:54  MIA APPR 
All right, uh we got you headed westbound there now eastern four oh one. 
2338:56  RD0-1 
All right. 
CAM-1 
CAM-2 
CAM-2 
How much fuel we got on this *** 
Fifty two five 
It won't come out no way. 
2339:37  CAM-1 
CAM-2 
CAM-1 
CAM-2 
CAM-1 
CAM-? 
CAM-4 
Did you ever take it out of there? 
Huh? 
Have you ever took it out of there? 
Hadn't till now. 
Put it in the wrong way huh? 
In there looks square to me 
Can't you get the hole lined up? 159 
CAM-?  *  *  * 
CAM-?  Whatever's wrong? 
CAM-1  What is that? 
2340:05	  CAM-2  I think thats over the training field 
CAM-?  West heading. You wanna go left or * ? 
CAM-2  Naw thats right, we're about to cross Krome 
Avenue right now. 
2340:17	  CAM  Sound of click 
CAM-2  I don't know what the * holding that *** in. 
CAM-2  Always something, we coulda make schedule. 
2340:38  CAM	  Sound of altitude alert (0.5 second C-chord to indicate 
deviation of +1- 25o feet) 
CAM-1	  We can tell if that *** is down by looking down at our 
indices 
CAM-1  I'm sure its down, there's no way it couldn't help but be. 
CAM-2  I'm sure it is. 
CAM-1  It free falls down. 
CAM-2  The tests didn't show that the lights worked anyway. 
CAM-1  Thats right. 
CAM-2  Its a faulty light. 
2341:05	  CAM-2  Boy, this *** just wont come out. 
CAM-1  All right, leave it there. 
CAM-3  I don't see it down there. 
CAM-1  Huh? 
CAM-3  I don't see it. 
CAM-1  You cant see that indi**** for the nose wheel ah, there's a 
place in there you can look and see if they're lined up. 
CAM-3  I know, a little like a telescope. 
CAM-1  Yeah. 
CAM-3  Well... 
CAM-1  It's not lined up? 
CAM-3  I can't see it.  It's pitch dark and I throw the little light I get, 
ah, nothing. 
2341:31	  CAM-4  Wheel light's on? 
CAM-3  Pardon? 
CAM-4  Wheel light's on? 
CAM-3  Yeah wheel lights always on if the gears down. 
CAM-1  Now try it. 
2341:40	  MIA APPR 
Eastern ah four oh one how are things comin' along out there (begins 
simultaneously with "now" above) 
2341:44	  RDO-1  Okay, we'd like to turn around and come, come back in. 
CAM-1  Clear on left. 
CAM-2  Okay 160 
2341:47  MIA APPR
 
Eastern four oh one turn left heading one eight zero.
 
2341:50  CAM-1  Huh? 
2341:51  RDO-1  One eighty 
2342:05  CAM-2  We did something to the altitude 
2342:06  CAM-1  What? 
2342:07  CAM-2  We're still at two thousand right? 
2342:09  CAM-1  Hey, what's happening here? 
CAM  (Sound of click simultaneous with "what's") 
2342:10  CAM  Sound of six beeps similar to radio altimeter (increasing in 
rate) 
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Viewpoint:  Aviation human factors researcher 
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A/C State 
Refers to the current, actual state of the aircraft. Examples include aircraft 
position, altitude, airspeed, Nei level, and position of flaps. 
Accomplish Commercial Transport Mission 
This fbnction transforms the inputs Situation Information, Crewmembcrs, 
and Aircraft (A/C) state into the outputs Team, and Altered A/C State 
subject to the constraints Environmental Factors, Organizational Factors, 
and Individual Factors with the help of the mechanism Hardware/Aircraft 
Systems. 
Altered A/C State 
(See Aircraft State) 
Accomplishing the commercial transport mission results in transforming the 
values of the parameters (e.g., altitude, fuel level, flap position), resulting in 
the output Altered Aircraft State. 
Crewmenibers 
Refers to cockpit crewmembers which typically ranges from two to three: 
Captain, First Officer (F/O), and Second Officer (3/0). 
Environmental Factors 
These include temperaturd; humidity, pressure, wind direction and velocity, 
visibility, runway conditions, and other meteorological conditions liable to 
affect or constrain the accomplishment of the overall missio. 
Hardware/Aircraft systems 
The entire aircraft, incorporating all its subsystems, aid the accomplishment 
of the commercial transport mission and are hence "mechanisms". 
Individual Factors 
These refer to those characteristics of the individual crewmembers that 
potentially constrain the fimetion of accomplishing the mission. These 
include individual knowledge, skills, attitudes, fatigue, and personality. 
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Organizational Factors 
These refer to all factors related to the organization that can affect crew 
performance such as company policies, rules and regulations, and special 
requirements. These are also considered to include the designated flight 
plan for a particular mission, local operating procedures, federal  on 
regulations (FAR's), and advisory circular. 
Situation Information 
This refers to all information about the situation that is potentially available 
for the accomplishment of the mission. Includes information about the 
environment, information about the aircraft, and information about 
crcwmembers. 
Team 
Team is the output of the function Accomplish Commercial Transport 
Mission. It represents the transformation of (individual) Crewmembers into 
an emergent whole (see definition at node CRM/A0 level). 
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A/C State 
Refers to the current, actual state of the aircraft. Examples include aircraft 
position, altitude, airspeed, Nei level, and position of flaps. 
Accomplish Technical Tasks 
This llinction transforms A/C state into Altered A/C state and Altered 
Shared Situation Models subject to Shared Situation Models, Environmental 
Factors, and Individual Situation Models with the help of the mechanisms 
Crew and Hardware/Aircraft Systems. 
Altered A/C State 
(Sec Aircraft State) 
Accomplishing the commercial transport mission results in transforming the 
values of the parameters (e.g., altitude, Mel level, flap position), resulting in 
the output Altered Aircraft State. 
Altered SharedSituation Models 
(Also see Shared Situation Models) 
Communication between Crewmembers as a part of the fbnction 
Accomplish Technical Tasks, results in an altering of the (existing) Shared 
Situation Models, resulting in Altered Shared Situation Models. 
Build and Maintain Team 
This function transforms the input Crewmembers into the output Team, 
subject to the constraint Individual Situation Models and Altered Shared 
Situation Models. 
Crew 
Crew represents the members of the group working together as a team. It is 
shown as a tunneled mechanism merely to highlight the significance of the 
fact that ultimately, it is the Crew that performs the lbnction Accomplish 
Technical Tasks. 
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Crewmembers 
Refers to cockpit crewmembers which typically ranges from two to three: 
Captain, First Officer (F/O), and Second Officer (S/0), 
Environmental Factors 
These include temperature, humidity, pressure, wind direction and velocity, 
visibility, runway conditions, and other meteorological conditions liable to 
affect or constrain the accomplishment of the overall missio. 
I lardware/Aircraft systems 
The aircraft, along with all its subsystems, aid the accomplishment of the 
commercial transport mission and are hence "mechanisms". 
individual Factors 
These refer to those characteristics of the individual crewmembers that 
potentially constrain the D.mction of accomplishing the mission. These 
include individual knowledge, skills, attitudes, fatigue, and personality. 
Individual Situation Models 
Individual Situation Models are 'Mental Models' of the Situation held by 
individual crewmembers. 
Wilson & Rutherford (1989) define a mental model as "...a representation 
formed by a user of a system and/or task, based on previous experiences as 
well as current observation, which provides most (if not all) of their 
subsequent system understanding and consequently dictates the level of task 
performance" (p. 619). 
Maintain Individual Situation Awareness 
This function transforms Situation Information into Individual Situation 
Models subject to the constraints individual Factors, Organizational Factors, 
and Environmental Factors with the help of the mechanism 
Hardware/Aircraft Systems. 
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Organizational Factors 
Those refer to all factors related to the organization that can affect crew 
performance such as company policies, rules and regulations, and special 
requirements. These are also considered to include the designated flight 
plan for a particular mission, local operating procedures, federal aviation 
regulations (FAR's), and advisory circulars. 
Shared Situation Models 
(Also see Individual Situation Models) 
These are formed through specialized communication; a result of explicit sharing of 
information or patterns of communication. They refer to the current or existing 
shared situation models, versus the Altered Shared Situation Models. 
Situation Information 
This refers to all information about the situation that is potentially available for the 
accomplishment of the mission. Includes information about the environment, 
information about the aircraft, and information about crewmembers. 
Team 
Team is the output of the ftmciion Build and Maintain Team. It represents the 
transformation of (individual)Crewmembers into an emergent whole. 
It is defined by this (Unction as: A crew with shared task model, a shared 
team-interaction model, and a shared team-personal model. 
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Acquire Information 
This ffinction transforms the Situation Information into Acquired Situation 
Information subject to Situation Assessment, Environmental Factors, 
Organizational Factors, and Individual Factors with the mechanism 
Hardware/Aircraft Systems. 
Acquired Situation Information 
(Also see Situation Information) 
Acquired Situation Information refers to the information that is "actually" 
available to the pilot as compared to the information "potentially" available 
(situation information). 
Only when the agent becomes "aware" of the information does "potentially" 
available information become "actually" available to the pilot (Smith & 
Hancock, 1993). 
Assess Situation 
This function transforms Acquired Situation Information into Situation 
Assessment subject to Individual Situation Models. 
Environmental Factors 
These include temperature, humidity, pressure, wind direction and velocity, 
visibility, runway conditions, and other meteorological conditions liable to 
affect or constrain the accomplishment of the overall missio. 
Existing Mental Models 
(see Individual Situation Models) 
Hardware/Aircraft systems 
The aircraft, along with all its subsystems, aid the accomplishment of the 
commercial transport mission and are hence "mechanisms". 
X	 WORKINO  READER  DATE  CONTEXT: 
DRAFT 
RECOMMENDED 
PUBLICATION 
Individual Factors 
These refer to those characteristics of the individual crewmembers that 
potentially constrain the function of accomplishing the mission. These 
include individual knowledge, skills, attitudes, fatigue, and personality. 
Individual Situation Models
 
Individual Situation Models are 'Mental Models' of the Situation held by
 
individual crewmembers.
 
Wilson & Rutherford (1989) define a mental model as "...a representation 
formed by a user of a system and/or task, based on previous experiences as 
well as current observation, which provides most (if not all) of their 
subsequent system understanding and consequently dictates the level of task 
performance" (p. 619). 
Organizational Factors 
These refer to all factors related to the organization that can affect crew 
performance such as company policies, rules and regulations, and special 
requirements. These are also considered to include the designated flight 
plan for a particular mission, local operating procedures, federal aviation 
regulations (FAR's), and advisory circulars. 
Situation Assessment
 
This is the output of the ftmction Assess Situation. Situation Assessment
 
leads to Situation Awareness.
 
Saner and Woods (1991) define Situation Assessment as "a complex 
process of perception and pattern matching greatly limited by 
working-memory and attentional capacity" (p.50). 
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Situation Information 
This refers to all information about the situation that Is potentially available 
for the accomplishment of the mission. Includes information about the 
environment, information about the aircraft, and Information about 
crewmcmbcrs. 
Update Situation Models 
This function transforms the (tunneled) input Existing Situation Models into 
Individual Situation Models subject to Situation Assessment and Individual Factors. 
The process of updating a situation model is an unconscious ono, which is interpreted 
as being the internallyAlre,cted fleet of situation awareness (Smith & Hancock, 
1993). 
NODE:  TITLE:  NUMBER: 
CRMIA 1 02  Maintain Individual Situation Awareness 
Figure 12. (Continued) USED AT:  AUTHOR: 
PROJECT: 
NOTES: 
Cherag Stikine 
Crew Performance 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
DATE: 06/13/94 
REV:  11/12/94 
X  WORKING 
DRAFT 
RECOMMENDED 
PUBLICATION 
READER  DATE  CONTEXT: 
Individual Situation Models 
It  -
Acquired 
Situation Information 
Perceive 
Current 
Situation 
Situation Assessment
C 
Perceived (state) 
Information 
Integrate/Comprehend 
Situation 
2 
Integrated 
Situation Information 
Project 
Situation 
3  Projected 
Situation Information 
NODE:  TITLE:  NUMBER: 
CRmiA I I  Assess Situation 
Figure 12. (Continued) USED AT:  AUTHOR:  Chorag Sukhia  DATE: 06/13/94 
PROJECT:  Crew Performance  REV:  11/12/94 
NOTES:  1  2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 10 
Acquired Si nation Information 
(Also see Situation Information) 
Acquired Situation Information refers to the information that is "actually" 
available to the pilot as compared to the information "potentially" available 
(situation information). 
Only when the agent becomes "aware" of the information does "potentially" 
available information become "actually" available to the pilot (Smith & 
Hancock, 1993). 
Individual Situation Models 
Individual Situation Models am 'Mental Models' of the Situation held by 
individual crewmembers. 
Wilson & Rutherford (1989) define a mental model as "...a representation 
formed by a user of a system and/or task, based on previous experiences as 
well as current observation, which provides most (if not all) of their 
subsequent system understanding and consequently dictates the level of task 
performance" (p. 619). 
Integrate/Comprehend Situation 
This function transforms Perceived Information into Integrated Situation  , 
Information subject to Individual Situation Models. 
Integrated Situation Information 
This represents the current understanding of the situation. After information 
is perceived, it is integrated with pre-existing information and the individual 
actually makes sense of the information or comprehends it. 
Perceive Current Situation 
This function transforms Acquired Situation Information into Perceived 
Information subject to Individual Situation Models. 
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Perceived (state) Information 
Acquired Situation Information is perceived by the individual and results in 
Perceived (state) Information. This is part of the process of assessing the 
situation. 
Project Situation 
This function transforms Integrated Situation Information into Projected 
Situation Information constrained by Individual Situation Models. 
Projected Situation Information 
No Glossary Text Provided. 
Situation Assessment 
This is the output of the function Assess Situation. Situation Assessment 
leads to Situation Awareness. 
Sailer and Woods (1991) define Situation Assessment as "a complex 
process of perception and pattern matching greatly limited by 
working - memory and attentional capacity" (p.50). 
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Acquire Information from Aircraft 
This fbnction transforms Situation Information into Acquired Information 
from Aircraft subject to Environmental Factors, Situation Assessment, 
Individual Factors, and Organizational Factors with the help of the 
mechanism Hardware/Aircraft Subsystems. 
Acquire Information from Crew Members 
This fbnction transforms Situation Information into Acquired Information 
from Crewmembers subject to Situation Assessment, Individual Factors, and 
Organizational Factors. 
Acquire Information from Environment 
This function transforms Situation Information into Acquired Information 
from Environment subject to Situation Assessment, Individual Factors, and 
Environmental Factors with the mechanism I lardware/Aircraft Subsystems. 
Acquired information from aircraft 
This includes information about the environment that may be acquired 
through the aircraft, information about the aircraft and its subsystems, as 
well as information received by the crew over the radio (ATC 
communications) or via data link. 
Acquired information from crew-members 
This refers to information about the situation acquired from crew-members, 
simply by observing the other's actions. 
Acquired information from environment 
Acquired Information from environment refers broadly to three three types 
of information that is actively acquired a) spatial or navigational information 
(i.e., knowledge of the aircraft's location in space), b) information about 
traffic, and o) information about weather conditions. 
Acquired Situation Information 
(Also sec Situation Information) 
Acquired Situation Information refers to the information that is "actually" 
available to the pilot as compared to the information "potentially" available 
(situation information). 
Only when the agent becomes "aware" of the information does "potentially" 
available information become "actually" available to the pilot (Smith & 
Hancock, 1993). 
Environmental Factors 
These include temperature, humidity, pressure, wind direction and velocity, 
visibility, runway conditions, and other meteorological conditions liable to 
affect or constrain the accomplishment of the overall missio. 
Hardware/Aircraft systems 
The aircraft, along with all its subsystems, aid the accomplishment of the 
commercial transport mission and are hence "mechanisms". 
Individual Factors 
These refer to those characteristics of the individual crewmembers that 
potentially constrain the function of accomplishing the mission. These 
include individual knowledge, skills, attitudes, fatigue, and personality. 
Organizational Factors 
These refer to all factors related to the organization that can affect crew 
performance such as company policies, rules and regulations, and special 
requirements. These are also considered to include the designated flight 
plan for a particular mission, local operating procedures, federal aviation 
regulations (FAR's), and advisory circulars. 
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Situation Assessment 
This is the output of the Emotion Assess Situation. Situation Assessment 
leads to Situation Awareness. 
Satter and Woods (1991) define Situation Assessment as "a complex 
process of perception and pattern matching greatly limited by 
workinmemory and anentional capacity" (p.50). 
Situation Information 
This refers to all information about the situation that is potentially available for the 
accomplishment of the mission. Includes information about the enviromnent, 
information about the aircraft, and information about crewmcmbers. 
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Altered Shared Task Model 
(see Crew with Shared Task Model, and Altered Shared Situation Models) 
Altered Shared Task Model is a component of Altered Shared Situation 
Models. 
Altered Shared Team-interaction Model 
(see Crew with Shared Team-interaction Model, Altered Shared Situation 
Models) Altered Shared Team-interaction Model is a component of Altered 
Shared Situation Models. 
Altered Shared Team-personal Model 
(see Crew with Shared Team-personal Model, Altered Shared Situation 
Models) Altered Shared Team-personal Model is a component of Altered 
Shared Situation Models. 
Altered SharedSituation Models 
(Also see Shared Situation Models) 
Communication between Crewmembers as a part of the flinction 
Accomplish Technical Tasks, results in an altering of the (existing) Shared 
Situation Models, resulting in Altered Shared Situation Models. 
Crew with shared Task Model 
A Shared Task Model includes knowledge about each other's tasks, task 
procedures, and task strategies. Iris formed by a sharing of individual team 
members' Task Models. 
A Shared Task Model creates expectations about how events are likely to 
unfold and the team's likely response to task demands. 
Crew with shared Team-'nteraction model 
A Shared Team-interaction Model is developed through the sharing of 
individual team-interaction models. A Shared Team-interaction Model 
would include knowledge about how each team member must interact with 
each other. A Shared Team-interaction Model implies a shared 
understanding and acceptance of group roles, norms, and the authority 
gradient. 
Crew with shared Team-Personal Model 
A Shared Tenm-personal Model includes information regarding the 
knowledge, skills, abilities, preferences, and tendencies of particular 
teammates so that behavior can be tailored accordingly. 
While the Shared Team-interaction Model is representative of group 
properties, the Shared Team-personal Model is representative of an 
understanding of the characteristics of the specific individuals involved. 
Crewmembers 
Refers to cockpit crewmembers which typically ranges from two to three: 
Captain, First Officer (WO), and Second Officer (S/0). 
Develop Shared Task Model 
This flinction transforms Crewmembers into a Crew with Shared Task 
Model and is constrained by Individual Situation Models and Altered Shared 
Task Model. 
Develop Shared Team-Interaction Model 
This Amction transforms Crewmembers into a Crew with Shared 
Team-interaction Model and is constrained by Individual Situation Models 
and the Altered Shared Team-interaction Model. 
The development of a Shared Team-Interaction Model typically takes place 
through implicit, non-verbal communication. 
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Develop She ed Team-Personal Model 
This limetion transforms Crewmembers into a Crow with Shared 
Team-personal Model and is constrained by Individual Situation Models and 
Altered Shared Team-personal Model. 
Development of the Shared Team-personal Model takes place as a result of 
mowinembers sharing information about themselves, their knowledge, skills, 
and past experiences as related to flying, as well as their likes, dislikes and 
tendencies. 
Individual Situation Models 
Individual Situation Modals are 'Mental Models' of the Situation held by individual 
crowinombers. 
Wilson & Rutherford (1989) define a mental model as "...a representation formed by 
user of a system end/or task, based on previous experiences as well as current 
observation, which provides most (if not all) of their subsequent system 
understanding and consequently dictates the level of task performance" (p. 619). 
Team 
Team is the output of the Ihnetion Build and Maintain Team. It represents the 
transformation of (individual) Crewmembers into an emergent whole. 
It is defined by this function as: A crew with shared task model, a shared 
team - interaction model, and a shared team-personal modal. 
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Altered Shared Task Model 
(see Crew with Shared Task Model, and Altered Shared Situation Models) 
Altered Shared Task Model is a component of Altered Shared Situation 
Models. 
Assess Shared Task Model 
This function has no inputs, but generates the output, Task Model 
Assessments (analogous to Situation Assessments) subject to Individual 
Situation Models and Altered Shared Task Model [Also see Altered Shared 
Task Model]. 
Clarify Goals 
This function transforms Crewmembers into a Crew (group) with Clarified 
Goals subject to Task-Model Assessments and Individual Situation Models. 
Contingency situations 
Preparing for contingency situations is part of what leads to the development 
of a Shared Task Model. [Also sec Task-Model Assessments] 
Crew with clarified goals 
Output of the function Clarify Goals [Also see Mission Goals] 
Crew with discussed contingencies/plans 
Output of the function Discuss Contingencies/Plans [Also see Contingency 
Situations]. 
Crew with discussed task strategies 
Output of the function Discuss Task Strategies 
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Crew with shared Task Model 
A Shared Task Model includes knowledge about each other's tasks, task 
procedures, and task strategies. It is formed by a sharing of individual team 
members' Task Models. 
A Shared Task Model creates expectations about how events are likely to 
unfold and the team's likely response to task demands. 
Crewmembers 
Refers to cockpit crewmembers which typically ranges from two to three: 
Captain, First Officer (F/O), and Second Officer (S/O). 
Discuss Contingencies/Plans 
This function transforms the Crew with Clarified Goals into a Crew with 
Discussed Contingencies/Plans subject to Contingency Situations (a 
component of Task-Model Assessments] and Individual Situation Models. 
Discuss Task Strategies 
This function transforms Crew with Discussed Contingencies/Plans into 
Crew with Discussed Task Strategies subject to Task-Model Assessments 
and Individual Situation Models. 
Individual Situation Models
 
Individual Situation Models are 'Mental Models' of the Situation held by
 
individual crewmembcrs.
 
Wilson & Rutherford (1989) define a mental model as "...a representation 
formed by a user of a system and/or task, based on previous experiences as 
well as current observation, which provides most (if not all) of their 
subsequent system understanding and consequently dictates the level of task 
performance" (p. 619). 
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Mission Goals 
Clear definition of Mission Goals is essential for the development of a 
Shared Task Model. Mission Goals thus act as a control to the Motion 
Clarify Goals. 
TaskModel Assessments 
Assessing the shared mental model is a fintdamental pad of developing a shared 
mental model. The assessment of the Shared Task Model results in TaskModel 
Assessments which drives the development or refinement of the Shared Task Model. 
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Altered Shared Team-interaction Model 
(see Crew with Shared Team-interaction Model, Altered Shared Situation 
Models) Altered Shared Team-interaction Model is a component of Altered 
Shared Situation Models. 
Assess Shared Team-Interaction Model 
This function has no inputs, but generates the output, Team-Interaction 
Model Assessments (analogous to Situation Assessments) subject to 
Individual Situation Models and Altered Shared Team-Interaction Model 
[Also see Altered Shared Team-Interaction Model]. 
Authority Dynamic 
Ginnett (1993) defines authority as "...the right to use power and influence". 
Because of differences in authority of crewmembers, there exists a 
'trans-cockpit authority gradient' (TAG) (Edwards, 1975) or an 'authority 
dynamic' (Ginnett, 1993) which needs to be optimized. 
Boundaries 
Boundaries are emergent, socio-psychological properties of groups. 
According to Vander Zanden (1977), "Group boundaries act not as physical 
barriers, but as discontinuities in the flow of interactions". Generally 
speaking, the more permeable the boundary, the greater are the possibilities 
of interaction. 
Crew with appropriate authority dynamic 
Output of the function Establish Appropriate Authority Dynamic (Also see 
Authority Dynamic]. 
Crew with expanded boundaries 
Output of the function Expand Group Boundaries [Also sec Boundaries] 
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Crew with refined norms 
Output of the function Refine Group Norms (Also see Norms]. 
Crew with shared Team-interaction model 
A Shared Team-interaction Model is developed through the sharing of 
individual team-interaction models. A Shared Team-interaction Model 
would include knowledge about how each team member must interact with 
each other. A Shared Team-interaction Model implies a shared 
understanding and acceptance of group roles, norms, and the authority 
gradient. 
Crewmembers 
Refers to cockpit crewmembers which typically ranges from two to three: 
Captain, First Officer (F/O), and Second Officer (S/O). 
Establish Appropriate Authority Dynamic 
This function transforms Crew with Refined Norms into a Crew with 
Appropriate Authority Dynamic subject to Team-Interaction Model 
Assessments and Individual Situation Models. 
Expand Group Boundaries 
This function transforms Crewmembers into a Crew with Expanded 
Boundaries subject to Team-Interaction Model Assessments and Individual 
Situation Models. 
Individual Situation Models 
Individual Situation Models are 'Mental Models' of the Situation held by 
individual crewmembers. 
Wilson & Rutherford (1989) define a mental model as "...a representation 
formed by a user of a system and/or task, based on previous experiences as 
well as current observation, which provides most (if not all) of their 
subsequent system understanding and consequently dictates the level of task 
performance" (p. 619). 
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Norma 
Oinnett (1993) defines Norms as the informal rules that groups adopt to 
regulate group members' behavior". Norms are an emergent property of 
groups that regulate many aspects of group life and provide expectations 
about behavior. 
Refine Group Norms 
TM. &fiction transforms time input Crew with Expanded Group Boundaries into a 
Crew with Refined Norms subject to Team-Interaction Model Assessments and 
Individual Situation Models. 
Team-Interaction Model Assessments 
Assessing the shared mental model is a faildaillealai part of developing a shared 
mental model. The assessment of the Shared Team-Interaction Model results 
inTeam-Interaction Model Assessments which drives the development or refinement 
of the Shared Team-Interaction Model. 
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Altered Shared Team-personal Model 
(see Crew with Shared Team-personal Model, Altered Shared Situation 
Models) Altered Shared Team-personal Model is a component of Altered 
Shared Situation Models. 
Assess Shared Team-personal Model 
This function has no inputs, but generates the output, Team-personal Model 
Assessments (analogous to Situation Assessments) subject to individual 
Situation Models and Altered Shared Team-personal Model Also see 
Altered Shared Tenm-personal Modell. 
Crew aware of team-members' attitudes/tendencies 
Output of the function Express Selves. 
Crew aware of team-members' knowledge/skills 
Output of the function Share Knowledge about Selves. 
Crew with shared Team-Personal Model 
A Shared Team-personal Model includes information regarding the 
knowledge, skills, abilities, preferences, and tendencies of particular 
teammates so that behavior can be tailored accordingly. 
While the Shared Team-interaction Model is representative of group 
properties, the Shared Team-personal Model is representative of an 
understanding of the characteristics of the specific individuals involved. 
Crewmembers 
Refers to cockpit crewmembers which typically ranges from two to three: 
Captain, First Officer O), and Second Officer (S/O). 
Express Selves 
This function transforms Crewmembers into a Crew aware of 
team-members' Attitudes/Tendencies subject to Team-personal Model 
Assessments and Individual Situation Models. 
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Individual Situation Models 
Individual Situation Models are 'Mental Models' of the Situation held by 
individual crewmembers. 
Wilson & Rutherford (1989) define a mental model as "...a representation 
formed by a user of n system and/or task, based on previous experiences as 
well as current observation, which provides most (if not all) of their 
subsequent system understanding and consequently dictates the level of task 
performance" (p. 619). 
Not aware of each other's knowledge/skills 
No Olossaty Text Provided. 
Not aware of other's attitudes /tendencies
 
No Glossary Text Provided.
 
Share Knowledge about Selves
 
This function transforms Crewmembers into a Crew (group) aware of
 
team-members' Knowledge/Skills subject to Team-personal Model
 
Assessments and Individual Situation Models.
 
'learn- personal model assessments
 
Assessing the shared mental model is a Rindamental part of developing a
 
shared mental model. The assessment of the Shared Team-personal Model
 
results inTeam-personal Model Assessments which drives the development
 
or refinement of the Shared Tcam-personal Model.
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A/C State 
Refers to the current, actual state of the aircraft. Examples include aircraft 
position, altitude, airspeed, fuel level, and position of flaps. 
Allocate Resources 
This function has no inputs, but generates the output, Allocated Resources 
subject to Prioritized Tasks, Shared Situation Models, and Individual 
Situation Models. 
Once tasks are prioritized, resources for the execution can be allocated. 
Allocated resources
 
Output of the function Allocate Resources.
 
Altered A/C State 
(Sec Aircraft State) 
Accomplishing the commercial transport mission results in transforming the 
values of the parameters (e.g., altitude, fuel level, flap position), resulting in 
the output Altered Aircraft State. 
Altered SharedSituation Model
 
No Glossary Text Provided.
 
Altered SharedSituation Models 
(Also see Shared Situation Models) 
Communication between Crewmembers as a part of the function 
Accomplish Technical Tasks, results in an altering of the (existing) Shared 
Situation Models, resulting in Altered Shared Situation Models. 
Environmental Factors 
These include temperature, humidity, pressure, wind direction and velocity, 
visibility, runway conditions, and other meteorological conditions liable to 
affect or constrain the accomplishment of the overall missio. 
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Execute Tasks 
This function transforms Aircraft (A/C) State into Altered Aircraft State and 
Task Agenda subject to Shared Situation Models, Individual Situation 
Models, and Altered Shared Situation Models with the help of 
Hardware/Aircraft Systems. 
Hardware/Aircraft systems 
The aircraft, along with all its subsystems, aid the accomplishment of the 
commercial transport mission and are hence "mechanisms". 
Individual Situation Models 
Individual Situation Models are 'Mental Models' of the Situation held by 
individual crewmembers. 
Wilson & Rutherford (1989) define a mental model as "...a representation 
formed by a user of a system and/or task, based on previous experiences as 
well as current observation, which provides most (if not all) of their 
subsequent system understanding and consequently dictates the level of task 
performance" (p. 619). 
Prioritize Tasks
 
This function transforms Task Agenda into Prioritized Tasks subject to
 
Individual Situation Models and Shared Situation Models.
 
The Task Agenda is prioritized depending upon the situation. Each task can 
be assigned a weight in terms of importance and urgency, thereby allowing 
for the agenda to be ordered or prioritized. 
Prioritized tasks 
Output of the function Prioritize Tasks. 
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Share Task Information 
This fu lotion transforms Prioritized Tasks and Allocated Resources into an 
Altered Shared Situation Model subject to Shared Situation Models 
[existing] and Individual Situation Models. 
Shared Situation Models 
(Also ace Individual Situation Models) 
These are formed through specialized communication; a result of explicit sharing of 
information or patterns of communication. They refer to the current or existing 
shared situation models, versus the Altered Shared Situation Models. 
Task Agenda 
Punk (1991) defines an agenda as "...a hierarchy of tasks to be completed during a 
mission". Further, the process of creating an agenda of tasks "...involves the selection 
and specification of a suitable task to achieve each goal and the definition of an event 
to initiate that task". 
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